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Russian conflict management has been understood as being ‘quintessentially Russian’. This 
project demystifies this reading. By exploring Russia’s approach from the early 1990s to the end 
of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012, the thesis answers the following question: to what extent 
has Russia’s behaviour corresponded with security governance as understood in the literature and 
practiced by other European actors? The argument is that Russia has selectively engaged in the 
norms and processes of security governance developed in European conflict management. This is 
driven by a policy that combines the defence of its sovereignty/national interests with a declared 
commitment to collective decision-making and policy implementation in European security 
governance. The framework of security governance is employed to examine Russia’s behaviour 
across its regional space and the wider European neighbourhood, and to ‘map’ its behaviour in 
accordance with the evolution of European security governance. Using multi-case study analysis 
and relying on documentary evidence, supported by semi-structured interviews, the thesis makes 
the following contributions. First, it offers a thorough empirical inspection of Russian conflict 
management. Second, it contributes to the debate on Russia and European security governance, 
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Since the end of the Cold War a system of security governance has emerged in Europe. Security 
governance has not only reflected the deep-seated transitions of globalisation but has also been a 
policy response to the structural changes in the European milieu because of the acceleration of 
this phenomenon. These policies of security governance are based on the ‘development of 
comprehensive and horizontally integrated responses to complex emergencies’ (Shroeder, 2011: 
2). European security governance is therefore about the cultivation of inventive and logical 
problem-solving responses to an increasingly fragmented external environment, and the 
aggregation of policy-relevant goals to a wider systemic purpose of ‘providing coherent direction 
to society’ (Peters, 1998: 2) through the internal socialisation of state actors to the norms and 
value preferences of this system. Both purposes have largely been organised around the widening 
and deepening of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
since the 1990s, including interaction with a variegated set of public and private actors above and 
below the state. As one scholar writes ‘The membership and relations among these systems of 
rule are complex and overlapping, so are their functions and obligations’ (Krahmann, 2001: 1). 
The EU and NATO form the institutional core of European security governance and have largely 
determined the accepted norms and practices of the security agenda in the European milieu. 
     While this system has matured since the early 1990s and experienced several phases of 
consolidation and integration, Russia has ‘endured a confusing, often tortuous process of self-
definition’, and has been ‘forced to answer a series of fundamental questions about its relationship 
to the post-Cold War world system and its own identity as a state’ (Mankoff, 2009: 11). A core 
set of questions therefore remain relevant about how Russia has managed the impacts of an 
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increasingly fragmented external environment and what this has meant for its political and 
security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. These questions 
have focused on Russia’s view of developments in European security policy, whether Russia 
identifies itself with these transitions and Russia’s policies in Europe (see Lynch, 2005: 7). These 
enquiries have led one scholar to conclude that Russia and its European neighbours have exercised 
two competing strategies of managing globalisation, with one aimed at protecting internal order 
and the other aimed at projecting internal order. In this sense, ‘Russia is reinforcing domestic 
stateness as a conservative means of minimizing the ambiguity of global challenges’, while the 
central actors of the system of European security governance ‘project [their] domestic structures 
as a means to manage ambiguity along [their] periphery’ (Medvedev, 2008: 225). 
     This thesis explores how this debate has unfolded in the policy area of conflict management. 
In the context of the evolving norms and processes of European security governance, the thesis 
analyses continuity and change in Russian doctrine, policy, and practice from the final days of 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s tenure in power in mid-1991 to the end of President Medvedev’s presidency 
in mid-2012. The thesis examines to what extent Russian behaviour corresponded with 
developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in 
practice by other European actors. Mechanisms and norms of European conflict management have 
rapidly evolved since the early 1990s in accordance with the consolidation of Europe’s system of 
security governance as ‘[p]eace operations reflect the nature of the evolution of security needs 
and of the ways to tackle security issues’ (Tardy, 2004: 3). The increasingly complex nature of 
intra-state conflict in terms of actors and interests involved (see Kaldor, 2007) has amplified the 
difficulties in establishing and maintaining peace for an intervening force. Former United Nations 
Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan’s words on the tenth anniversary of the massacre in 
Srebrenica that ‘[it] will haunt our history forever’, are a poignant reminder of how important and 
fragile the stakes are for the intervening forces when engaging in conflict management.1 
Highlighting these challenges, Ramesh Thakur (2006: 41) crucially points out that ‘[a] significant 
                                                          
1 Kofi Annan, ‘May we all learn and act on the lessons of Srebrenica’, 11 July 2005, accessed 12 January 
2015, available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm9993.doc.htm.  
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cost of the cascade of generations of peacekeeping within a highly compressed timeframe is that 
most of the major operations today have little real precedent to go by; each has to make and learn 
from its own mistakes’.  
     In Russia’s case, much of the literature has criticised Moscow’s behaviour and argued that it 
has diverged from the norms and practices of security governance developed in European conflict 
management since the early 1990s. It has been understood that Russia’s approach to conflict 
management has exhibited a large degree of political and economic interference, and the use of 
disproportionate force to enforce the peace (Baev, 1993, 1996, 1998; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 
1995; Jonson and Archer, 1996; Lynch, 1999; Sagramoso, 2003; Mackinlay, 2003; Allison, 
2013). However, this thesis contends that there has been a degree of ambivalence in Russia’s 
approach, particularly in its regional space, where existing analysis has failed to consider the 
complexities of Russia’s response. Russia has been a central actor in the European experience of 
conflict management and has been extensively engaged in this policy area. Russia’s experience 
has included operations along its regional periphery and in the wider European space, where it 
was a key player in the management of the conflicts in the Balkans throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. This thesis aims to unpack and to demystify existing understandings. It offers a rigorous 
interrogation of these experiences to identify trends in Russia’s approach. This introductory 
chapter will first discuss the thesis’ rationale and contributions, and then provide a summary of 
the argument. The methodology will then be briefly introduced, followed by an outline of the 
thesis’ structure.  
 
Rationale and contributions of the thesis 
As noted above, this thesis examines Russian conflict management from the early 1990s to the 
end of President Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012. The thesis analyses continuity and change 
in Russian doctrine, policy, and practice in accordance with the policies of security governance 





• To what extent has Russian doctrine, policy, and practice corresponded with 
developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied 
in practice by other European actors?  
 
By focusing on Russia’s approach towards complex intra-state conflict, this research question is 
concerned about how Russia has attempted to manage an increasingly fragmented external 
environment because of the processes of globalisation, and how this has contributed towards the 
shaping of Russia’s political and security relationship with the system of European security 
governance. This research makes an empirical contribution by providing a rigorous examination 
of Russian security behaviour in the policy area of conflict management.  
     The central problem with much of the existing literature is that it focuses on Russia’s behaviour 
in its immediate regional space during a narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s, and 
has failed to provide an empirically informed and rounded analysis of Russia’s approach towards 
conflict management in the European security milieu. This severely limits our understanding 
about how Russia has responded to complex intra-state conflicts and how this has informed 
Moscow’s wider relationship with the system of European security governance. The first part of 
this limitation relates to the unbalanced nature of existing analysis. Emphasis is predominantly 
placed on Russia’s regional behaviour while largely overlooking Russia’s experience across the 
wider European neighbourhood. Russia’s engagement in the Balkans is a vital episode in its 
experience of conflict management and the minimal attention it has received is a significant 
drawback in the analytical integrity of existing scholarship. This would be acceptable if this 
scholarship made clear that inferences put forward about Russian behaviour were confined to 
Moscow’s regional experience of conflict management – although many assumptions are largely 
problematic. However, whether explicit or implied, inaccurate assumptions are made about 
Russia’s regional approach which have then been used to provide generalisations about Russia’s 
wider behaviour (Baev, 1998; Mackinlay, 2003; Allison, 2013). Existing frameworks and analysis 
have been imprecise, interpreting Russian conflict management as an entirely coercive and 
instrumental exercise in the pursuit of narrow self-interests (Jonson and Archer, 1996; Macfarlane 
and Schnabel, 1996; Lynch, 1999). While a degree of ambiguity in Russia’s response has been 
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recognised, much of this existing scholarship has difficulties providing a nuanced understanding 
of Russian behaviour. Yet, as will be argued below, Russia’s experience of conflict management 
in the European context is linked to a considerably more expansive set of principles and practices 
than currently understood.  
     Even where attempts have been made to engage in an analysis of Russia’s wider European 
experience, these have largely been limited in empirical scope (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; 
Bowker, 1998) or have only emphasised the impact on Russia’s wider foreign and security policy 
thinking of Moscow’s policy in the Balkans (Headley, 2009; Thorun, 2008). While this has 
offered an informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not 
systematically linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of 
developments in Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict 
management. Others have marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed to its lack of empirical 
utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict management, claiming 
that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience (Antonenko, 1999, 2007). In 
this sense, the existing scholarship’s treatment of Russia’s behaviour is analytically insufficient.  
     The second limitation in the existing literature relates to the timeframe which research has 
focused upon. Existing studies which specifically focus on Russian conflict management tend to 
focus on the narrow window of Russia’s experience between the early to mid-1990s. Scholarship 
was either written during this period or after the conflicts had taken place and conscious decisions 
were made by commentators to maintain their focus on this period. This has misrepresented 
Russian conflict management because there has been very little consideration of potential change 
and development in Russia’s behaviour. This limitation has been further intensified as existing 
analysis has not taken into consideration changes in norms and practices in European approaches 
(alongside the UN) when analysing Russian behaviour. The literature has interpreted a narrow set 
of static principles and practices, and has not considered their intentional evolution to manage the 
impact of an increasingly fragmented external environment. An informative understanding of 
Russia’s behaviour can only be achieved if its responses to these transitions in security policy are 
taken into consideration. The failure to appreciate the fluidity of norms and practices in this policy 
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area restricts our understanding of their impact on Russia’s broader political and security 
relationship with the central actors of European security governance. Likewise, this static 
understanding of European approaches fails to recognise that the developments in doctrine, 
policy, and practice relate to a wider systemic purpose of European security governance through 
the internal socialisation of state actors to the normative preferences of this system. 
     This empirical contribution is combined with the thesis’ conceptual significance concerning 
the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline of 
IR and Security Studies. In the former, the project complements existing research agendas in the 
security governance literature. These research agendas focus on: (1) the link between the 
Westphalian to the Post-Westphalian state, particularly in Europe and its periphery, to the growing 
relevance and practice of security governance; (2) and to the assessment of the evolution of 
security governance across time and space in the European regional context (see Sperling, 2014: 
3-4). In this regard, the project applies these existing research agendas in the security governance 
literature to the context of Russia’s political and security relationship with the central actors of 
European security governance. However, it offers a contribution beyond existing works which 
have only offered a general level of analysis regarding Russia and issues of European security 
governance (Webber, 2000, 2007; Mirwaldt and Ivanov, 2007; Averre, 2010). Yet, while 
providing an insight into the wider contours of Russian foreign and security policy, none of these 
studies offer an extensive treatment of Russia’s behaviour regarding policies of security 
governance. They do not ‘bore’ into the specifics of an issue area to provide a close conceptual 
and empirical inspection of Russia’s understanding of and approach towards security governance. 
This thesis will therefore assess Russian foreign and security policy in accordance with the 
Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security governance literature, and through this 
will examine Russia’s interaction with the evolution of security governance across time and space 
in the specific policy area of conflict management.  
     In the latter, this thesis contributes towards the wider disciplines of IR and Security Studies by 
using security governance to frame the research project. It is acknowledged that security 
governance still possesses a degree of obscurity and has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance 
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and attention as its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and 
regimes, and global governance. Despite this, there is ample empirical evidence that security 
governance is a ‘real-world’ phenomenon that requires further explanation and provides a fruitful 
research programme and framework for understanding contemporary security issues and ‘the 
evolutionary trajectory of […] international [and] [regional] systems’ (Sperling, 2014: 3). The 
project will therefore add to and demonstrate the conceptual and empirical purchase of the 
security governance literature to the disciplines of IR and Security Studies. As will be shown in 
the following chapters which outline the project’s framework, security governance sits alongside, 
complements, and in some cases, goes beyond established ways of thinking about decision-
making and policy implementation in the realm of security. 
     Thinking about Russian conflict management in terms of security governance can, therefore, 
correct existing limitations in the current literature in terms of how Russian behaviour has been 
approached and in relation to the conclusions formulated. These limitations are addressed in this 
thesis using security governance as a framework for analysis – both in terms of concept (how 
security policy is to be studied) and practice (how security policy is implemented) (Sperling and 
Webber, 2014: 128) – which will provide a conceptually and empirically richer understanding of 
Russia’s engagement in conflict management than has been provided by existing studies. Security 
governance will help to organise the analysis and bridge the study of Russia’s behaviour in its 
immediate regional space and in the wider European neighbourhood. By offering a useable 
framework, security governance will identify and elucidate the behaviour of Russia across these 
two spaces in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of Russian doctrine, policy, 
and practice. As security governance captures the fluidity of the European security environment 
and the complexity of the response towards the management of insecurity (Webber, 2014: 28) 
based on a quantitative shift from ‘government’ (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to 
‘governance’ (fragmentation of policymaking and political authority) (Krahmann, 2003: 6), this 
assists in the identification of changes in Russian security behaviour vis-à-vis the norms and 
practices developed in European conflict management. This framework allows for the possibility 
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that Russian behaviour also engages in policies of security governance, moving beyond narrow 
interpretations that render Moscow’s response as narrow and self-interested acts.  
 
Summary of argument 
To manage globalisation and its attendant consequences European actors have engaged in security 
governance. Security policy in European conflict management has moved from a Westphalian to 
a Post-Westphalian character, which follows from the assumption that security policy has shifted 
from government (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to governance (fragmentation of 
policymaking and political authority). It is understood that the operations Westphalian actors 
participate in are typically predicated on limited engagement, strict adherence to sovereignty, and 
remain wedded to the notions of consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These 
operations have limited goals of establishing peace through a cease fire. At the other extreme, 
operations Post-Westphalian actors participate in tend to be based on extensive engagement, 
employ a flexible view of sovereignty, and understand the necessity of the recalibration of the 
notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. These operations include a range of methods, 
have wider goals, and possess not only short but long term aims in establishing peace through 
ceasefires and the promotion (or even enforcement) of democratic polities in the host country 
(MacQueen, 2006; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 36). These divergent approaches, based 
on actor preference, demonstrate the differences in strategies adopted to manage the impact of 
globalisation.  
     In the case of Russia, existing scholarly analysis has either situated its behaviour at the 
Westphalian end of the continuum, arguing that its operations have shown limited methods and 
narrow aims (Baev, 1996), or in its more critical form has argued that its approach is located on 
an entirely different spectrum. This body of literature has contended that Russia’s behaviour 
remains part and parcel of ‘conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1998: 216) devoid of humanitarian and 
peacebuilding processes and aims (Baev, 1997: 116), and employed to serve narrow Russian 
interests (Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995). One scholar sums up this thinking, claiming that 
Russia’s experience has been ‘quintessentially Russian’ and ‘narrowly unilateral in its underlying 
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motives and distinct in its practical manifestation from any regional responses to other 
emergencies’ (Mackinlay, 2003: 203). This relates to a broader argument in the literature that in 
the policy area of conflict management Russia has chosen to adopt a different approach from its 
European neighbours when managing the impact of globalisation.  
     This thesis argues that Russia’s behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state conflict has 
shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in European 
conflict management. Between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach was far more expansive and 
complex than currently recognised. Its behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some 
of the core aspects of the policies of security governance which have evolved in European conflict 
management. Crucially, Russian approaches have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian 
and Post-Westphalian security behaviour, with a selective subscription to the methods and aims 
across the spectrum of operations developed in the European experience. This has been driven by 
a policy that combines the staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests with a 
declared commitment to collective European approaches in the policy area of conflict 
management. In this regard, while Russia’s wider policy agenda has shown a tendency to gravitate 
towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact of globalisation, its behaviour 
in conflict management has shown a more nuanced picture of its security preferences. Indeed, as 
noted by Charlotte Wagnsson and Arita Holmberg (2014: 326) both ‘Westphalian and post-
Westphalian states often share an interest in effective security governance efforts that can turn 
failed states into functioning units’.   
     Russia’s engagement in the wider European neighbourhood, principally in the Balkans, 
demonstrated a largely consistent approach located in the middle ground between Westphalian 
and Post-Westphalian security provision. In Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow 
exercised a purposeful approach that was rooted in and shaped by the developments of the 
conflict. This was not, as is typically argued, informed by a superficial thinking to protect its 
‘Serbian brothers’ or merely an extension of predetermined political and strategic aims contesting 
the emerging NATO-centred system of European security governance. Many of the lessons and 
thinking that Russia cultivated in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina were applied in its 
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experience in Kosovo. Although for Russian policymakers Kosovo represented a watershed in 
Moscow’s relations with the central actors of European security governance, Russia’s doctrine 
and practice demonstrated a deepening divergence with certain aspects of European conflict 
management whilst maintaining a consistent degree of convergence on others.  
     In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has been ambiguous. Russia’s involvement in 
regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal 
understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The 
tension between its contribution towards European security governance and the safeguarding of 
its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s approach towards the former Soviet 
space. Russia found it increasingly difficult – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – to accept 
the widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. Therefore, its 
approach revealed a manipulation of methods attributed to both forms of security provision noted 
above and demonstrated a continuity mirroring its behaviour towards conflict in the wider 
European neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which interprets Russia’s regional 
experience as a highly calibrated response that only serves Russia’s narrow self-interests.  
 
Research methods 
This thesis has employed an interpretivist approach to interrogate Russian conflict management 
in the wider European context. This has been used to capture the ‘meaning, process, and context’ 
(Divine, 2002: 197-199) of Russian conflict management. This starting point of the research 
design explicitly acknowledges that contrary to quantitative-based research, ‘All empirical 
material’ is subject to ‘different interpretations’ (Divine, 2002: 206). In this regard, it is 
understood that ‘the onus is on the qualitative researcher to make the interpretation of the data as 
explicit as possible in the development of an argument using systematically gathered data’ 
(Divine, 2002: 207). This interpretivist response to research recognises that although research 
‘cannot provide the mirror reflection of the social world that positivists strive for’, it can, however, 
provide access to the meanings people, and in this case state-actors, ‘attribute to their experiences 
and social worlds’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126). It is this interpretivist response which has 
11 
 
driven the selection of three methods. In relation to ‘data’ gathering, this project has employed 
the principal method of documentary analysis supported by semi-structured interviews. The 
material gathered has been organised using the method of comparative case study analysis. For a 
lengthier discussion on the methods used in this research see Appendix A.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has begun by introducing the framework for analysis. Chapter 1 will provide an 
overview of the debate on Russia and European security governance, introducing the framework 
of security governance in Europe and provide the policy context of Russian conflict management 
by examining Russia’s political and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s 
system of security governance. It will first discuss the evolution of European security provision 
in the context of changes in the European milieu and go onto discuss the analytical merits of this 
framework. The chapter will then provide a broad outline of Russian foreign and security policy 
thinking across the Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev presidencies between 1991 and 2012. It will 
support an existing argument in the literature that Russia remains ‘included out’ of Europe’s 
system of security governance due to its selective subscription to the norms and processes of this 
system.  
     Chapter 2 will introduce the policy area of conflict management. It will begin with a discussion 
on definition, methods, and operations before moving on to an exploration of the evolutionary 
trends in European conflict management. It will be demonstrated that European approaches 
towards the management of intra-state violence have largely reflected the transitions in norms and 
policy practice of European security governance since the early 1990s. It will be shown that, in 
their adaptation to security changes in Europe, the operations state-actors have engaged in have 
become increasingly complex in terms of methods, scope, and aims moving from Westphalian to 
Post-Westphalian security provision. The chapter then introduces Russia’s approach towards 
conflict management across the regional and wider European spaces. Here, Russia’s behaviour is 
examined in accordance with the evolutionary trends of European conflict management. It is 
argued that Russia’s experience of conflict management has been more expansive and complex 
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than currently understood and has demonstrated a selective subscription to European methods of 
conflict management as based on the norms and processes captured by European security 
governance. During the period between 1991 and 2012 this selective engagement demonstrated 
both consistencies and inconsistencies across its regional space and the wider European 
neighbourhood. In relation to the latter, Russia’s participation in the management of conflict in 
the Balkans, whilst displaying divergences, reflected some of the core features of policies of 
security governance as developed in European conflict management. 
     The subsequent chapters analyse Russia’s behaviour in the framework of security governance 
through four case studies organised across its immediate regional space and the wider European 
neighbourhood. The first two deal with Russia’s participation in the management of conflict in 
the Balkans, with chapter 3 discussing Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and chapter 4 
examining international action in Kosovo. The following chapters interrogate Russia’s 
involvement in the intra-state conflicts along its regional periphery, with chapter 5 focusing on 
its approach to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and chapter 6 concentrating on the 
Moldova-Transnistria conflict. Interrogating Russia’s response towards these conflicts is 
necessary to provide a rich insight into its experience of conflict management in the European 
context. Finally, the thesis will offer general conclusions and provide some brief thoughts on the 





























This chapter will provide an overview of the debate on Russia and European security governance. 
It will begin by introducing the framework of European security governance in the context of 
changes in European security provision, before moving onto a discussion of Moscow’s political 
and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s system of security governance. It will 
provide a broad outline of Russian foreign and security policy thinking across the Yeltsin, Putin, 
and Medvedev presidencies between 1991 and 2012. Supporting existing academic commentary, 
the chapter will argue that Russia remains ‘included out’ of Europe’s system of security 
governance due to its selective subscription to the norms and processes of this system.  
 
1.2 The security governance turn 
This section will provide a broad discussion of the conceptual journey of European security, 
before introducing what has been understood in the literature as the security governance turn.2 
The section presents the key contributions of security governance in the conceptualisation and 
practice of security provision in post-Cold War Europe. This section is divided into three sub-
sections, with the first offering a brief overview of existing concepts and approaches of European 
                                                          
2 With a growing body of literature on security governance since the early to mid-2000s, Christou, Croft, 
Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli (2010) have considered this scholarship a ‘turn’ in the broader discipline of 
Security Studies.  
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security. The following two sub-sections then go on to discuss the security governance turn in 
relation to concept and practice as ‘security governance should be seen both as a concept, a 
scholarly means of analysis and understanding, and as a mechanism of policy, a practice deployed 
in pursuit of security within (and often across) specific geographic or policy domains’ (Webber, 
2014: 17).  
1.2.1 Existing approaches and concepts of European security 
European history has been summed up as ‘preparing for war, waging war, or recovering from 
war’ (Minogue, 2000: 52). Continental Europe has been one of the major regions where conflicts 
of an international character have been initiated and concluded. In the twentieth century alone, 
the failure of inter-state relations caused two of the most devastating conflicts in world history, 
which were followed by a period of Cold War. It is not surprising, therefore, that concepts such 
as the balance of power and the security dilemma based on realist theoretical roots have been used 
to explain the features of previous European security relations. In brief, it was generally 
understood that the accretion of material power in an anarchical international system where two 
superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – sought primacy via an arms race of vast 
proportions, maintained a perpetual state of insecurity because of the security dilemma 
(Morgenthau, 1993; Waltz, 1988, 2001; Mearsheimer, 2010). 
     However, although the East-West confrontation was a central aspect of relations in the region 
it did not completely define European foreign affairs during the Cold War. Security began to 
assume a new loose form of external arrangement based on the central Western European powers. 
Coined by Karl Deutsch in 1957, the security community in Western Europe signified a policy of 
institutional development. The establishment of collective defence under NATO in 1949 and the 
formation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, alongside the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the founding of the European Economic Community in 
1957/1958, and the formation of the European Atomic Energy Company (EAEC), facilitated this 
security community (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 1). The purpose of this security community 
was largely driven by rational economic and political interests. Yet, over time these states became 
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increasingly integrated and in this context, the Deutschian perspective of a (pluralistic) security 
community emerged on the academic scene. It has been understood when states become 
embedded in a particular form of social relations which are characterised as a community 
generating ‘stable expectations of peaceful change’ (see Adler and Barnett, 1998: 6).  
     Building upon Deutsch’s work, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998: 38) suggested that 
the development of a security community was facilitated by three interrelated factors: (1) 
precipitating conditions based on changes in technology, economics, and the new interpretation 
of social relations and threats; (2) factors conducive to mutual trust and the development of a 
collective identity, such as transactions, organisations, and social learning; (3) necessary 
conditions, based on mutual trust and collective identity. They also put forward the notion that 
security community can possess multiple layers of interaction, including: nascent, ascendant, and 
mature forms of a community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 6).3 The important point to consider is 
that the degree of expectations of peaceful change and, therefore, the recourse to use violence to 
solve disputes is assumed to diminish along this continuum from nascent to mature. European 
security evolved along this trajectory towards a more mature form of security community, 
conditioned by rational behaviour and through the consolidation of a common sense of identity 
premised based on collective norms and values.  
     The literature on security communities has provided an insight into how state-actors manage 
their relations peacefully. In the European context, the assumptions of the security community 
concept have been relevant in understanding the continuation of certain institutions following the 
end of the Cold War. Contrary to views rooted in the realist tradition (Mearsheimer, 1990), NATO 
remained a central European institution even after the demise of the Soviet Union. This was 
complemented by the formal emergence of the EU in 1993 after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The persistence of institutions after the Cold War demonstrated the analytical utility of 
                                                          
3 Nascent: this phase includes various diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges. Institutions and 
organizations are developed to extend the level of interaction and, thus, transparency. Ascendant: this 
phase includes the increase of interaction through deepening networks and institutions along functional 
and normative lines. Collective security is observed as a pure public good, mitigating the security 
dilemma. Mature: this phase includes actors which have developed a deeper collective identity which 
supports diverse and multiple functional arrangements in binding the various actors. 
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concepts, such as security community, that moved away from structural and material power-based 
explanations, towards an understanding alert to the importance of common identity and ideas. 
The security community literature suggests that Europe did not revert to competitive balancing 
behaviour because of a collective identity that had matured since the end of the Second World 
War (Krahmann, 2003: 8). However, while security community helps to explain the main aspects 
of the transformation of European security, it does not address how states have confronted ‘the 
increasing internal differentiation and fragmentation of the post-Cold War [European] security 
architecture’ (Krahmann, 2003: 8).  
     Security regimes, on the other hand, provide a more promising research agenda in analysing 
the complexity of post-Cold War Europe. Defined as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner, 
1982: 185; also see Jervis, 1982: 357), they offer an understanding of how actors (and non-state 
actors) converge and interact on given security issues. However, security regimes ‘tend unduly to 
simplify the increasing multiplicity of actors and organisations engaged in contemporary 
European security policy. (Krahmann, 2001: 2). Moreover, many of the new security 
arrangements in Europe which deal with increasing non-traditional security issues ‘are more fluid 
than security regimes […] (Krahmann, 2003: 9). As will be demonstrated below, security 
governance does include regimes, and for that matter institutions, but it encompasses more 
besides. Security governance, according to Webber (2014: 20), ‘is about how institutions [and 
regimes] (both formal and informal) interact and how this involves networks of actors that are not 
simply agents of the state’.  
 
1.2.2 Security Governance as Concept 
Security governance evolved alongside the approaches outlined above although it is considered 
to go beyond these conventional approaches in analysing security provision. To unpack security 
governance as concept, this section will examine the constitutive elements of ‘security’ and 
‘governance’, and highlight the conceptual utility of security governance. 
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Transitions in Security 
The current debate on governance has been influenced by the intellectual developments on 
security during the 1980s and 1990s (Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli 2010: 342).4 These 
debates on the re-definition of security have been concerned with enquires into what constitutes 
a ‘threat’ and what or whom is to be ‘secured’ (see Booth, 1991; Baldwin, 1997; Buzan, Waever 
& De Wilde, 1998; Wyn-Jones, 1999). This research agenda was steered by a dissatisfaction with 
how narrow readings of security at the time were shaping government policies in only traditional 
military terms. Referring to the increasing militarisation of US foreign policy under President 
Reagan, Richard H. Ullman (1983: 129) argued that  
[proceeding] from the assumption that defining national security merely (or even 
primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality. That false image 
is doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate 
on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it 
reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of 
international relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity.  
 
On this basis, Ullman (1983: 133) redefined security as ‘an action or sequence of events’ that 
either threatened ‘drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life 
for the inhabitants of a state’ or significantly threatened ‘to narrow the range of policy choices to 
the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) 
within the state’. Proceeding from this, there has been an accumulation of readings of security 
which have radically transformed the concept. For some, states continued to be the main victims 
of security risks. For others, it was society and human beings that were being endangered. Still 
further, the planet and environment were prioritised as the referent of security (Christou, Croft, 
Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli, 2010: 343). Therefore, security was still about ‘survival’ although the 
referent object – ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival’ (Buzan, Wilde, and Waever, 1998: 36) – was not necessarily definable 
(Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli, and Lucarelli 2010, 2010: 343). 
                                                          
4 The proliferation of scholarship and thinking on the re-defining of security during this period led one 




     This broadening of understanding has captured ‘real-life’ issues which can be seen as 
occurring across four dimensions (see Webber, 2014: 27). First, issue proliferation refers to the 
range of issues that have increased under the agenda of security. Since the end of the Cold War 
greater awareness of other non-traditional security issues and threats has occurred. The 
proliferation of issue areas beyond the state include but are not limited to: infectious disease, 
environmental degradation, criminalisation (drug trafficking, money laundering, human 
trafficking), terrorism (which includes the attempted acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)), the arms trade (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998; Williams, 2001; Fukuda-Parr, 2003), 
intra-state conflict, resource insecurity, and mass migration (Ullman, 1983), and cyber (Cavelty, 
2012). However, traditional understandings of security remain relevant in the post-Cold War era 
(Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 163) as ‘security issues remain heavily militarized’ (Webber, 
2014: 24). Incidents of war (inter- and intra-state) and the control of military instruments remain 
concerns of foreign policies (Webber, 2014: 24).  
     Another consideration is that many of these issues did not emerge after the end of the Cold 
War. The Cold War should be considered a ‘permeable’ watershed in terms of conceptualising 
security, but particularly regarding the identification of actual security change. Buzan and 
Waever’s (2003: 61-62) thesis of Cold War ‘overlay’ did not push non-traditional security threats 
to the periphery of the security agenda in large parts of the globe. Certain security issues such as 
resource scarcity have always been problems for ‘developing’ countries. Terrorism and 
energy/environmental insecurity, for instance, also held a place on the agenda of ‘developed’ 
countries (Webber, 2014: 24). While these qualifications are important, they do not detract from 
the central point that (in)security has ‘become associated with a much more fluid set of problems 
against which strictly military responses are of less and less utility’ (Webber, 2014: 24).  
    Second, actor proliferation refers to an increase in actors beyond the state which generate 
security threats and contribute towards solutions, and the degree to which their ‘authority rivals 
and encroaches upon that of the state’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 9). An important point to 
recognise is that the purpose of these actors can be both benign and malign (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 
2005: 9). In the former category, there is a variety of private actors able to supply security 
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independently of the state or act as subcontractors for it (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7). These 
can range from charities to private security companies, dealing with issues in humanitarian aid, 
human rights monitoring, peacebuilding, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), 
alongside military training and protection (Krahmann, 2003: 10). It is crucial to acknowledge, 
however, that these benign actors may also unintentionally contribute towards greater levels of 
insecurity. In the latter, non-state actors can be ‘the agents of threat’ and beyond the reach of 
diplomacy and coercion, traditionally understood (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7). These include 
transnational organised criminal elements and terrorist groups, which do not necessarily target 
the ‘state’ (appendages and mechanisms of government and infrastructure), but society and ‘the 
foundations of the social contract’ (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 7) via greater access to ‘tools 
once reserved for nation-states’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 7).  
     Third, spatial proliferation concerns the ‘reach’ of threats which transcend state boundaries 
and blur the divide between internal and external security. This is related to the fourth dimension 
of temporal proliferation, which refers to the complexity of issues as they accumulate over time, 
with their lessening susceptibility to solutions pointing to problems of management and 
resolution. Through the globalisation of trade, communication, and transport new incentives have 
been provided for non-state actors (other than institutions) to operate and, in the malign form, 
undermine societal and state security (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 10). Non-state actors which 
pose threats are therefore able to operate along channels dissimilar to the traditional threats posed 
to the territorial state (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 4). Described as ‘a complex, dynamic, and 
global web’, it offers an array of opportunities and capabilities to individuals and groups who 
intend on threatening the ‘preservation of […] well-being, freedom, [and] national culture’ 
(Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 163).  
     This is particularly the case regarding terrorism and organised crime, where in the former a 
‘terrorist may be trained in Libya, receive funds from a religious sect in the United States via a 
Caribbean bank, purchase weapons from a Russian crime organization, travel on a Canadian 
passport, and attack British tourists in Germany. Sever one of the links in this chain, and he or 
she will quickly find a replacement’ (Matthew and Shambaugh, 1998: 164). In the latter, 
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organised crime is able to operate ‘through fluid network structures rather than more-formal 
hierarchies’ (Williams, 2001: 62). Even the effects of natural and man-made disasters can 
contribute towards environmental degradation and cut across borders with the initiation of 
migration and famine, in addition to increased criminalisation and exploitation of the vulnerable 
(Ullman, 1983: 1). The spread of infectious disease has also become a central issue on the security 
agenda of states as it knows no boundary. While the ‘developed’ countries have managed to 
contain and prevent the spread of infectious diseases from infiltrating their societies, ‘developing’ 
countries still suffer from both epidemics and pandemics such as AIDS/HIV, malaria, 
tuberculosis, and Ebola.  
 
Governance and the State 
Alongside these intellectual developments in security, the concept of governance has ‘emerged 
from virtual obscurity to take a central place in contemporary debates in the social sciences’ 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 1). Governance is a broad term and the literature on it has been 
extraordinarily diffuse, with different academic communities using governance to understand 
issues across an array of fields, including but not limited to: International Relations (IR), Security 
Studies, Political Science, economics, development studies, and public administration (Bevir, 
2013: 1). One scholar highlights a central explanation for this: ‘Governance is not a new or faddish 
label, but usage has expanded in response to an increasingly complex policy environment’ 
(Webber, 2014: 19). While the identification of a precise definition of governance has received 
much scholarly attention, the understanding this thesis operationalises pertains to IR and Security 
Studies; both of which relate to the tradition of meaning and application of governance in Political 
Science more broadly.5 The assumption is that insights drawn from the literature on governance 
                                                          
5 The political science scholarship defines governance as: ‘Governance is ultimately concerned with the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not therefore different 
from those of government. It is rather a matter of a difference in processes…The essence of governance is 
its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of 
government’ (Stoker, 1998: 17); ‘governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ 
(Rhodes, 1996: 660). Similarly, the IR & Security Studies literature defines (security) governance as: 
‘governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and 
formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome 
defiance and attain compliance…It embraces governmental institutions but it also subsumes informal, 
non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, 
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in other areas of study should bear fruit when applied more specifically to the study of 
international security (Sperling and Webber, 2014: 127).  
     For the purposes of this thesis, the term security governance is therefore defined as 
 
the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, 
the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issues), formal 
and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully 
directed toward particular policy outcomes’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth, et al., 2004: 4). 
 
This definition is premised upon an assumption made in the literature that a governance 
perspective is the best way to analyse state decision-making, policy formulation, and 
implementation in an environment which has transitioned from government to governance. 
Governance in the realm of security is concerned with understanding the process of security 
policy. As Mark Webber and James Sperling (2014: 128) point out ‘the altered threat environment 
has called forth a particular type of response. Understanding that response is best done via the 
concept of ‘governance’, insofar as governance brings with it well-established ways of thinking 
about actors and policy’. Governance differs from government in that the latter suggests activities 
which are supported by formal authority, by coercion to ensure policy implementation, whereas 
the former refers to activities backed by shared goals derived from legal and formally prescribed 
responsibilities, and that do not necessarily rely on coercion to attain compliance (Rosenau, 1992: 
4; Smouts, 1998: 81-82; Webber, Croft, Howorth, et al., 2004: 5). Hierarchy has thus been 
replaced by heterarchy and horizontal forms of behaviour. 
     The assumed alterations of the state – which continues to be the central unit of enquiry in 
security governance – have been at the centre of this analysis. Because the utility of state capacity 
has diminished extensively in an increasingly complex domestic and international policy 
environment, the outsourcing of state competencies has been the necessary response, further 
weakening the state via a fragmentation of the state’s authority and a reduction in its policy 
                                                          
satisfy their needs, and fulfil their wants’ (Rosenau, 1992:4); ‘Governance denotes the structures and 
processes which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and 
interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central 
political authority’ (Krahmann, 2003: 11). 
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oversight (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 1; Krahmann, 2003: 6; Schroeder 2011: 31). Acknowledging 
the changes in the understanding of security discussed above, state behaviour can be better 
understood if conceptualised along a continuum from Westphalian to Post-Westphalian security 
provision. Certain scholars reject, however, Post-Westphalianism because violations of territorial 
integrity ‘have been an enduring characteristic of the international system before and after the 
peace of Westphalia’, and states have never been able ‘to regulate perfectly transborder flows’ 
(Krasner, 1995: 123). Yet, on closer inspection, these violations are distinct from the largely 
voluntary acceptance of governance and the loss of autonomy attending it. The point is not 
necessarily whether states have lost control of trans-border flows, but that the qualitatively 
different nature and volume of these flows have impacted a ‘government’s ability to govern’ 
(Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5).    
     Although organising analysis around the existence of two kinds of states with opposite 
preferences may ‘lack theoretical elegance’, the presence of states that deviate significantly from 
the Westphalian ideal-type ‘requires a conceptual explication’ (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5). 
Using a continuum provides for a flexible analysis which better conforms to the complexities of 
the ‘empirical world’; by relaxing the assumption of the homogeneity of the Westphalian ideal-
type, the continuum offers a useful tool to locate the characteristics of particular forms of state 
behaviour (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: 5). It is fruitful to consider the differences between 
Westphalian and Post-Westphalian states as shown in Figure 1.1 along four dimensions: (1) 
penetration; (2) critical threats; (3) sovereign control; (4) interest referent (Sperling, 2010: 4). It 
should be recognised that both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian characteristics represent ideal-
types, and that most states do not exhibit characteristics solely from one form or the other. While 
states may gravitate towards one pole, this does not preclude their adoption of features from the 
other as the proclivities of a state may change depending on the policy area and the political 
context – although, as will be demonstrated below, the majority of European states have largely 




     This continuum can be operationalised through the following dimensions of the broader 
framework of security governance, which elucidates state behaviour regarding a system (regional) 
and policy area level of analysis. These descriptive dimensions include: (1) pooling of sovereignty 
(collective interests and distribution of resources); (2) stakeholder interaction complexity 
(channels of cooperation); (3) purposefulness (decision-making and policy implementation); (4) 
norms and ideas. It should be noted that each dimension can take a variety of forms along a scale 
between the ideal notions of government and governance (Krahmann, 2003: 12). In the case of 
the state, it would be expected that states which demonstrate more engagement with the processes 
and practices described by these constitutive dimensions would gravitate towards the Post-
Westphalian end of the continuum, whereas those states that showed a minimal engagement 
would be situated at the opposite end of the continuum.  
     The first dimension of security governance is the pooling of sovereignty for collective action. 
This refers to the intentional pooling of sovereignty from national towards external informal and 
formal collective arrangements, such as institutions or ad hoc assemblages. It is recognised that 
state-actors cannot fully achieve their goals without external cooperation (Krahmann, 2003: 10). 
Hence, there is an expectation of a convergence of interests with a deliberate distribution of 
resources to fulfil policy aims. The pooling of sovereignty is also suggestive of a set of institutions 
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and actors which are drawn from but also beyond government (Stoker, 1998: 18). The 
Commission on Global Governance (1995: 2) recognised that ‘Governance is the sum of many 
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs […] It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest’. 
While this provides a description of the actors involved in security governance, certain 
qualifications are required. In processes of security governance, ‘the state is still the centre of 
considerable political power’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 12) with security governance often being 
about the ‘coordination of states’ (Webber, 2014: 19). It is acknowledged that states are the agents 
‘through which the structures of governance are instituted and financed, and the agents through 
which the efforts of these structures are largely realised’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 
7). However, this positioning of states at the centre of security governance does not preclude the 
recognition of non-state actor participation (Webber, Croft, Howorth et at., 2004: 7).  
     This raises a further qualification concerning the understanding of other actors beyond the state 
in security governance. This is particularly the case regarding formal institutions (issue-based 
regimes, intergovernmental organisations, and legal instruments such as agreements, resolutions, 
and treaties), where, although governance transcends government based solely on centralised 
control (Webber, 2014: 20), it does require ‘a minimum institutional framework that outlines the 
rights and duties within a society’ (Smouts, 1998: 87). Put differently, ‘institutional arrangements 
remain important not least because they determine much of what roles the state can actually play 
in governance’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22). However, security governance should not be 
considered a synonym for institutions and state-centrism, security governance is also concerned 
about how informal and formal institutions interact and how this involves ‘networks of actors that 
are not simply agents of the state’ (Webber, 2014: 20). Therefore, a security governance 
perspective is not so much concerned about ‘structures’ but with the ‘interactions among [and 
between] structures’, and, therefore, expects the practice of security governance to be dynamic 
regarding both ‘configuration and objectives’. This means that while there is ‘a modicum of order 
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[and the presence of] routinized arrangements’ (Rosenau, 1992: 7), ‘the inclusion and influence 
of different actors could well change over time and across sectors’ (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22).  
     Proceeding from the pooling of sovereignty, security governance also refers to the processes 
of stakeholder interaction complexity. This regards the number of actors in positions of authority 
and the intricacy and density of their channels of interaction. As introduced above, security 
governance is most likely to emerge when interaction density is high and reaches a point where 
state actors no longer possess the capability to achieve their security goals (Sperling and Webber, 
2014: 135). A central assumption is the presence of a multitude of stakeholders who cooperate 
via various patterns of concurrent and overlapping channels of interaction complexity. While the 
state is still the central actor, security governance – in terms of system and policy domain – is 
characterised by the presence of consistent forms of interaction complexity (Sperling and Webber, 
2014: 136).  
     The third dimension refers to purposefulness, meaning ‘the capacity to get things done’ 
(Stoker, 1998: 18).  A security governance perspective captures the problem-solving orientation 
of actors ‘geared toward the setting of goals and the production of a desirable outcome’ (Webber, 
2014: 19). This is indicative of the mutual processes of decision-making when setting goals and 
policy implementation when producing desirable outcomes. This problem-solving nature of 
actors is understood to involve forms of ‘rationalist calculation’ and ‘norms and values’ (Webber, 
2014: 21) which involves prescribed rules, norms of interaction, and constraints (Keohane, 1988: 
384). However, it is acknowledged that the preferences of decision-making and policy 
implementation in both forms of problem-solving are often similar but may occasionally be 
contested. It is presumed that policy outcomes may meet the objectives of the majority but not 
necessarily of all actors (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 8).  
     The final dimension of security governance concerns the role of ideas and norms. James 
Rosenau (1992: 4) states that security governance ‘is […] a system of rule that is as dependent on 
inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters’. Advocates of a 
security governance perspective consider this a logical consequence of governance’s 
independence from entirely vertical forms of authority as attributed to government. In the absence 
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of compulsion, collective action remains dependent initially upon ‘a willingness to act and a 
consistency of views on a desirable end state’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 7). As noted 
above, these ideas and norms are also embedded in institutions such as organisations and regimes 
which condition action. In this regard, proponents of security governance place particular 
importance on the notions of consent and legitimacy. In the former, without the presence of 
hierarchy and coercion, consent is essential in steering collective action towards common aims. 
Rosenau (1992: 4) suggests that security governance ‘works only if it is accepted by the majority 
(or, at least, by the most powerful of those it affects). Whereas governments can function even in 
the face of widespread opposition to their policies’. In the latter, legitimacy is considered crucial 
to understanding actor behaviour regarding their conformity to rules, processes, and formats, and 
their recognition of other actors all deemed to be legitimate (Webber, 2014: 22).    
     Security governance, therefore, provides a ‘framework clarifying and capturing within group 
security challenges as well as those posed by a variegated set of ‘others’’ (Sperling, 2010: 7). The 
concept ‘moves beyond the issue of whether multiple centres of power [such as balance-of-power, 
regime and security community] will lead to the re-emergence of war in Europe, to the question 
of how the fragmentation of power and authority affects the making and implementation of 
security policy in a broader sense’ (Krahmann, 2001: 21; also see Smouts, 1998: 6). For this 
reason, ‘security governance is a distinct form of security management (and not merely a 
conceptual substitute for security multilateralism or systems of global order)’ (Sperling and 
Webber, 2014: 7), and is, therefore, ‘a framework that describes and elucidates some of the core 
features of the actuality of Europe’s security relations […] Governance provides a framework of 
analysis that can ascertain how the ‘rules’ of security develop […] Similarly, governance is a lens 
that can help understand how security is produced. Its focus on states, organisations and norms 





1.2.3 Security Governance as Practice 
This section will consider security governance as practice and discuss how the security provision 
by actors in Europe has cultivated integrated approaches towards the mitigation of threats.6 Some 
scholars, however, continue to regard post-Cold War Europe as ‘an anarchic self-help system’ 
(Hyde-Price, 2007: 3), while others point towards the weaknesses of European security 
governance, characterising it as ‘slow, incremental, and riddled with conflicts’ (Schroeder, 2011: 
3). This thesis opposes the view that European security relations are still suspended in an 
environment reminiscent of the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War, or for that 
matter, the 1920s and 1930s, a conception of European security that has misunderstood the 
significance of the transitions in security policy discussed in the previous sections. Charges that 
security governance in the European context has suffered from a lack of resilience hold more 
credence and that existing claims of the effectiveness and integration of European security 
governance are exaggerated. There has, indeed, been problems underpinning the smooth 
evolution of European security governance, yet these have not necessarily been systemic obstacles 
but have rather been sporadic episodes confined to particular policy areas. The point to consider 
is that there has been a tendency towards an intentional form of behaviour amongst European 
security actors which has continued to contribute towards the aggregation of systemic preferences. 
     The discussion below will be organised around the central institutional pillars of European 
security governance: the EU and NATO. Within the frameworks of these two institutions the 
countries of Europe, as one commentator explains, ‘have gone further in developing defence, 
security and foreign policy cooperation than any other region of the world’ (Cottey, 2014: 164; 
also see Winn, 2003: 149). While security governance is not a synonym for institutions, 
institutional arrangements form a core part of European security governance. A brief exploration 
will be provided on the nature of European security governance’s attempt to engage states situated 
outside of this system in the ‘shared neighbourhood’, highlighting the consequences of these 
policies for regional security.  
                                                          





The North Atlantic Alliance 
After the Cold War NATO remained the primary institutional actor of European security in the 
face of much scepticism that the organisation would disappear with the end of the bipolar 
confrontation (Duffield, 1994: 763). With the consolidation of the EU yet to take place, the 
Alliance became the lead actor in facilitating Europe’s system of security governance (Cottey, 
2014; 646). Through the institutionalisation of security governance, since the early to mid-1990s 
NATO has been able to ‘translate the rationale, goals and principles of the regional entity into 
strategic plans, policies and actions that in turn affect the provision of regional security’ (Kirchner 
and Dominguez, 2011: 319). Although there have been tensions within the Alliance since the end 
of the Cold War on issues such as the role of the US and its purpose in terms of collective defence, 
collective security, or a hybrid of these two responsibilities, NATO has contributed towards the 
emergence of European security governance. 
     The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity have been central 
dimensions of how NATO members have practiced security in Europe since the end of the Cold 
War. Members have pooled their sovereignty to facilitate consensus-building and collective 
action in terms of Article V collective defence, and to tackle security threats. NATO has 
demonstrated this through its engagement in conflict management in the Balkans, where it has 
cooperated through multiple channels of interaction with a vast array of actors above and below 
the state. In both the pre- and post-conflict stages of Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, NATO coordinated its behaviour with other regional organisations and humanitarian 
organisations, because it lacked the expertise to tackle every threat (Hofmann, 2011: 113). With 
the signing of the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, NATO agreed to allow the EU to draw on some 
of its military and security assets so that it may take effective action in this policy area. NATO 
has also coordinated in the sharing of intelligence and expertise with other organisations and 
agencies such as the EU, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), and financial institutions in 
the fight against terrorism and organised crime. This shift in state-actor preference in NATO to 
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pool sovereignty is not a pragmatic means of problem-solving but is attached to a deeper set of 
norms and values that it deems the legitimate response to mitigate threats.  
     NATO’s behaviour has been purposeful in terms of its role in Europe. Members have 
intentionally expanded the Alliance’s responsibilities linked to changes in threat perceptions. 
Alongside collective defence, NATO has focused on the areas of counter-terrorism, transnational 
crime, conflict management, and cyber (Lepgold, 1998: 80). Although NATO does not possess 
expertise in every area, this has demonstrated a deliberate reorientation in its understanding of 
security. The Alliance has indeed ‘undertaken a conscious engagement in the changed meaning 
of security in Europe’ (Webber, Croft, Howorth et al., 2004: 9), facilitating a set of post-Cold 
War aims in the form of intervention, enlargement and partnerships (Cottey, 2014: 647). NATO 
has been instrumental in setting the agenda conditioning security policy and response throughout 
most of Europe. Through greater interoperability the Alliance assisted in the fight against 
terrorism with the patrolling of the Mediterranean by elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces 
in the early 2000s (Domingeuz, 2012: 65). NATO has also been central in countering the 
smuggling of narcotics and other forms of transnational crime in Europe. While this has revealed 
a functional approach towards promotion of security, this engagement is related to a wider goal 
based on the perpetuation of European security governance as a system of norms and values. This 
cooperation has been accompanied by NATO’s eastward enlargement. Although this has 
extended the Article V guarantee to these former Warsaw Pact countries, it has also unfolded 
alongside the expansion of the EU and has complemented Brussels’ normative socialising process 
of these states.  
     This purposefulness has been shaped by the cultivation of an integrated Alliance based on the 
rule of law, human rights and democracy which have been expressed in the Alliance’s response 
towards threats. NATO has been a central institutional vehicle for the promotion of these norms 
and values to regulate the behaviour of its members and to ‘consolidate the democratic state 
building of new members [to] promote a broader sense of Europe’ (Cottey, 2014: 47). This has 
particularly been the case in the policy area of conflict management, where the Alliance assumed 
a central role via its missions in the Balkans, associating security-related goals with the promotion 
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of system-wide norms and values. Its response based on the use of force and engagement in 
peacebuilding demonstrated the Alliance’s regard for the protection of human rights over the 
resilience of sovereignty as in the case of Operation Allied Force (OAF) (1999), and for the 
establishment of responsible self-governing state units which can contribute towards security 
governance. NATO’s actions showed that it was prepared to punish violations of its norms and 
values, but was also willing to re-socialise states back into the slipstream of European security 
governance. The latter has also been facilitated by NATO enlargement in 1999, 2004 and 2009. 
     Throughout this period, while it can be argued that NATO’s focus was on Afghanistan for the 
best part of a decade, the Alliance remained a key institutional pillar of European security 
governance because of its military capability in comparison to other actors in Europe. Even with 
the emergence of the EU as a security actor in the 2000s this did not override NATO’s importance 
for European security governance.  
 
The European Union 
NATO’s resilience as a central institutional actor of European security governance has been 
reinforced by the emergence of the EU. Although there is still a degree of institutional rivalry, 
this has been offset by a common set of norms and values across both organisations due to the 
dual membership of many state actors. Moreover, the division of labour between the organisations 
‘is complementary and does not represent the displacement of one organization by another’ 
(Whitman, 2004: 430). Highlighting the integration of the EU, the organisation has been used ‘as 
a frame of reference against which other regional systems of governance are measured, either 
from a normative perspective (the non-violent resolution of conflict) or a structural one (the 
presence of complexity and heterarchy)’ (Sperling, 2014: 588). With the EU’s remit in internal 
and external security the institution has taken centre-stage in the evolution of European security 
governance. While this integration has predominantly occurred in domestic policy, since the late 
1990s, driven by concerns about its inability to act during the conflict in Kosovo, members set in 
motion a rapid change in policymaking and implementation in matters of defence and security 
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(Kirchner, 2010: 114). The emergence of an EU security and defence character throughout the 
2000s reinforced European security governance.  
     The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity have been central aspects 
of this process. Internally, EU members have pooled their sovereignty into the central institutions 
of the EU. While a core feature of the Post-Westphalian state, this has not meant that the national 
identity of the members has been superseded by a European identity. What is clear, however, is 
that governments ‘possess a (relatively) denationalized understanding of the threats common to 
Europe and generally expect a collective European response to those threats’ (Sperling, 2014: 
592). Because of the Post-Westphalian character of European states and the deep-seated structural 
regional changes in politics and security, it has made it virtually impossible for those states to act 
independently. Members ‘are structurally compelled’ to transfer sovereign authority to the EU to 
expedite their relations with one another and tackle external threats (Sperling, 2014: 593). This is 
viewed as a rational means of ‘survival’ to satisfy national interests, and as a public good due to 
the normative socialisation of state preferences.  
     EU members have also recognised the utility of cultivating collective responses towards 
external security issues. With the development of the EU’s security and defence capability, the 
EU has engaged in collective responses in many policy areas. This is based on a variety of 
stakeholder channels of interaction complexity. The EU has been more effective than NATO in 
the fight against terrorism because of the deep levels of interaction between member states’ 
defence and security communities. In terms of tackling the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), the EU can influence export controls and thwart illegal shipments across the 
territory of its members (Kirchner, 2010: 121). Alongside this, the EU has engaged in conflict 
management operations in the Balkans, such as Operation Concordia (2003) in Macedonia and 
Operation EU Force (EUFOR)-Althea (2004 to present) in Bosnia & Herzegovina. In both 
operations, the EU relied on NATO assets and cooperated with UN agencies and an array of 
NGOs (Sperling, 2014: 610-612).    
     This intentionality to pool sovereignty has been linked to a wider purposefulness to facilitate 
European security governance based on the institutional deepening and widening of the EU. The 
32 
 
EU’s engagement in certain policy areas since the development of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is understood as being 
linked to the wider-systemic purpose of promoting the norms and values of European security 
governance. The EU is alert to the agenda of shaping a geographical, political and security space 
in Europe that is conducive to the collective preferences of its members. In the realm of security 
and defence the EU has developed common policies crafted on the security cultures and interests 
of its members. While divergences exist on how best to approach security provision, a 
considerable degree of consolidation has nevertheless taken place. This began in the late 1990s 
with the St Malo Accord (1998) between France and the UK which initiated the EU’s ESDP. This 
was a major component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was activated 
under the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. This was followed by the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
in 2003 and the development of the ESDP into the CSDP in the late-2000s after the signing of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2007.  
     This has culminated in a security and defence identity where the EU is alert to a multitude of 
threats. While the ESS recognises ‘hard’ security issues, it also focuses on other threats such as 
terrorism, regional conflicts, and state failure, which although they possess ‘hard security edges’, 
also have ‘soft’ security implications (Kirchner, 2010: 117).7 The EU has developed a range of 
policies ‘tailored to the expanding number of security pathologies targeting internal tranquillity 
and external stability’ (Sperling, 2014: 594). The EU has crafted its response towards issues based 
on both civilian and military dimensions. The EU is reliant on NATO to provide collective 
defence, while Brussels’ recourse to use force is still premised upon the narrow parameters of the 
Petersburg tasks which include ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.8 This has not ruled out certain 
divergences, particularly in relation to the use of force, in security cultures between the central 
member states.  
                                                          
7 European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 
December 2003, accessed 12 March 2014, available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
8 Petersburg Tasks, chapter II, paragraph 4, 1992. 
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     Enlargement to the east has also been a central means to consolidate security governance in 
Europe, with the main expansions taking place in 2004 and 2007. This has been accompanied by 
the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (2004) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) (2009) 
to facilitate stability along the EU’s borders. Nevertheless, both the ENP and the EaP have 
demonstrated varying degrees of success, cultivating an inconsistent patchwork of relationships 
with the former Soviet Republics in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus (Delcour, 2010; 
Christou, 2010). Engaging in softer forms of conflict management in places such as Moldova and 
Georgia, alongside the employment of statebuilding, both the ENP and EaP have been unable to 
socialise these states into the mainstream of security governance. Although writing before the 
development of the ENP and EaP, one scholar explains that enlargement ‘is a security policy by 
other means [by] extending the Union’s norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive 
applicants the [EU] has made instability and conflict on the Continent decreasingly likely’ 
(Missiroli, 2003: 17). Yet, as will be a central theme in the following sections, this extension of 
security governance through the EU has not only resulted ‘in a wider Europe’, according to some 
experts, but has also produced “outside states” (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77).  
     As mentioned earlier, this purposefulness has been closely bound up with the normative and 
values dimension of the EU. The importance of this dimension is that European security 
governance is not simply the constellation of interactions between states, but is rather state 
interaction in the context of a ‘complex system of norms, institutions and practices which shape 
and define both the way states behave and the system as a whole’ (Cottey, 2014: 171). The power 
of ideas runs at the core of the EU’s contribution towards security governance and how security 
provision is translated into practice. Ian Manners (2002) famously described the security and 
defence policy of the EU as facilitating a ‘normative power Europe’. This refers to the EU’s 
normative and value-laden conception of security and defence policy, where its engagement in 
tackling threats relates to a systemic purpose in promoting European security governance. As in 
the case of NATO, the EU has aimed to engage in preventative approaches towards latent and 
existing security issues via the deliberate extension of its norms and values. This has been 
intentionally built into the enlargement processes of the EU, which places the states in the former 
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Soviet space under the scrutiny of the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. External action has increasingly 
been encoded in normative and values-based arguments. 
      
1.3 Russian Foreign and Security Policy  
The previous discussion highlighted the evolution of European security governance into a highly 
integrated system. It was shown that the cultivation of and engagement in European security 
governance has become the principal route in which European states have attempted to manage 
the impact of globalisation. This follows from the assumption that the major European states are 
those which hold membership in either or both central institutional pillars of European security 
governance. It is the dual expansion of NATO and the EU since the end of the Cold War which 
although has incorporated new members has inevitably resulted in a ‘wider Europe’ and ‘outside 
states’ (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77). Russia is perhaps the most important example 
of an excluded state, if only because of its size and significance in the realm of foreign and security 
policy (Light, White, and Lowenhardt, 2000: 77). The section will therefore consider Russia’s 
external policy in light of the emergence of European security governance. It will highlight the 
development of trends in Russian policy thinking and outline Moscow’s relationship with the 
central actors of European security governance. It will embed the discussion in the existing 
literature on Russia and security governance, acknowledging that Russia since the early 1990s 
has remained ‘included out’ (Webber, 2007: 141) because of its selective subscription to the 
norms and processes of European security governance (Averre, 2010).  
 
1.3.1 The Yeltsin era 
During the Yeltsin presidency Russia’s approach towards the emerging system of European 
security governance was steered in large part by the stewardship of Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev (1991-1996) and his successor Yevgeny Primakov (1996-1998). The articulation of 
foreign and security policy under both Ministers demonstrated attempts to manage the tension 
between Russian national interest/sovereign autonomy and a constructive engagement with its 
external environment. Moscow’s pro-Western tilt during its initial post-Soviet years gave way to 
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a policy that became more alert to the promotion of national interest as the decade unfolded. 
Western policymakers were alarmed at this reversal in Russian thinking and perceived it as a 
departure from an integrationist path with Europe. This was understood differently in Moscow, 
as many in the Russian government and across the spectrum of the political elite considered this 
correction vital to cultivate a realistic understanding of its external environment. Alexey Arbatov 
(1993: 10) pointed out that both Russia and the West employed a naïve thinking about the 
potential of mutual integration. Kozyrev’s ‘doctrine’, he argued, ‘underestimated the uniqueness 
of the Russian state and its heritage, as well as Western reservation about too rapid a 
convergence’, stating further that ‘The West was unprepared for that and feared making too broad 
a commitment, taking on too great a responsibility, or getting too deeply involved in the destinies 
of a giant country that is hard to understand and even harder to predict’.  
     This balancing act produced an external policy that strove for Russia’s equal partnership with 
the central institutional pillars of European security governance. This was not a policy of 
confrontation, but was rather a policy of recognition in terms of interests and status. Therefore, a 
consistent dynamic of convergence with and divergence from European security governance 
unfolded across a range of policy areas. The following discussion will demonstrate that Moscow 
engaged in security governance when tackling specific issues, but was not prepared to be 
socialised into the wider purpose of European security governance. 
 
Policy and the external environment 
The beginning of President Yeltsin’s tenure in office facilitated an initial period of cooperation 
and warming of relations between Russia and its Western partners. One commentator notes that 
to integrate Russia into the ‘world community’ Yeltsin ‘embarked upon a policy of full-blooded 
westernization’ (Bowker, 2000: 34). Kozyrev strove for a policy of integration with Europe. 
Believing that history had indeed ended and presented no alternative to Western development 
(Tsygankov, 2013: 56), Kozyrev declared that Russia should strive to enter the international 
community of states. Moreover, Kozyrev identified Russia with the promotion of the West’s 
human rights agenda, which was accompanied by his description of Russia ‘as a great (but 
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normal!) power in all its aspects’.9 The policy was to integrate Russia into the family of Western 
states as an equal player and ‘become partners and allies in the struggle for peace and stability in 
Europe and beyond’ (Bowker, 2000: 35). Russia’s policy of integration during the early 1990s 
reflected conviction, necessity, and self-interest to maintain Russian great power status through 
further accord with the West (Marantz, 1997: 347; Donaldson, 2000: 306).   
     This thinking, which underpinned Russia’s immediate policy after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, has been described as ‘conspicuously pro-Western’ with ‘a heavy tilt towards economic 
determinism and universal democratic values’, and at the same time, generally indifferent to ‘the 
geopolitical and strategic facets of international relations’ (Arbatov, 1993: 10). The Russian 
leadership exercised a largely empty policy towards its immediate regional space.10 While Russia 
established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991 to initiate regional economic 
and military integration, the former Soviet Republics, though in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, 
were not considered a priority and, therefore, ‘no explicit, coherent policy was pursued; the 
sovereignty of the newly independent states was respected but that was all’ (Jackson, 2003: 58-
59). Although Moscow’s lack of engagement in its regional periphery in 1991 and the first quarter 
of 1992 was irresponsible due to the instability occurring there, Moscow was largely focused on 
wider security matters which, as one scholar pointed out, assisted in ‘the creation and 
consolidation of structures’ that defined ‘the shape of post-Cold War Europe’ (Webber, 2000: 
35).  
     This pro-Western tilt was short-lived because of a recalibration in Russian thinking about its 
external environment. Throughout the rest of the 1990s nationalist views in political and military 
circles shaped Russia’s thinking. Existing scholarship contends that Russian policy became 
increasingly assertive from mid-1992 onwards (Adomeit, 1998; Bluth, 1998; Light, 2003; Sakwa, 
                                                          
9 Kozyrev (1992) ‘Russia: A chance for Survival’, Foreign Affairs, 71, p. 15, accessed 10 August 2013, 
available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora71&id=237&collection=journals. 
10Jackson (2003: 58-59) notes that ‘[t]here was almost no historical precedent for a Russian foreign policy 
towards the other successor states and little knowledge about their new governments’ intentions and 
policies on which to base foreign policy. Also, there was not yet even a section in the Ministry of Foreign 




2008). This has been described as ‘geopolitical realism’ (Thorun, 2009: 9) based on ‘a Realist 
calculation of national interests’ (Adomeit, 1998: 40). A change of attitude, particularly relating 
to Russia’s relationship with European security governance, did take place under Kozyrev and 
Primakov. However, this did not rule out Russia’s cooperation, and in some respects integration, 
with its European counterparts. In 1993, the MFA introduced its first post-Soviet foreign policy 
concept which featured realist thinking, but also provided a nuanced understanding of Russia’s 
external environment beyond a narrow concern about the accretion of material power. Due to 
globalisation, Russia recognised structural changes in Moscow’s external environment and 
acknowledged the expansion of the security domain to include a plethora of security threats 
beyond traditional military issues. The Russian political and military elite recognised that the 
maintenance of a cooperative relationship with its European partners was crucial to tackle these 
security issues. The concept emphasised the UN to facilitate consensus and collective efforts 
towards the management of international relations and the mitigation of issues. 
     The foreign policy concept was clear, however, about Russia’s self-proclaimed ‘great power’ 
status and emphasised the safeguarding of Russia’s national interests via a rational and 
independent pragmatic policy. This meant that Russia strove for cooperation and equality with its 
European counterparts rather than subordination, both in shaping international relations and in 
matters of security. Although the foreign policy concept pointed out the destabilising effects of 
US hegemony, it also acknowledged that cooperation with Washington was crucial. Russia’s 
existing and future relationship with the EU was also considered vital to the development of the 
Russian state, although its scepticism towards NATO remained. Finally, Russia’s new thinking 
emphasised a re-engagement with its immediate regional space. Besides support for economic re-
integration, Russia’s role as regional security guarantor was considered a central approach to 
cultivate good neighbourliness along Russia’s borders. Russia began to view this region as ‘part 
of its extended security zone’ (Garnett, 1998: 70). While this policy thinking remained largely 
consistent throughout the 1990s, it went through a period of transition from early 1992 to late 
1993 before a more confident regional policy was formed – although Russia was unable to wield 
a coherent policy across this space due to its complexity (Adomeit 1998: 43-44; Garnett, 1998: 
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67-68). Several paradoxical policies were adopted, some of which made Russia’s separation from 
the former Soviet Republics official, while others continued to reassert Russian national interests. 
This reflected a general confusion in policy and demonstrated an uncertainty of external events 
(Jackson, 2003: 68). 
    This view persisted under Primakov’s tenure at the MFA from 1996 onwards – although 
Russia’s understanding of its external environment did become more realist. This was due to a 
shift towards more domestic conservative views and international triggers relating to the 
emergence of an increasingly NATO-centric system of European security governance. Primakov 
declared that ‘We [Russia] are a great power, and our policy must reflect that status. I consider it 
my main task to step up the Foreign Ministry’s activities in defending our national interest’. 
Primakov further pointed out that ‘We will also liquidate the imbalance of our foreign policy by 
diversifying our approach, by working on all fronts’. Described as a ‘policy of alternatives’ 
(Selezneva, 2003: 15), the new Foreign Minister claimed that ‘Russia has been and remains a 
great power. And, like any great power, its policy should be multidirectional and 
multidimensional’. This was reflected in the 1997 national security concept which understood the 
‘international political system’ as being multipolar and pointed out that ‘attempts to create a 
structure of international relations based on unilateral solutions as the key problem of world 
politics’.11 ‘Statism’ was also a feature of Primakov’s thinking, characterising Russia as a 
Derzhava. This can be loosely translated as ‘a holder of international equilibrium of power’ 
implying Russia’s reliance on its own strength rather than that of formal institutions (Tsygankov, 
2010: 95). 
     In terms of Russia’s relationship with European security governance, Primakov was more 
critical of this relationship. Due to NATO enlargement and its dominance in Europe, Russia 
became increasingly opposed to the continued existence of NATO. Russian arguments reflected 
in its 1997 national security concept, had become more refined about the necessity for an inclusive 
institutional basis of European security governance through the OSCE. This was a direct 
                                                          
11 The Kremlin, ‘Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation’, 1997, accessed 12 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html. 
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challenge to the primacy of the US and NATO, as it promoted a re-visiting of security 
arrangements in Europe based on equality. The concept was clear in stating that ‘Multilateral 
mechanisms for maintaining peace and security at both the global (United Nations) and regional 
(OSCE, CIS) levels are still insufficiently effective’.12 Nevertheless, while these challenges were 
a feature of Primakov’s thinking, the Russian government continued to acknowledge ‘an 
expansion of the commonality of Russia’s interests with many states on problems of international 
security’, Moscow remained committed therefore to an engagement in certain policy areas of 
European security governance.13 This was linked to an understanding of cooperative relationships 
with the central actors of European security governance. Moscow’s quest for a recalibration of 
European institutional security arrangements to safeguard Russian national interests and to 
promote a transparent interpretation of European security governance was not a confrontational 
policy (Bowker, 2000: 39). Primakov regarded cooperation a necessity and was unwilling to break 
from a path of closer relations with Russia’s European counterparts.  
 
Policy in practice 
During the initial years of the Yeltsin presidency, Russia engaged in the evolving system of 
European security governance. This was based on a purposefulness to break down the barriers of 
the Cold War and integrate into European and wider Western structures. While Moscow 
considered this move in its best interests, this policy was also shaped by pro-Western sentiment 
which pushed for the wholesale subscription to the norms and values of this system. Moscow 
continued to implement its military withdrawal from the Baltic states and East-Central Europe 
(ECE) which had been initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev (Ghebali, 2005: 376). Russia supported 
European institutions with its pooling of sovereignty in the CSCE and its inclusion in the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Groundwork was also being put in place for a Partnership 
and Co-Operation Agreement (PCA) with the European Community (EC) (Timmins, 2002: 80). 
                                                          
12 The Kremlin, ‘Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation’, 1997, accessed 12 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html. 
13 The Kremlin, ‘Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation’, 1997, accessed 12 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html. 
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Russia intended to play a role in these institutional processes to facilitate collective responses to 
security issues in Europe. This was particularly the case regarding Russia’s participation in United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was tasked to manage the conflict in the Balkans 
(see chapter 3). At this stage, however, the extent of Russia’s engagement in stakeholder 
interaction complexity was limited due to Russia’s lack of formal membership in the institutional 
framework of European security governance. Moscow’s stakeholder interaction complexity was 
based on its involvement in the CSCE but Russia maintained a degree of cooperation with NATO 
via the NACC (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000: 48), and cooperated in the CSCE. Moscow placed its hopes 
in the latter organisation and pushed for its extended responsibility as the Pan-European security 
institution (Kropatcheva, 2015: 10). This was supplemented by Russia’s continued interaction in 
other capacities through the constructive implementation of several treaties and regimes on 
conventional arms and nuclear non-proliferation (1990) (Averre. 2000: 152; Bowker, 2000: 35).  
     With the recalibration in Russia’s foreign and security policy, Moscow’s engagement in the 
dimensions of security governance diversified. The extent Russia engaged in the promotion of the 
evolving norms and values of European security governance was pragmatic. Moscow jealously 
guarded its internal political development – particularly because of the First Chechen War (1994-
1996) and the increasing fears of separatism – and became irritated when it was criticised by its 
European counterparts. This resistance was reflected in its policy which showed selective 
conformity in practising a ‘value-laden’ approach towards international security. This, however, 
did not deter Russia’s active involvement in democracy promotion in certain policy areas. 
Moscow assisted in the individual peace efforts in the Balkans, supporting their integration into 
the institutional structures of European security governance. 
     The debate over the nature of the institutions of European security governance shaped the 
relationship between Russia and its European counterparts throughout the 1990s. This raised 
significant questions about Russia’s understanding of the pooling of sovereignty in Europe. For 
Moscow, besides the cultivation of a favourable relationship with the former Soviet Republics, 
questions regarding the extent Moscow could contribute towards the re-designing of the post-
Cold War European order. This centred squarely on the issue of Russia’s inclusion in evolving 
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European institutions. While the Russian leadership supported collective institutional 
arrangements as an equal partner in decision-making and policy implementation, it was 
understood in Moscow that the nature of these mechanisms should not encroach upon vital 
Russian national interests. Russia’s 1993 foreign policy concept was unequivocal when it 
declared that ‘attempts to depreciate the role of a sovereign State, as a fundamental element of 
international relations, creates a threat of arbitrary interference in a State’s internal affairs’. 
Therefore, according to one Russian commentator, during the 1990s there was no one European 
institution with which Russia maintained ‘easy relations’; even the OSCE, which remained ‘the 
favourite project of Russia’, was no exception (Zagorski, 1997: 539). 
     Nevertheless, the central purpose of Russia’s engagement in this debate was both to ensure it 
could shape European security governance and to prevent its marginalisation from collective 
responses towards emerging security threats. Besides the low profile of Russia’s economic 
relationship with the EC/EU – which was still in its adolescence as an institution – Moscow 
focused on its relationship with NATO.14 Russia’s exclusion from NATO’s formal decision-
making body at a time when the Alliance was declaring its intention to initiate enlargement 
triggered sharp criticism from Moscow. Reflecting its nuanced policy, Russia argued that 
NATO’s persistence as a military alliance facilitated a ‘bloc mentality’, it was expanding rather 
than reducing its purpose and zone of responsibility, and instead of privileging international law 
and the UN Security Council, NATO was perceived ‘as disregarding them both and pretending 
to have an exclusive droit de regard with respect to what is going on in the world’ (Baranovsky, 
2001: 9-10).15 Moscow, therefore, made a considerable effort to promote the CSCE/OSCE as the 
Pan-European security institution based on the Helsinki principles.16 Throughout 1993 and 1994 
                                                          
14 While not viewed by the Russian government as a priority in the security field, the EU was a major 
trading partner for Russia throughout the 1990s with the signing of a PCA in 1994 – although this was 
suspended and only ratified in 1997 by Brussels due to Russia’s conduct in the First Chechen War (1994-
1996). This was followed by the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia in 1999 but this 
failed to inject new life into the relationship as its signing virtually coincided with NATO’s military 
intervention against Belgrade. See Timmins (2002; p. 82, p. 85). 
15 For further discussion on Russian attitudes towards NATO enlargement during the 1990s see Averre 
(1998), Light, White, and Lowenhadt (2000), Smith (2006), and Polikanov (2004).  
16 For instance, Russia’s 1993 Foreign Policy Concept stated that ‘Russia is interested in the further 
balanced development of the multifunctional character of the Organisation on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) and will be making efforts in this direction’. 
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Moscow submitted numerous proposals to Vienna for the reformation and enlargement of the 
CSCE’s role in security issues (Kropatcheva, 2015: 11). Moscow proposed a coordinating 
committee that reflected the organisation of the UNSC, where the decision-making apparatus was 
based on the preferences of permanent and rotating members (Ghebali, 2005: 377). These 
proposals were rejected by the bigger Western countries who were reluctant to give up their 
security within existing institutional fora. Although Russia’s enthusiasm for the promotion of the 
CSCE/OSCE declined as the 1990s progressed due to its criticism of Russia’s conduct in 
Chechnya and its refusal to provide a mandate for Russian regional conflict management, 
Moscow still promoted the CSCE/OSCE as it was the only central European organisation with 
which Russia held ‘a legitimate place and role’ (Polikanov, 2004: 482; Ghebali, 2005: 375). 
     Moscow was also involved in talks over the nature of its relationship with NATO in the context 
of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Permanent-Joint Council (PJC) 
in 1997. Russia’s pursuit of CSCE/OSCE institutional primacy was a means to deflect attention 
away from a system of security governance dominated by NATO (Antonenko, 1999: 126). 
Despite this, Moscow signed up to the PfP in June 1994 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations in May 1997 establishing the JPC. Regarding the former, Russia’s partnership 
was based on an Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) elevating its status within the PfP 
compared to the former Soviet Republics to appease Russian concerns that its status as a great 
power was being undermined. Moscow recognised that it was better to be a part of these initiatives 
than to be standing on the side-line. Although the PfP was considered too narrow and technical 
‘to serve as a basis for Russia’s relations with the West in Europe’ (Arbatov, 1995: 140), and 
Moscow was given a formal voice in the JPC (Stent and Shevtsova, 2002: 129-130; Ponsard, 
2007: 70). NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 abruptly halted any further consultations and 
shattered ‘any illusion that Russia possessed a guaranteed strong vice in European security 
decision-making’ (McGuigan, 2009: 153). While NATO was attempting to accommodate Russia, 
Russian academic opinion scolded NATO’s behaviour asserting that through these various 
‘palliatives’, the Alliance sought to avoid the elephant in the room and merely attempted to ‘soften 
Russia’s opposition to enlargement’ (Antonenko, 1999: 126).  
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     Due to these institutional divergences, the extent of Russia’s formal stakeholder interaction 
complexity was limited during this period. Moscow’s involvement in the PfP and the JPC offered 
only an informal degree of inclusion. At best, this demonstrated a quasi-channel of interaction 
complexity where dialogue and potential avenues of cooperation were maintained between Russia 
and the members of NATO. The OSCE’s institutional foot-print became increasingly 
marginalised, much to Russia’s dismay. This was particularly the case regarding the conflict in 
Kosovo where the efforts of its observation mission were quickly forgotten once NATO airstrikes 
began (Ghebali, 2005: 378). Moreover, Moscow’s attempt to establish regional institutional 
mechanisms via the CIS failed to cultivate strong relations. Russia only understood the CIS as an 
organisation to promote regional integration and to assist in the safeguarding of Russian interests. 
The restricted channels of stakeholder interaction between the members of the CIS due to a lack 
of political will, suspicion of Russian intentions, and the development of other regional 
arrangements such as GUAM (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development), 
demonstrated the CIS’s limited institutional clout.17 Therefore, the CIS was largely circumvented 
and replaced by bilateral relations. 
     Nevertheless, Russia continued to supplement its limited institutional engagement with its 
involvement in several other treaties and regimes. This coincided with the recalibration in Russian 
policy thinking which meant that Moscow was not going to automatically follow the Western 
line, though this did not rule out Russia’s contribution towards European security governance. 
Moscow’s approach was not simply employed to project specific national interests ‘in 
juxtaposition to positions held by NATO’ (Webber, 2000: 46). Russia demonstrated a degree of 
assistance in the mitigation of traditional and non-traditional security issues. Alongside its 
contribution towards non-proliferation in Europe through the removal of nuclear warheads from 
the former Soviet Republics,18 Russia continued to reduce and withdraw its arms under the Treaty 
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) from Eastern and Central Europe, and from its 
                                                          
17 Members of GUAM include Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.   
18 Although tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were not reduced as paranoia crept back into the thinking of 
the military leadership because of NATO enlargement in 1999.  
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immediate regional space (Webber, 2000: 48-49). Moreover, as we shall see, Russia’s 
contribution towards the management of successive intra-state conflicts in the Balkans showed 
both divergence from and convergence with the approaches adopted by the central actors 
participating in the international peace efforts. Even with NATO’s bombing campaign against 
Belgrade in 1999, Russia maintained its channels of communication with several central Western 
powers and its troops continued to participate in the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina.  
     Finally, Russia made efforts to promote the CSCE/OSCE in Europe and cooperated with both 
Vienna and the UN in regional conflict management in its regional space – although Russia was 
careful not to let any external actors supplant its role in matters of conflict resolution. Under 
Kozyrev and Primakov, the immediate regional space was considered a sphere of vital Russian 
interests and Moscow was sensitive to external interference. Russia’s complex re-engagement 
with its regional periphery was of an economic, strategic, and security-related character. The 
uneven policy during the Yeltsin presidency was reflected in Russia’s securing of economic and 
resource markets mainly through energy, its participation in conflict management operations, the 
protection of the Russian diaspora, and its maintenance of a military footprint to preserve a 
regional response. The irregularity of this policy was not a deliberate design to facilitate a form 
of hegemony or neo-imperialism (Adomeit, 1998: 43-44; Bluth, 1998: 325-326), but rather 
stemmed from Russia’s competing security logics informing its decision- and policy-making 
processes.  
     Several observations can be offered on the nature of Russian policy during this period. First, 
the shift from a pro-Western to a more independent stance was not necessarily anti-Western. This 
policy was not solely conditioned by realist thinking and a hostility towards Western international 
hegemony. Russian policy and practice featured Post-Westphalian preferences that were not 
incompatible with European security governance. Second, closely bound up with the first point, 
Russia wanted to be situated in the mainstream of international politics (Tsygankov, 2010: 35), 
and aimed to seek closer cooperation with Europe (Bluth, 1998: 327). Rather than oppose this 
system, Moscow attempted to negotiate its place in European security governance – although 
Moscow considered its national interests in its immediate regional space as non-negotiable. Even 
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with an increase in nationalist rhetoric during the Primakov years, Russian thinking was still 
Europe-focused (Bowker, 2000: 39). Based on its common understanding of international 
security, Moscow was prepared to assist in the development of European security governance 
through specific policy areas. Third, Russia’s thinking and policy towards its immediate regional 
space evolved in three stages: (1) neglect during Yeltsin’s initial years; (2) chaos between 1992-
1993; (3) coherence from 1993 onwards. Despite this, Russia’s practice remained fragmented due 
to its competing security logics. This space remained an issue between Russia and its European 
counterparts throughout this period and, as will be shown in the following section, became an 
increasingly problematic factor during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies.  
1.3.2 The Putin and Medvedev Presidencies 2000-2012: A new assertiveness or a 
refinement of policy?   
 
The debates of the 1990s – largely centred around Russia’s formal inclusion in European decision-
making – remained relevant in shaping the relationship between Russia and the central actors of 
European security governance throughout the 2000s (Lynch, 2005: 9). Yet, these debates had 
become no less protracted as the relationship took on new meaning, with the consolidation of the 
EU’s ability to shape European security governance and the new sense of determination in 
Russia’s external policy. While the general contours of the relationship largely showed the same 
pattern of behaviour based on the enduring exclusion/inclusion dynamic in the organisation of 
European security governance, both Moscow and its European counterparts were aware, as one 
authoritative Russian scholar put it, that they were ‘“doomed” to a partnership’ (Danilov, 2013). 
However, it was the nature of this relationship which became deeply contested. Under Vladimir 
Putin and Dmitri Medvedev the deep-seated tension that had developed in Russian policy thinking 
as far back as 1993 continued to shape Moscow’s response to the evolution of European security 
governance. Russian policy was based on the constructive engagement in security governance but 
on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests (which were 
not necessarily incompatible with the interests of the central European actors) – both perceived 
to have been weakened considerably during the Yeltsin years. Richard Sakwa (2008: 246) 
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remarks that Russia ‘wants to be a part of the West, but on its own terms. While the West wants 
Russia to be a junior partner, Russia insists that it is a separate power in its own right’. 
     The recalibration under Putin of Russia’s policy, and its continuation under Medvedev, was 
pursued for one aim: to be recognised as a ‘normal great power’ that is part of a system of security 
governance which takes into consideration its national interests. Moscow’s ambition to develop 
Russia into a great power was not a goal in itself but was considered a security necessity to prevent 
its disintegration and to confront a volatile environment. To be a great power was a necessary 
condition to facilitate Russia’s more advanced engagement with the world (Tsygankov, 2005: 
134). In an address to the Federal Assembly at the start of his presidency Putin declared that 
‘The only real choice for Russia is the choice of a strong country. A country that is strong 
and confident of itself. Strong not in defiance of the international community, not against other 
strong nations, but together with them’.19 This meant Russia’s selective subscription to European 
security governance; while this allowed for cooperation in a range of policy areas, Putin set out 
to re-negotiate European security arrangements. This did not advocate a revision but rather a re-
visiting of security and political arrangements in Europe within a practice-based system of 
security governance (Averre, 2010: 267).  
     Russian policy under Putin and Medvedev was not anti-Western but sought to cultivate a 
relationship with its European partners based on the principles of equality, transparency and 
indivisibility. This points to a vital observation that while Moscow’s policy and behaviour 
demonstrated a degree of instrumentality to safeguard narrow self-interests, this inconsistency 
with its professed normative character demonstrated the complexity of Russia’s external policy. 
According to one Russian expert ‘treating Russia as a black-and-white realpolitik actor is a gross 
oversimplification’ because Moscow’s ‘Normative arguments have become a tool for the 
reformulation of Russia’s messages to the world, while being embedded in Russia’s 
understanding of its international power’ (Makarychev, 2008: 4).  
 
                                                          
19 Vladimir Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, July 8 2000, 
accessed 5 January 2015, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480 
47 
 
Policy thinking and the external environment 
When Putin came to power in mid-2000 he inherited a Russia that was amid fighting a second 
bloody war in Chechnya (which he helped to orchestrate), still attempting to recover from the 
cataclysmic effects of the 1998 financial crisis, and was dealing with the political fallout from 
NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. Putin recognised the significance of 
these events when he acknowledged them in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly on 8 
July 2000. He recognised that ‘economic effectiveness’ was crucial for Russia’s future 
development, understood that the Cold War was over but pointed out that Russia had to confront 
forces that strove for ‘a geopolitical reorganization of the world’ and that there was still a need to 
overcome certain difficulties in the form of humanitarian operations which ‘infringe on the 
sovereign rights of nations’. Putin finally described ‘international terrorism’ as a ‘new type of 
external aggression’ towards the state’s ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’.20  
     Some scholarship contends that Russia’s policy changed considerably from the Yeltsin era 
(Tsygankov, 2005: 133; Stent, 2008; Thorun, 2009; Spechler, 2010; Kropatcheva, 2015: 13). 
Sakwa (2008) describes Russia’s policy as the ‘New Realism’, arguing that extensive transitions 
occurred during the early 2000s which pointed towards a departure from previous policy thinking. 
Sakwa (2008: 242) and Tsygankov (2005: 153) both argue that Putin’s approach moved away 
from Primakov’s zero-sum pragmatism which wielded a highly traditional understanding of 
realism ‘underscored by a heavy dose of anti-western Sovietism’ (Sakwa, 2008: 242). This, 
however, misconstrues Primakov’s thinking and overlooks the rhetoric in Primakov’s policy. 
Neither should it be understood that Putin exercised a policy of ‘restoration’ to correct many of 
the mistakes and weaknesses of the Yeltsin era (Stent, 2008: 1089-1090). Again, while there were 
setbacks in the Yeltsin era this misrepresents Russian policy during the 1990s and overstates the 
differences between the Yeltsin and Putin eras (Robinson, 2009: 24). Nevertheless, it is equally 
as important not to downplay the changes which took place on Putin’s coming to power as some 
scholars have been guilty of doing (Casier, 2006).  
                                                          
20 Vladimir Putin, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’, July 8 2000, 
accessed 5 January 2015, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480 
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     Putin’s thinking showed that pragmatism was still a cornerstone of Russian policy – the new 
foreign policy concept (2000) declared that policy was ‘based on consistency and predictability, 
on mutually advantageous pragmatism’ – but the level of realism shaping policy was diluted.21 
As Sakwa (2008: 245) points out, Putin’s policy was complex, premised upon a mixture of realism 
and idealism which centred on Russia’s ‘European civilizational identity’ where it should be 
accepted on its own terms into ‘the international community’. This was further complemented, 
according to Sakwa (2008: 245), by a strand of realpolitik which included severe overreaction 
when its sense of self-worth was perceived to have been undermined. Finally, Sakwa (2008: 245) 
points out that ‘The fact that these various approaches – the realist, the idealist and the 
instrumental – jostle cheek by jowl reflects the tension in Putin’s new realism’. Putin’s immediate 
priorities when he came to power were to revitalise Russia’s economy, to re-engage the CIS in a 
more cost-effective approach than was exercised under Yeltsin, to eradicate terrorism, and to 
cooperate with the West (Tsygankov, 2005: 138-139; Thorun, 2009). Moscow made it clear that 
its external policy was based on the consideration of ‘the legitimate interests of other states’ and 
was ‘aimed at seeking joint decisions’.22 It was also emphasised that Russia was ‘a reliable partner 
in international relations’, and that ‘Its constructive role in resolving acute international problems 
has been generally acknowledged’.23 Russia’s policy was, therefore, based on what Andrei 
Tsygankov (2008: 40) has labelled the ‘“great power normalizers’”, which aimed ‘to regain its 
great power status, within acceptable international parameters, and be accepted by the West’.  
     This did not reflect a new assertiveness and was far from the absurdity of certain 
characterisations of Russia as ‘the Terminator […] back as a major actor in world affairs and as 
a major headache for security policy decision makers in the Western world’ (Skak, 2011: 138). 
Although there were acute divergences, during this period Russia’s understanding of and its 
attempts to manage changes in its external environment demonstrated a degree of convergence 
                                                          
21 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
22 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
23 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
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with Europe that indeed reflected aspects of thinking under Kozyrev and Primakov. While Putin’s 
policy continued to exercise a ‘negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO’ and considered 
‘Attempts to belittle the role of the sovereign state’ as ‘arbitrary interferences in the internal 
affairs’ of the state, Putin proposed collective responses towards the management of security, 
including the management of relations between Russia and its European neighbours, via the 
‘creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation’ based on ‘the 
further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe’.24 Recognising the expansion of security beyond the narrow military 
domain, Moscow proposed combatting threats through multilateral formats ‘within the 
framework of specialized international agencies’ and ‘on a bilateral level’.25 As Russia still 
considered NATO enlargement into the former Soviet space a challenge to its national interests, 
policy thinking continued to promote regional engagement to cultivate ‘good neighbourly 
relations and strategic partnership with all CIS member states’.26 Dmitri Trenin (2003/04: 82) 
explained that Putin’s regional policy ‘aims for the maximum benefits for the Russian business 
community and seeks to solidify a loyal and secure environment in which Russian interests are 
taken seriously’.  
     During Putin’s second term and under Medvedev, the Russian leadership became more 
defensive of its sovereignty and maintained its understanding of a strong state to confront the 
consequences of what it considered as an increasingly fragmented and insecure environment.27 
Russian arguments became more refined and sophisticated, promoting both normative and values-
based arguments. Indeed, one expert points out that Russia attempted to establish itself ‘as an 
international role model’ and a valid value centre ‘reflecting an important evolution in Russian 
thinking’ (Monagahan, 2008: 718). This has been in defence of Russia’s domestic political order 
                                                          
24 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
25 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
26 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2000, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. 
27 The Kremlin, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, 2009, accessed 15 March 2015, 
available at http://www.russianmission.eu/userfiles/file/foreign_policy_concept_english.pdf. 
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in the face of Western ‘regime change’. Moreover, this has been bound up in Russia’s attempt to 
revisit European security under Medvedev with the promotion of Russia’s European Security 
Treaty and, as mentioned above, a rules-based European order not conditioned by values such as 
democracy and human rights.  
 
Policy in practice 
Russia’s behaviour during Putin’s first term demonstrated a selective engagement in European 
security governance. This pattern of limited engagement was largely based on Russia’s behaviour 
throughout the 1990s as Putin attempted to negotiate a cooperative relationship with European 
security governance whilst protecting Russia’s sovereign identity and national interests. From the 
early to mid-2000s, Moscow demonstrated a degree of engagement in the dimensions of European 
security governance on a very practical basis. While this was through the facilitation of 
cooperation in specific policy areas, it did not amount to Russia’s formal integration into the 
system of European security governance. By the end of Putin’s first presidential term it was clear 
that Russia did not want to integrate into European security governance where practices were 
embedded in a wider value-laden purpose. Rather, Moscow supported a rules-based system of 
security governance that had at its core common practices rather than collective values. Because 
of this fundamental divergence, Russia remained excluded from the processes of this system’s 
evolution and enlargement which caused a degree of friction between Moscow and its European 
neighbours. While Moscow did not set itself up against the central actors of European security 
governance, the Russian leadership became more willing to assertively defend its national 
interests. By the time of the ‘colour revolutions’ Russia considered the path of its development as 
an autonomous and legitimate great power to be under threat by its European neighbours. The 
warming of relations at the beginning of Putin’s presidency gave way to a cooler state of affairs 
by the time of Putin’s second inauguration in May 2004.   
     The extent of Russia’s engagement in the dimensions of European security governance 
remained on a selective basis. This was especially the case regarding the pooling of sovereignty 
and stakeholder interaction complexity where Moscow was still not a formal member of the 
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central institutions of European security governance. Russia maintained a line of cooperation 
without integration. With the development of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, this 
provided a more equal and transparent decision-making process than previous arrangemens. 
While NRC had qualitatively moved forward from the in-effectiveness of the JPC, Moscow 
continued to exercise a cautious attitude, remaining unconvinced about the transparency of the 
NRC because there was still every possibility that NATO members could informally reach 
common positions in advance of Council sessions (Rontoyanni, 2002: 13). Nevertheless, the NRC 
was a serious attempt to provide some form of institutional character to Russia’s political and 
security relationship with European security governance. Russia was clear, however, that while 
they were participating in the NRC, this did not signify Russian membership in the Alliance.  
     Russia was prepared to engage in collective action in the NRC, but drew a line at pooling too 
much sovereignty as its autonomous character would be inextricably altered. This was linked to 
Russia’s concern about NATO enlargement. During a press conference following an NRC session 
in Prague in 2002, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov pointed out that ‘We have always emphasized 
that a mechanical NATO expansion with the preservation of the previous military focus is 
unlikely to meet the interests of security and cooperation, including in the Euro-Atlantic space’.28 
At the same time, Moscow ceased to view its relationship with the organisation, according to one 
notable Russian scholar, as being dependent on the issue of enlargement and therefore it ‘had lost 
its raison d’etre’’ (Danilov, 2005: 83). While the Russian leadership did not entirely desensitise 
policy thinking from existing issues, it also did not want to be ‘cornered on those issues’ proposing 
new areas of cooperation (Tsygankov, 2005: 141-142). This was reflected in Ivanov’s statement 
in Prague who went on to explain that ‘if the declared transformation is realized in practice, if in 
its activities NATO tackles the same tasks of countering new threats and challenges as Russia is 
now, then the possibilities of cooperation between NATO and Russia will, beyond any doubt, 
                                                          
28 Igor Ivanov ‘Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Remarks at Press 






expand’.29 The NRC did offer new avenues to streamline cooperation during this period, but the 
underlying issue of Russia’s inability to shape European security governance remained. Dov 
Lynch (2005: 9) points out that ‘Deepening ties with NATO have offered benefits, but these do 
not ensure Russia an equal voice in European security’.  
     The development of the EU provided Russia another opportunity of institutional engagement. 
Moscow remained consistent in recognising the importance of its relationship with the burgeoning 
EU. As noted above, a central facet of Putin’s thinking during his first term rested on the 
development of Russia’s economy. The maintenance of positive relations with the EU were 
crucial in facilitating this goal. Despite this, the relationship did not prove to be as fruitful as 
Moscow envisaged. As Sergey Karaganov (2003) remarks ‘the process of rapprochement 
between Russia and the EU, have created new opportunities as well as new problems’. The EU’s 
development as, perhaps, the central institutional pillar of European security governance during 
the early 2000s (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007: xi), altered the dynamic of its relationship with 
Moscow. The Russian leadership was very clear about its unwillingness to join the EU (if ever 
there was an opportunity), but was also alert to the ‘real possibility of isolation from core 
European institutions’ (Lynch, 2004: 113). In this regard, Russia across a series of summits with 
the EU in 2003 agreed to the development of Action Plans on four common spaces covering (1) 
economic relations; (2) freedom, security, and justice; (3) external security and; (4) research and 
education, alongside the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) as a replacement to the 
Cooperation Council (Timmins, 2005: 58). Although these spaces lacked concrete substance on 
how cooperation was to be translated into practice (Averre, 2005: 183), this demonstrated a 
direction in which the potential for further engagement was possible. Moscow was serious in its 
attempts to cultivate some form of institutional arrangement where a degree of sovereignty would 
be pooled. This relationship became increasingly problematic throughout Putin’s second term and 
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into Medvedev’s presidency. The launching of the EU’s ENP and EaP was viewed by Moscow 
with a degree of suspicion, particularly since the eruption of the ‘colour revolutions’ in the mid-
2000s.  
     However, as will be discussed below, difficulties outnumbered any comprehensive forms of 
cooperation. Alongside this, the PPC and other consultative mechanisms failed to provide 
efficient channels of interaction complexity and meetings ‘often lacked real content’ (Averre, 
2005: 176). While issues were discussed within a densely institutionalised structure, consultations 
largely consisted of the sharing of information rather than facilitating discussions on joint action. 
As one scholar notes, the dialogue served ‘the purpose of avoiding surprises rather than providing 
for more coordinated action’ (Zagorski, 2005: 74). Moreover, Moscow’s push for a revision of 
the format from the troika to an arrangement based on the inclusion of all 25 members of the EU 
failed to gain traction. Brussels also continued to exclude the possibility of Russia’s participation 
in the EU’s internal decision-making processes (Averre, 2005: 176).  
     In relation to the normative dimension of European security governance, it became 
increasingly clear that Russia’s approach towards its external environment were not entirely 
compatible with its European partners. Moscow faced a system in which norms and values were 
a central ‘ordering’ aspect of security policy. Both the EU and NATO act as vehicles for 
normative promotion within-system and externally. NATO aside, Hiski Haukkala (2005: 2) points 
out that ‘[f]or the European Union, the link between norms, values and foreign policy seems to 
be an obvious one’. While this recognition of the blurring between the internal and external has 
conditioned the foreign and security policy of European security governance, this has been 
increasing contested by Moscow. Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, alongside Medvedev’s 
promotion of the European Security Treaty in 2009, have been direct challenges to some of the 
norms and ideas shaping European security governance. As pointed out by some scholars, this 
normative debate between Moscow and Brussels is not as straightforward as typically argued 
(Averre, 2009; Wagnsson, 2008). Derek Averre (2009: 1696) puts it ‘the Russian governing elite 
– despite its claim to share fundamental values with Europe – has over the recent period engaged 
more and more in a ‘battle of ideas’ with the EU to promote and defend the legitimacy of its own 
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norms, or competing principles of political organisation, as an alternative to purportedly 
‘universal’ Western liberal democratic norms’.  
     This contestation has largely unfolded in Russia’s immediate regional space, or in Western 
academic parlance the ‘shared neighbourhood’, where Moscow has considered the promotion of 
Western values and norms along its periphery as a top priority and threat. It is crucial to 
acknowledge that Russia’s leadership has not exercised a uniform policy towards this space. 
Moscow’s behaviour has displayed both positive and negative adjustments to the structural and 
normative ‘interference’ into the former Soviet space. Negatively, Russia has reacted with force 
in 2008 and applied gas levers to protect its national interests, but on a positive level the Russian 
leadership has been forced into formulating an idea of European security – although vague and 
imprecise. Crucially, this has not necessarily meant that Russia understands and approaches 
foreign and security policy differently. Some scholars argue that ‘the EU portrays itself as an 
ethically good promoter of human rights’, whereas ‘Russia maintains its tradition of prioritising 
the security of the state’ (Wagnsson, 2008: 135). While there is credence in this understanding, 
the debate is a lot subtler and nuanced.  
     In this regard, key observations can be offered on the nature of policy and thinking under Putin 
and Medvedev. First, external policy became increasingly sophisticated and refined using norms 
and ideas. Second, Russian behaviour continued to remain defensive rather than assertive. Third, 
national security primarily stemmed from the protection of the state. Fourth, Moscow aimed to 
revisit rather than revise European security governance.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the wider contextual framework of the thesis, where the debate on 
Russia and European security governance has been interrogated. The chapter has discussed the 
development of Europe’s system of security governance and identified its evolution based on the 
institutional pillars of the EU and NATO. It has highlighted change in security provision premised 
on the adoption of policies of security governance and how these have related to the broader 
systemic purpose of European security governance. In this context, the chapter identified trends 
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in Russian foreign and security policy and analysed them in accordance with the development of 
the norms and processes of European security governance. Russia’s complex engagement with its 
external environment was elucidated within the context of European security. It was demonstrated 
that Russia selectively subscribed to European security governance, which has been conditioned 
by the tension in Russian foreign and security policy thinking. On the one hand, Russia has been 
prepared to ardently defend its national interests and sovereign identity, and on the other it has 
demonstrated a purposefulness to engage in specific policy areas of security governance. The 
following chapter will provide the second part of this framework where the thesis’ main 
contributions and argument will be discussed in relation to Russia’s engagement in the policy area 
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This chapter introduces the second part of the framework for analysis on Russia and the policy 
area of conflict management. The chapter begins by introducing the policy area of conflict 
management based on a broad outline on definition, methods, and operations. Considering the 
evolving norms and processes of European security governance, the chapter then goes on to 
discuss the development of several trends in Europe’s experience of conflict management. The 
second half of the chapter introduces Russian conflict management. Here the limitations of the 
existing literature on Russia’s response towards intra-state violence will be examined. This will 
be followed by the signposting of the thesis’ central contributions and arguments.   
 
2.2 European Conflict Management 
2.2.1 Making sense of the policy area 
The overview below of the policy area of conflict management will cover the basic terminology, 
definitions, and methods of the policy area. This overview is necessary to provide general clarity 
to the development of the policy area since the end of the Cold War. This will provide a better 
sense of the policy area when exploring Russia’s approach in accordance with the trends of 




Definitions of conflict management  
Defining conflict management has been crucial for international actors since the proliferation of 
operations in the early 1990s. This definitional debate in the policy and academic community has 
become increasingly complex because of the rapid evolution of conflict management. Moreover, 
as conflict management operations lack legal integrity and precision because they are not explicit 
in international legal instruments, such as the UN Charter, this has added further complexity 
(Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 14). In this respect, should one consider any operation 
authorised by the Security Council an example of conflict management if its purpose is to 
facilitate peace and stability? Chapter I, Article 1 (1) of the Charter vaguely states that for the UN 
to maintain peace and security it is ‘to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace’, which is to be ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’. This 
may involve conventional warfare through enforcement action such as in Korea (1950-1953) and 
the First Gulf War (1990-1991). In both cases the Security Council acknowledged these conflicts 
as a breach of the peace and acted accordingly. While such interpretations cannot be ruled out, 
this thesis steers clear of such permissive understandings and is concerned with operations that 
are short of war and enforcement practices.  
     Since the early 1990s the evolution of doctrine and practice has been extraordinary. This policy 
area has become considerably discursive and acquired a complex and confusing terminology, with 
an array of overlapping labels and definitions (Wagnsson & Holmberg, 2014: 325). As one expert 
notes ‘Few processes in contemporary international relations have been as imperfectly defined as 
that of ‘peacekeeping’, which is not due to the intellectual laziness but because ‘Virtually 
everyone has a personal sense of what actually peacekeeping is – but it is usually perceived as an 
activity with extremely flexible boundaries’ (McQueen, 2006: 1).30 Conflict management is a 
                                                          
30 Once termed by a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander ‘a very ambiguous term’ (Craddock. 
2006), conflict management has thus been substituted with a variety of diverse labels by an assortment of 
actors. This thesis uses the term ‘conflict management’ to denote the wide array of operations and 
methods which have developed considerably since the early 1990s. Other labels may include, but are not 
bound to: ‘crisis management’, ‘peace support operation’, ‘military ‘operations other than war’, 
‘stabilisation’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘multi-dimensional peacekeeping’, and ‘(humanitarian) intervention’. 
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slippery (Paris, 2004: 38) and contested policy area notorious for ‘conceptual muddles’ (Dhiel, 
2008: 3). Many scholars have attempted to provide definitional clarity to identify an operation’s 
conceptual boundaries and rules of engagement. According to Marrack Goulding (1993: 455) they 
are 
 
[f]ield operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties 
concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations 
command and control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and 
other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between 
the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. 
 
This definition offers a narrow interpretation restricted to UN practice only and premised on a 
traditional understanding prevalent during the Cold War and the early 1990s. Others have 
provided broader definitions to reflect changes in practice and thinking. William Durch (2006: 
xvii) describes them as ‘internationally authorised, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote 
and protect such transitions from war to peace’. Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin 
(2010: 18) provide a comparable definition, explaining that operations 
 
 
involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or 
without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme to: (1) assist in the prevention 
of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; (2) serve as an instrument to observe or 
assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or (3) enforce ceasefires, 
peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace. 
 
Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010: 18) further explain that operations ‘are therefore one 
general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as 
rebuild in its aftermath’. Thierry Tardy (2004: 1-2) contends that conflict management is ‘a broad 
concept, covering military and civilian activities led by state and non-state actors in a host state 
(or two), and aimed at dealing with a crisis or with consequences of a crisis, at different possible 
stages (before, during and after a crisis)’. Tardy (2004: 1-2) points out that these operations ‘are 
short of war’ with the principle of impartiality being ‘indissociable’ from conflict management as 
their central objective ‘is the promotion of peace, and not to defeat of one of the parties involved’. 
It is worth reiterating three crucial aspects that characterise conflict management operations: (1) 
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they are short of war; (2) they must be impartial; (3) they are not intended to defeat one of the 
belligerents and, thus, do not have a designated enemy. 
 
Methods of conflict management  
This section introduces a glossary of conflict management methods and discusses their legal and 
conceptual roots. The central methods of conflict management are based on the following: 
Preventive diplomacy (and conflict prevention) which is an action to prevent conflicts from 
erupting or from spreading to neighbouring regions; Peacekeeping (also in its wider form) which 
is the deployment of a lightly armed or robust multinational force for purposes including the 
observation of ceasefires and the delivery of humanitarian aid; Peacemaking which is the attempt 
to end an ongoing conflict by the use of peaceful means such as negotiation and diplomacy. 
According to Paris it may also include the authorisation of a military force to impose a settlement 
to the conflict; Peacebuilding which is action undertaken at the end of a conflict in order to 
prevent a resumption of violence. It is aimed to rebuild society after war through the deployment 
of military and civilian personnel; Peace enforcement which is the threat or use of non-defensive 
military force to impose, maintain, or restore a ceasefire.31 The use of peace enforcement, 
however, has moved beyond this narrow aim to ‘bring about or ensure a compliance with some 
aspect of a Security Council mandate or an agreement among the parties’ (Boulden, 2001: 3).  
     The application of some of these methods has changed because of the recalibration of the 
notions of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. In relation to the methods of preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, the notions of consent and impartiality remain 
constant. However, there have been considerable changes in the understanding of peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement due to a wider acceptance of the utility of force in conflict management. 
This has particularly been the case in European approaches towards conflict management, which 
will be discussed in more detail below. The development and application of these methods should 
                                                          
31 See Paris (2004: 38-39) for this glossary of methods which has been adapted from the UNDPKO’s 
‘United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines’, 2008, accessed 12 April 2015, 
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pd. This is also widely known 
as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’.  
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not be considered in a linear or sequential order. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there is a degree of 
overlap between certain methods at the intersection of conflict and a ceasefire. It is possible for 
several methods such as sanctions and wider-peacekeeping or peacemaking and peace 
enforcement to coincide simultaneously. 
 
     It is also crucial to identify the differences and linkages between certain methods in order to 
provide conceptual clarity. Of importance is the conceptual debate regarding the characterisations 
of peace enforcement and wider peacekeeping. This extends beyond mere terminology and has 
wider legal implications concerning the legitimacy and credibility of certain forms of conflict 
management. Dhiel (2008: 13-14) notes that peace enforcement cannot be considered under the 
rubric of conflict management as it resembles collective security operations, where the use of 
force is extensive and offensive military actions are more common. According to Dhiel (2008: 
13), classic examples of authorised UN peace enforcement were in Korea and the Gulf. Therefore, 
any operations which utilise force below collective security measures should be placed into the 
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category of ‘wider-peacekeeping’, and ‘occur in the context of ongoing violence, but outside the 
context of interstate war’. Other scholars, however, differ from this categorisation and support a 
further category of ‘enforcement’. Jane Boulden (2001: 2-3; also see Goulding, 1993: 460-461; 
Findlay, 2002: 6-7; Oliver, 2002; Fenton, 2004: 21) defines (collective) enforcement actions as 
full-scale military operations like those identified by Dhiel, whereas peace enforcement is used 
to substitute Dhiel’s use of wider-peacekeeping for operations that ‘fall into the grey area between 
full-scale enforcement measures and traditional peacekeeping situations’. Instead, wider-
peacekeeping is generally used to describe methods which aim to separate the parties to the 
conflict, disarm the combatants, deliver humanitarian aid, protect civilians, guarantee the freedom 
of movement, monitor cease-fires, and enforce no-fly zones (NFZ) (Roberts, 1994: 14-15; 
Dandeker & Gow, 1997: 334; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 194-195).32 This includes a 
robust posture that is designed to ‘allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to provide freedom 
of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate, or more 
broadly the peace process, is ‘taken hostage’ by spoilers’ (Tardy, 2011: 153). Although there is a 
degree of convergence between the robust characteristics in wider-peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement, they are different (Findlay, 2002: 6).  
     There are also legal divergences between these methods as expressed in the UN Charter. 
Traditional peacekeeping is typically attributed to the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’ in Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter. Although termed by the second UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld as ‘Chapter VI 
and-a-half missions’ due to the absence of peacekeeping in the nomenclature of the Charter, 
Article 36 (1) has been recognised by many as a sufficient legal basis because the ‘Security 
Council may, at any stage of a dispute […], recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment’ (Orakhelashvili, 2003: 491). In relation to wider-peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement there is a grey area in the Charter. Boulden (2001:2) points out that the grey area 
between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement is derived from Chapter VII Article 40 which 
authorises the Security Council to take ‘provisional measures’ that ‘shall be without prejudice to 
                                                          
32 This is also termed ‘expanded’ (Findlay, 2002: 5) or ‘second generation’ peacekeeping (Mackinlay and 
Chopra, 1992).  
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the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned’. This grey area is also drawn from Article 
42 which stipulates that the Security Council ‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Thus, these types of 
operations are linked to Chapter VI and VII as they share characteristics from traditional 
peacekeeping and enforcement (Boulden, 2001: 3). 
  
Operations of conflict management  
An animated scholarly debate has surfaced on conflict management operations and their relations 
to the methods above.33 This debate has attempted to analytically organise and identify operations 
based on their intended purposes, and to demarcate operations actors engage in to tackle intra-
state violence which has been crucial for understanding actor behaviour. One expert points out 
that this exercise is significant as ‘Placing missions in different groups is not merely a 
classificatory exercise. There are implications for how we analyse, evaluate, and train for peace 
operations’ (Dhiel, 2008: 16).   
     According to these taxonomies these operations have developed in relation to function 
(Goulding, 1993; Nikitin and Demurenko, 1998; Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998), chronology 
(Goulding, 1993; Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992), and global politics (Bellamy, 2004; Bellamy and 
Williams, 2010). A functional understanding demonstrates the scale of operations, and that they 
can be utilised in a non-linear fashion. A chronological approach reveals the degree of institutional 
learning from each consecutive operation or period. This also acknowledges a superficial link 
between functional and structural change in the international system. And, a global political 
approach demonstrates the deeper relations between functional change and shifts in the normative 
preferences of an actor and in international politics. Certainly, there have been broad historical 
normative shifts shaping an actor’s doctrine and practice, and revealing a general trajectory of 
evolution. Within these broad changes, however, while it is possible to ascribe specific 
approaches to certain actors because of normative preference, there has also been a degree of 
                                                          
33 Some of the methods discussed in the previous section correspond to operations in their own right i.e. 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement.  
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pragmatism in the selection of these approaches on a functional/case-by-case basis due to political 
expediency and context (Berdal, 2008: 176). 
     A collection of taxonomies has therefore emerged covering the broad spectrum of methods 
and stages of a conflict management operation. These can be summarised into the following 
operations.34 Observation operations consist of the deployment of a detachment of unarmed 
personnel, with the consent of the host-state or parties to collect information and monitor activities 
typically after a ceasefire agreement (Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39). Preventive 
diplomacy (conflict prevention) aims to prevent disputes from arising and existing disagreements 
from escalating into further tension through a range of measures, such as preventive deployment 
(the interposition of an international force between the parties), observation, early warning, and 
mediation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Existing taxonomies fail to consider other instruments in this 
type of operation outside of ‘preventive deployment’ as a means of prevention (Mackinlay and 
Chopra, 1992: 117; Goulding, 1993: 456; Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39; Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 22). The toolset of this operation converges with many others, such 
as observation and wider/robust peacekeeping. In relation to peacebuilding, Nikitin and 
Demurenko (1998) put forward two operations to ‘restore social and political institutions whose 
functioning has been disrupted by the conflict’ and to ‘restore basic conditions for daily living’, 
which may merge into the same operation. Other taxonomies acknowledge ‘state/nation building’ 
and ‘election supervision’ (which may also form a part of observation and wider-peacekeeping) 
(Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39), ‘Assisting in the maintenance of law and order 
(Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117), and ‘peace support operation’ (Bellamy, Williams, and 
Griffin, 2010: 22). This operation is implemented usually after a peace settlement has been agreed 
and, therefore, may also overlap into areas of peacekeeping. This operation is vital for the 
facilitation of potential long term peace and stability. 
                                                          
34 These existing taxonomies in the literature are either too expansive in their categorisation or too narrow 
in their scope; both equally debilitating when defining the purpose and responsibilities of a conflict 
management operation. Therefore, some of these characterisations have been removed and individual 
operations merged with others to avoid unnecessary convolution. At the same time a degree of nuance has 
been maintained across and within these classifications. 
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     Traditional peacekeeping operations involve monitoring cease fires, controlling and providing 
buffer zones, and weapons disposal. Traditional peacekeeping is recognised as an operation by 
several existing taxonomies (Mackinlay and Chopra, 1992: 117; Goulding, 1993: 457; Dhiel, 
Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 22) and is still used today 
although the following operation is generally preferred. In terms of wider-peacekeeping, many 
existing taxonomies divide wider-peacekeeping into various operations, such as: the 
‘implementation of a comprehensive settlement’ and the ‘protection of humanitarian relief 
supplies’ (Goulding, 1993: 457-458); ‘humanitarian assistance during the conflict’, ‘arms 
control’, and ‘protective services’ (Dhiel, Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 39); ‘Supervising a Cease-
fire Between Irregular Forces’, ‘Assisting in the Maintenance of Law and Order’, ‘Protecting the 
Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance’, and ‘The Guarantee of Rights of Passage’ (Mackinlay and 
Chopra, 1992: 117). These are generally components of a much larger conflict management 
operation and are rarely implemented in isolation.  
     Peacemaking operations are not mentioned by other taxonomies, although they are a crucial 
aspect in the management of conflict. Sanction operations enforce economic or other types of 
blockades by air, sea or land to assist in the facilitation of conditions conducive to peace and 
stability. Although only two out of the five taxonomies mention such operations (see Dheil, 
Druckman, and Wall, 1998: 40; Mackinlay and Chopra, 199: 117), they are vital in containing the 
conflict from spreading and/or intensifying. Again, these operations may depend on the 
circumstances and can be used individually or as part of a wider framework of conflict 
management. With regards to peace enforcement, existing taxonomies have disagreed on the 
purpose and application of these operations. Goulding (1993: 459) distinguishes between two 
types of operations premised on the use of force, including ‘intervention into a failed state’ (the 
use of force, if necessary, to protect and implement the mandate if consent is not forthcoming 
from the conflicting parties) and ‘cease fire enforcement’ (the use of force to protect the mandate 
and maintain the cease fire – presumably with consent from the opposing parties). Nikitin and 
Demurenko (1998) also recognise two operations, including to ‘halt or prevent military actions’ 
(the use of mediation, deterrence and peace enforcement), and to ‘uphold law and order in a 
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conflict zone’ (mediation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement). Paul Dhiel, Daniel Druckman, 
and James Wall’s (1998: 40) taxonomy differentiates between ‘Pacification’ (consent from the 
opposing parties to use force against any side or renegade group that breaches the mandate) and 
‘Intervention in support of democracy’ (the use of force across a state’s border to safeguard 
existing democratic institutions or, if necessary, facilitate this through regime change). Others 
such as Mackinlay and Chopra (1992: 117) identify a range of operations under the banner of 
‘Enforcement’ from the First Gulf War to scenarios like the UN’s Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) (1993) – although, as noted above, this is considered conceptually imprecise.   
     From this, it is possible to categorise three types of operations built on variable notions of 
consent, impartiality, and the use of force. First, consent-based (strategic level) peace enforcement 
where the host-state has offered invitation to an international force to maintain peace by using 
military force, if necessary, against an actor which threatens the security of the host-state and its 
population. Second, peace enforcement operations where there is limited to no consent at all levels 
of engagement because of a complete or partial breakdown of state functions. Force is, therefore, 
used against any party which fails to abide by the mandate. Third, the use of strategic force across 
state borders without consent to protect civilians from the actions of the state. This has generally 
been termed as humanitarian intervention and has been conceptualised through Pillar III of the 
responsibility to protect (R2P). This taxonomy provides a broad overview of the range of 
operations available to intervening forces either under the UN flag or through regional formats.  
     Further qualifications are required. In the recent past, interpretations have become ascribed to 
a more expansive set of approaches, including counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations. 
Both raise considerable conceptual difficulties for the researcher when defining the policy area of 
conflict management in relation to the rules of engagement and the legitimacy of those 
intervening. Tardy (2004: 8) recognises that while an evolution of the mandate of conflict 
management operations to include counter-terrorism cannot be excluded, the ‘risks that such an 
evolution would entail will have to be raised, especially insofar as the compatibility of this 
evolution with the nature of peace operations is concerned (and particularly their impartial 
characteristic)’. The counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations of the post-9/11 era in Iraq 
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and Afghanistan have demonstrated a degree of convergence in doctrine and practice in that they 
focus on civilian rather than military solutions, can be for the protection of civilians, recognise 
the limitations of the use of force, acknowledge the importance of host-nation ownership (Friis, 
2010: 50). This is in addition to the possible participation of many actors and methods such as 
peacebuilding.35  
     Despite this, certain qualifications are required, especially in relation to the operational aims 
and purposes. A caveat is placed on assuming that all counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency is 
now understood through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan – although both experiences have 
contributed extensively towards the development of such approaches. Nevertheless, this 
overlooks the possibility that the methods employed may be particular to these cases i.e. an 
abnormally extensive stabilisation operation as part of a counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency 
operation. What is most noticeable is that in these operations the protection of civilians is a means 
to an end or supplementary to the completion of the primary goal: defeating an identified enemy 
for a political aim, upon which victory can be claimed (St-Pirre, 2008: 11). This departs from the 
definitions of conflict management introduced above which, through protective actions, aim to 
safeguard the mandate by enhancing the security of civilians and maintaining stability where the 
defeat of an enemy is not a necessary goal (St-Pirre, 2008: 11). Moreover, in such operations 
impartiality is not a guiding principle on which to conduct an operation, whereas in a conflict 
management operation impartiality is crucial. In this regard, there are fundamental differences 
here that run deeper than tactical processes. Stuart Griffin (2011: 332) points out that ‘[w]hile the 
tactical activities associated with peace support can also be found in counterinsurgency, the 
nature, ethos and intent of such campaigns are fundamentally at variance and it is ill-advised to 
obscure the distinctions between them’. While this debate is significant for the future evolution 
of conflict management and while counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency may form parts of 
conflict management, there remains significant differences between conflict management and 
                                                          
35 The British Army’s doctrine even places peace support immediately alongside that of 
counterinsurgency in terms of rules of engagement. See MoD, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 Security 




these operations. Further research and practice is required before substantial judgements can be 
made, although this is beyond the scope of this thesis.       
 
2.2.2 Evolution and development in European approaches 
With the basic parameters of conflict management covered, this chapter will now discuss how the 
policy area of conflict management has evolved in the European experience. It will highlight the 
development of several trends in the European experience of conflict management. These trends 
reflect the aggregation of collective policy-relevant goals, which are related to the wider systemic 
purpose of promoting European security governance.  
The European experience 
Managing conflict in Europe since the early 1990s has for the most part shown a progressive 
development in doctrine and practice to mitigate intra-state violence. This progress as some 
scholarship has observed is ‘quite remarkable’ (Wagnsson and Holmberg: 324), and has coincided 
with the evolution of European security governance, structured primarily around the core 
institutional pillars of the EU and NATO. Although conflict management operations ‘involve 
different actors, all having their own approach towards the concept, their own agenda, and their 
own motives’ (Tardy, 2004: 2), and although there have been disagreements and set-backs, there 
has also been a considerable degree of coordination and consensus shaping the ‘European 
experience’. The trends in European conflict management, which have been crafted based on a 
steep learning curve through bloody experiences and failures, and because of the transition and 
consolidation of European security governance. As discussed above, this experience can be 
attributed to broad historical normative shifts in the conditioning of the central actors involved in 
European conflict management. Within these broad changes, however, there has also been a 
degree of pragmatism in the selection of these approaches on an ad hoc basis due to political 
expediency and context. While the presence of Westphalian state preferences cannot be ruled out 
from the European experience of conflict management, there has indeed been a general shift 
towards Post-Westphalian state preferences in this policy area. The making of doctrine and 
practice in the European experience has largely been attributed to the management of conflict in 
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the Balkans, where there have been clear transitions in doctrine, policy, and practice. Approaches 
towards conflict in the Balkans were also shaped by experiences outside of Europe and so 
references to other conflicts will be used to provide further understanding.  
     As introduced in the previous chapter, the evolution of European security governance is 
premised upon the following dimensions: the pooling of sovereignty, stakeholder interaction 
complexity, purposefulness, and norms and ideas. In the policy area of conflict management these 
dimensions have elucidated several trends. First, operations have progressively come to possess 
a humanitarian dimension. This is closely intertwined with the second trend, whereby the integrity 
of state sovereignty as a prevalent norm has become increasingly contested, particularly if a 
conflict threatens international peace. Nevertheless, the dilemma regarding the balance between 
territorial integrity and self-determination has become fraught because of this focus on human 
rights, with decisions implemented on an increasingly pragmatic basis. During the early to mid-
1990s the UN wrestled with the norm of sovereignty and its concepts of consent and impartiality 
on the one hand, and the protection of civilians on the other. These operations did possess a 
humanitarian dimension but it was not until ODF in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1995, which was 
further complemented by NATO’s Operation Allied Force (OAF) against Belgrade in 1999, that 
a more human-centred understanding of conflict management emerged.  
     The early 1990s marked a period of renewed activity by the UN through the establishment of 
several operations and the creation of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO) by the newly appointed UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. ‘An Agenda for 
Peace’ (1992), Boutros-Ghali’s seminal report, epitomised the changes in thinking surrounding 
operations at the time and reinforced the UN’s leadership in international affairs. While the report 
emphasised the necessity for the wider use of force through peace enforcement to maintain 
ceasefires already agreed to but not complied with (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: paragraph 44), the 
protection of civilians using force was not specifically referred to. However, it did give further 
‘rise to new thinking about human security’ (Peou, 2002: 51) through the promotion of human 
rights and democracy. Imbued by the UN’s call for firmer measures to preserve peace in war-torn 
societies, operations were much larger, launched into situations where the conflict was still raging, 
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and utilised more robust methods (Dandeker & Gow, 1997: 328; Frantzen, 2005: 47). Operations 
during this period ‘seemed to have a wholly different character, although this was not understood 
conceptually at the outset’ (Frantzen, 2005: 47). A humanitarian element was present in these 
operations although there was confusion and failure in places such as Somalia and Rwanda, where 
intervening forces attempted to interpret UN doctrine and mandates as a means of best practice. 
This blurred the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Gray, 2008: 282).  
     Many actors participating in conflict management during the early to mid-1990s skirted around 
the issue of using force to protect civilians and instead advocated the use of wider-peacekeeping 
methods. While these operations possessed a humanitarian element, they did not advocate the 
wider use of force in the safeguarding of human rights. Indeed, US involvement in Somalia 
confirmed for many the dangers of becoming a party to the conflict through a lack of consent and 
impartiality, and the use of disproportionate force. As understood at the time, the danger of 
crossing the consent-divide from peacekeeping to ‘war-fighting’ was persistently reiterated in 
other conflicts, such as Bosnia (see Rose, 1998).36 As head of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, General Rose upheld this approach based on experience and thinking developed 
by Charles Dobbie’s report ‘A Concept of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’ (1994), which was later 
developed into the official doctrine ‘Wider Peacekeeping’ (1995) by the British Army and 
implicitly acknowledged in US Army doctrine (1994).37 Force was authorised on several 
occasions during this period, but this was on a tactical level, and channelled through a protracted 
process of checks-and-balances before being authorised. However, dismayed by the continued 
violence, the intransigence of both parties, and the systematic targeting of civilians, authority was 
eventually given to NATO by the UNSG, by-passing the Security Council, to conduct strategic-
level bombing of Bosnian Serb military in late 1995. A consensus on the use of force emerged 
between the central powers and institutions of European security governance.  
                                                          
36 Thereafter, this was famously referred to by Former-Head of UNPROFOR, British General Michael 
Rose, as the ‘Mogadishu Line’. 
37 For the UK’s Wider Peacekeeping see the MoD, ‘Wider Peacekeeping’, Army Field Manual, February 
1995. For US Army doctrine see Headquarters Department of the Army, ‘Peace Operations’, FM 100-23, 
December 1994.  
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     The perceived failures of the early to mid-1990s, and the greater use of peace enforcement 
demonstrated in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, resulted in a degree of caution by the UN 
regarding the role of an intervening force.38 Adam Roberts (1994: 41; also, see Goulding, 1993: 
461; Hansen, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2004: 2) explains that during this period conflict 
management faced a dilemma where intervening forces had to choose between either losing 
credibility for not acting (as in Rwanda and in the “safe areas” in Bosnia) or losing impartiality 
for potentially overreacting (as in Somalia in 1993). This debate unfolded in the academic 
community where some commentators argued for a return to traditional forms of peace 
operations, or as a minimum a strict adherence to robust peacekeeping without recourse to the use 
of force (Thakur, 1994; Tardy, 2011). Others claimed that present methods were acceptable but 
required further integration and coordination (Goulding, 1993: 461; Berdal, 2000). Although not 
every member of NATO agreed to this direction in doctrine and practice, the central actors and 
powers of European security governance opted for a robust response to protect civilians and 
maintain the peace.  
     The mandates of the following operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina were based on robust rules 
of engagement, with the protection of civilians explicitly mentioned in their mandates. Steered 
largely by the doctrine developed in the UK and the US, NATO deployed a peace support 
operation where the notion of consent was reconceptualised to enable the conflation of wider 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures into a ‘useable framework’ (Bellamy, Williams, 
and Griffin, 2010: 279). According to NATO peace support is based on the consent and/or non-
consent of the parties with the agreement and not against any biased or predetermined 
designation.39 In this sense, the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina owed no allegiance to any 
party to the conflict and could shift between a peacekeeping and peace enforcement posture 
depending on the levels of consent.40 However, it was not until NATO’s action in Kosovo in 1999 
                                                          
38 See Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’ (1995). 
39 See NATO, ‘Peace Support Operations’, July 2001, AJP-3.4.1, p. 21, accessed 12 May 2016, available 
at http://walterdorn.net/pdf/PSO_NATO_JointDoctrine_AJP_3-4-1_PSO_July2001.pdf.  
40 This approach was given further impetus with the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping 
(2000), or commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report. This Report stated that more emphasis should be 
placed on impartiality, meaning an adherence to the UN Charter and to the objectives of a mandate rooted 
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and calls for humanitarian intervention that the norm of sovereignty was seriously questioned. 
The use of force became recognised as an acceptable and necessary measure in specific 
circumstances by legitimising its strategic application for the protection of civilians if submitted 
to egregious acts of violence by the host state (Holzgrefe, 2003: 18). This represented a 
fundamental evolution in the thinking of the central actors of European security governance in 
terms of their understanding of the relationship between the use of force, sovereignty, and human 
rights. One noted scholar recognised that from this point the turn towards strategic intervention 
in human security framings, which focus on non-Western subjects, began to dominate security 
discourses underpinning conflict management operations (Chandler, 2012: 224).  
     This approach was further promoted through the norm and framework of Responsibility to 
Protect which, although introduced in 2001, only entered the formal vocabulary of the UN with 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO).41 The concept of R2P stipulates that it is: first, a state’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens from fear and want; second, the international community must 
engage in preventive measures by assisting the state’s capacity to fulfil the requirements of the 
first pillar; third, if the state fails in its responsibility towards its citizens, the Security Council 
must use all necessary methods in a timely and decisive response to protect these citizens. Yet the 
concept of R2P has been diluted considerably from its original form and has altered nothing as 
the P5 members of the UNSC, to a large extent, still pursue policy in accordance with their vital 
interests, the criterion for intervention has been limited to specific circumstances, and the UNSC 
has ensured that it is not obliged to invoke R2P in times of crisis (Hehir, 2010: 222). R2P has also 
received considerable opposition and disapproval from particular members of the UN who fear 
that the erosion of sovereignty will result in anarchy, and view military intervention under R2P 
as both a pretext for regime change and a cloak for the promotion of post-colonial hegemonic 
interests (Thakur, 2013: 66; Morris, 2013: 1280). Irrespective of its architects’ intentions, R2P 
                                                          
in the Charter, and that such ‘impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in 
all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement’ (2000: chapter 2, paragraph 50, p. 9).  
Therefore, it was recognised that ‘In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious 
aggressors and victims and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but 
morally compelled to do so’ (Brahimi. 2000: chapter 2, paragraph 50, p. 9). 
41 Put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. 
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has not substituted existing approaches even in the most extreme cases of human rights abuses. It 
is questionable whether R2P, as a means to reconceptualise the use of force under the traditional 
banner of humanitarian intervention, has offered a new direction in the management of conflict. 
     The third trend is based on the re-calibration of conflict management operations to include a 
range of methods and operations. This is closely intertwined with the fourth trend based on the 
emergence of complex coordination and interaction through the pooling of sovereignty between 
multiple actors, where a consent-based culture of coordination between civil and military aspects 
of a mission developed. The deployment of UNPROFOR to the Balkans in 1992 was the most 
expansive mission the UN had ever conducted up until that point. It was a multifunctional 
operation which included military aspects alongside peacemaking, the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, sanctions, observation missions, and peacebuilding efforts. These methods and operations 
were consolidated under NATO in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, and were provided with 
further support by the UN.42  
     With the emergence of the EU’s ESDP during the early to mid-2000s, the EU largely replaced 
NATO and the UN in Bosnia & Herzegovina.43 In terms of managing Bosnia & Herzegovina, the 
EU employed what was later labelled a comprehensive approach. Javier Solana as Secretary 
General of the Council of the EU stated in 2009 that ‘This is the European way of doing things: 
a comprehensive approach to crisis prevention and crisis management; a large and diversified tool 
box; a rapid response capability; playing our role as a global actor’.44 At the heart of this approach 
was peacebuilding, understood as being crucial for the maintenance of a durable peace (Drent, 
                                                          
42 The UNSG and the UNDPKOs had recognised the utility of a multidimensional approach since the 
early 1990s with Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. This understanding remained consistent throughout 
the 1990s and into the 2000s with the publication of the UNDPKO’s Handbook on Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations in 2003. As a lead military actor in NATO, the UK also contributed towards 
doctrinal thinking in the organisation. The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) use the term ‘comprehensive 
approach’ which has been defined as ‘Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that 
enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’. See the MoD, 
‘The Comprehensive Approach’, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, 2006, p. 1-5. 
43 European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea) replaced KFOR in 2004, while the European Union 
Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) replaced UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) in 2002. 
44 Javier Solana ‘EU High Representative for the CFSP, addresses the European Parliament on the EU 
common, security and defence policy’, Council of the European Union, 18 February 2009, accessed 18 




2001: 3), the EU attempted to re-construct and re-habilitate the region as a means of re-socialising 
the region into the organisation. These multidimensional approaches reflected a deep level of 
coordination between civilian and military elements. For instance, the EU’s development of the 
tactical concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (2002) – which owes much to NATO’s 
Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) (2003) doctrine – and the political-strategic publication 
Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO) (2003) highlighted the need of what the European Council 
has termed ‘a culture of coordination’ when ‘ensuring overall coherence in the EU’s response to 
a crisis’.45 While the effectiveness of this coordination has received criticism (Spence, 2002; 
Gourlay, 2004; Drent, 2001; Schroeder, 2011), the point to consider is that there has been a 
deliberate adoption of these policies of coordination and interaction.46  
 
2.3 Russian conflict management  
Following a discussion on the trends of European conflict management, the chapter now outlines 
Russia’s experience. It will introduce how Russian conflict management is understood in the 
existing literature and discuss the limitations of this body of scholarship. The chapter will then 
highlight the contributions of the thesis by offering a more thorough interpretation using the 
framework of European security governance.   
 
2.3.1 The existing literature 
The existing literature on Russian conflict management can be organised around two bodies of 
scholarship across Russia’s immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. 
These literatures have developed almost independently from one another and have provided 
                                                          
45 Council of the European Union, ‘Civil Military Co-ordination’, 14457/03, 7 November 2003, paragraph 
4, p. 2 and paragraph 5, p. 2.  
46 Many European and wider Western actors recognise the multidimensional approach and its attended 
array of methods and channels of coordination. See the House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The 
Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace’ Seventh Report 
of Session 2009-10, 9 March 2010; Headquarters Department of the United States Army, ‘Stability 
Operations’, FM 3-07, October 2008, and the United States Institute of Peace ‘Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction’, United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 2009; Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘National strategy for Swedish 
participation in international peace-support and security-building operations’, Government 
Communication 2007/08:51, Stockholm 2007/2008.  
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varying degrees of insight. Certain aspects of both bodies of scholarship have only emphasised 
the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on its policy implementation in 
Moscow’s experience. Other scholars have concentrated on the narrow window of Russia’s 
experience between the early to mid-1990s. This is because the literature was written during this 
timeframe or scholarship has maintained a focus on this period of Russia’s experience. This 
treatment of Russian conflict management in the existing literature has severely limited its 
analytical rigour.  
 
Russia’s ‘wider’ European experience 
The existing literature on Russian approaches and involvement in the wider European space have 
focused on its engagement in the series of conflicts in the Balkans – specifically Croatia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The extent of their thoroughness has differed and so too has 
their research agenda. There are very few empirically informed accounts of Russia’s involvement 
and these are primarily focused on the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on 
its policy implementation in the Balkans (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; Antonenko, 1999; Lynch, 
1999; Baranovsky, 2000; Levitin, 2000; Headley, 2008; Averre, 2009; Hughes 2013). While this 
has offered an informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not 
systematically linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of 
developments in Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict 
management. James Headley (2009) is perhaps the most rigorous in his attempt to unpack and 
explain Russia’s behaviour in the Balkans. Headley traces the evolution of Russia’s involvement 
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s; however, his work is largely policy focused and lacks a close 
inspection on the development of Russian doctrine and practice. Headley specifically states that 
the study of Russia’s Balkan experience is to highlight trends in Russian foreign and security 
policy thinking (Headley, 2009: 4). This has been accompanied by other scholarship which 
although not as comprehensive, has also centred its analysis on Russian policy preferences – 
particularly in light of Russia’s evolving attitude towards NATO in the context of the impact on 
European security (Antonenko, 1999, 2007; Lynch, 1999; Levitin, 2000; Averre, 2009). There 
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are others in this body of literature which have even marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed 
to its lack of empirical utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict 
management, claiming that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience 
(Antonenko, 1999, 2007). This claim is deeply problematic as Russia’s involvement in the 
Balkans formed a central part of its conflict management experience in the context of the 
European milieu.  
 
The regional experience: ‘quintessentially’ Russian? 
One scholar has described Russia’s response towards intra-state conflict in its immediate regional 
space as being ‘quintessentially Russian; a Russian answer to a Russian problem, narrowly 
unilateral in its underlying motives and distinct in its practical manifestation from any regional or 
international responses to other emergencies’ (Mackinlay, 2003: 203). This view primarily sums 
up the existing literature’s understanding of Russia’s approach towards regional intra-state 
conflict. With few exceptions, scholarship has focused on the period of Russia’s involvement in 
intra-state violence during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This emphasis on Moscow’s involvement during this phase of its post-Soviet experience 
has raised several observations regarding its behaviour in the policy area of conflict management. 
These have centred around the following characteristics: (1) Russian contingents have dominated 
the conflict management operations; (2) Russian contingents have been prepared to employ high 
levels of force and have not been constrained by rules of engagement and defined mandates; (3) 
Russian troops have been deployed into active conflicts where there was no peace to keep; (4) 
Russian troops have sought to maintain at least the semblance of impartiality; (5) Russia has 
demonstrated a degree of cooperation with external international actors in the conflict zone – 
although Russian officials have dominated the settlement process (Allison, 1994: 15; Shashenkov, 
1994; 56; Jonson and Archer, 1996: 8: Lynch, 1999: 104-105; Yermolaev, 2000: 6-7). These are 
considered as defining characteristics of Russia’s regional experience of conflict management 
and, for the purposes of this discussion, can be categorised under the following headings: doctrine, 
practice, policymaking and decision-making, and drivers/motivations.   
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     In relation to doctrine, debates in the literature on Russian conflict management can be divided 
into two bodies with distinct and overlapping analytical aspects. The first body of scholarship has 
proposed that Russia’s understanding of conflict management is linked to a narrow set of methods 
and employed to expedite Russian political and strategic aims. Alternatively, the second body of 
literature has showed a more expansive and nuanced interpretation of Russian doctrinal 
understanding. While acknowledging that certain groups within the military understood conflict 
management to be a narrow military exercise, this body of scholarship also identified several other 
views between and within the power ministries, and military and political elite. In accordance 
with the doctrine being developed in Europe at the time, it was noted that these groups understood 
conflict management to be related to a much broader set of methods and concepts. In this regard, 
the first body of literature has concluded that Russian thinking was largely based on a military 
understanding of conflict management, with slippery conceptions of consent and impartiality. 
This body has exercised a narrow reading of Russia’s doctrinal understanding, associating it with 
a restricted set of principles and practices (Allison, 1994, 2013; Baev, 1993, 1996, 1998; 
Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995; Jonson and Archer, 1996).  
     It has been argued that without a rich legacy of conflict management Moscow’s experience of 
counterinsurgency was crucial in conditioning its initial doctrinal thinking, highlighting 
Moscow’s bloody campaign in Afghanistan as ‘the prototype for Russian peacekeeping 
operations and doctrine’ (Sagramoso, 2003: 15). In this sense, Soviet military thought based on 
offensive force was considered the bedrock shaping Russia’s doctrinal thinking on conflict 
management. Proceeding from this assumption, this commentary argued that Russia exercised a 
narrow interpretation of the terms mitovorcheskiye operatsii (‘peacemaking’ or ‘peace-creating’ 
operations) and, less frequently used, opertsii po poderzhaniyu mira (‘operations for the 
maintenance of peace’) identified in Russian parlance (see Allison, 1994: 1). Pavel Baev (1996: 
136) claims that ‘Russian views on conducting peace-keeping operations differ strikingly from 
thinking in the West’, pointing out that ‘the fundamental difference concerns the concept of low-
intensity conflicts. While Western theories suggest a rather ambivalent link, in Russia 
peacekeeping remains part and parcel of conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1996: 135).  
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     This close association with ‘conflict-waging’ is also acknowledged by other Western expert 
opinion, with Roy Allison (1994: 1) characterising peace-creating as an ‘assertive, even coercive, 
function [which] may involve a strong element of enforcement’. While Dov Lynch (1999: 97) 
understands the debate to be more nuanced in practitioner and policymaker circles, he suggests 
that ‘Peace-creating operations have implications that transcend classic and emerging UN 
peacekeeping norms’, pointing out that ‘The concept of mirotvorcheskiye operatsii is similar to 
the Western concept of peace-enforcement, where standard military principles characterize 
combat actions’. Peace-creating has therefore been understood as solely a military enterprise via 
the application of force beyond a defensive and limited capacity because ‘Their rules of 
engagement are often very flexible about the use of force’ (Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995: 321).  
     The second body of literature has provided a more expansive understanding of Russian 
thinking. This is based on a recognition of a pluralistic debate which occurred during this period 
and has acknowledged that Russian perspectives on conflict management have been far more 
nuanced than the positions expressed above, with views emanating from the military 
establishment/MoD, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the CIS General Staff (Crow, 
1992; Allison, 1994; Jonson and Archer, 1996; Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1996; Lynch, 1999; 
Yermolaev, 2000; Sagramoso, 2003). These, according to one scholar, have spanned from 
‘traditional interposition to integrating ‘peacekeeping’ into war-fighting concepts’ (Lynch, 1999: 
94). Both Lynch (1999) and Domitilla Sagramoso (2003) have offered lengthy discussions about 
the pluralism that shaped the Russian doctrinal debate during the early 1990s. This debate has 
largely been conditioned by a set of views emanating from the central power ministries, 
principally the MFA and the MoD. In relation to the former, Lynch (1999: 96) contends that the 
Foreign Ministry’s approach ‘allows for more force than do traditional international peacekeeping 
practices’, and have ‘sought to combine in ‘peacekeeping’ the carefully calibrated use of force 
with political instruments to promote conflict resolution and advance Russian interests’.  
     In comparison to the MFA, the literature identifies an unfolding of an internal debate within 
the MoD during the early 1990s. Lynch (1999: 96) states that while the MoD was more 
consciously interventionist, it was divided on ‘peacekeeping’ as a form of military activity. 
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Indeed, Allison (1996: 271) points out that the debate between Russian high ranking military 
commanders expressed ‘differing underlying principles and doctrinal assumptions’. Lynch 
elucidates this further and contends that the first group within the military establishment/MoD 
accepted the use of coercive intervention short of war in the internal affairs of the former Soviet 
Republics. This group advocates peacekeeping as a military-political instrument to resolve 
conflicts. However, as Sagramoso (2003: 24) puts forward while there were similarities between 
Russian and Western thinking on the conduct of operations, ‘Western peacekeeping concepts 
tended to emphasize the humanitarian character of peacekeeping operations as well as the need 
to interact with civilian structures, [whereas] Russian operations tended to follow narrower 
interests’. Sagramoso (2003: 24) is tougher on Russia’s understanding than Lynch, stating that 
the Russian military tended to stress the importance of facilitating a quick termination of 
hostilities, while Western doctrine emphasised the necessity ‘to reach reconciliation among the 
sides for the operation to be called a success’. At the same time, the second group within the 
military establishment/MoD, considered peacekeeping a ‘war-fighting tool in low-intensity 
conflicts and counter-insurgency operations’ (Lynch, 1999: 97).  
     In relation to practice, Lynch’s (1999: 4) work on ‘armed suasion’ is perhaps referred to the 
most when discussing Russian regional conflict management. Lynch (1999: 4) contends that 
international norms and standards of peacekeeping do not apply in the Russian case, arguing that 
the Russian government has pursued a deliberate ‘strategy of armed suasion’ [emphasis in 
original] using coercive intervention, ‘peacekeeping’, and ‘various forms of political pressure’ in 
an attempt ‘to restore clear hierarchical power relations in the CIS region by means short of war’.  
In this sense it is widely recognised that Russian behaviour departed from official doctrine centred 
in the CIS which advocated traditional rules of engagement based on the strict adherence to 
consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. The ‘striking difference’, according to Pavel 
Baev (1993: 142; also see Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1996: 321; Sagramoso, 2003: 29), between 
‘Eastern and ‘Western’ approaches is the ‘absence of the principle of neutrality’ where in these 
operations Russian troops impose ‘a quasi-peace that is probably worth keeping only for Russia’s 
own national interests’. Indeed, Shashenkov (1994: 60) adds that Russia has ‘blurred the 
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distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement’. This is closely intertwined with the 
fragmentation of policymaking and implementation demonstrated by the autonomy of the forces 
on the ground. It is recognised that the ‘dichotomy between peacekeeping theory and practice’ is 
largely a result of the ‘reactive and unplanned nature of Russia’s operations’ (Sagromoso, 2003: 
28). Allison (1994: 2) concurs, suggesting that the requirements of the situation on the ground 
have largely determined the character of Russia’s response rather than any preconceived notions 
or principles. Another aspect of Russian behaviour is that Russian operations are largely unilateral 
with an instrumental understanding of the legitimating benefits regional and international 
organisations, such as the CIS, would offer (Allison, 1994:8). Finally, Baev notes that Russia’s 
understanding and practice of conflict management is confined in various ways to the political 
and military domains and, therefore, other approaches such as peacebuilding is completely foreign 
to those involved. Baev (1993: 141) suggests that ‘The idea of peace-building (i.e. social 
reconstruction) remains essentially foreign, mainly due to the dangerous erosion of the socio-
economic fabric in the newly-born states, all ripe for social conflicts’.  
     Driving Russian engagement and behaviour in these conflicts is a central point in the literature 
and relates to the wider foreign and security policy direction of Russia in the immediate aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Shashenkov (1994: 61-62) makes a crucial point relating to 
the consequences of the retreat of empire, which is largely overlooked in the existing literature 
on Russian regional approaches. ‘A fact that is often neglected, both in the West and Russia’, 
Shashenkov (1994: 61-62) comments, ‘is that current developments in the FSU signify the 
decolonisation and imperial separation of one of the largest-ever continental empires’. Comparing 
the withdrawal of the Soviet empire with the experiences of British and French dis-engagement 
during the 1950s and 1960s, both countries aimed to perpetuate military bases in regions of 
strategic importance and to establish a network of agreements with the newly independent states. 
According to Shashenkov, ‘These steps were seen as necessary to prevent potentially dangerous 
local crises, to help contain rival influences and to defend the ‘metropole’s’ remaining interests 
[…]’. In this regard, the ‘peculiarities of Russian peacekeeping’ are derived from Moscow’s 
imperial transition and separation where insecurity along Russia’s periphery has ‘immediate 
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repercussions for Russia’s own security and domestic politics’ (Shashenkov, 1994: 62). It is 
argued that Russia must shape and stabilise its periphery or the ‘developments in the near abroad 
will determine Russia’s own development through waves of refugees, political upheaval, regional 
conflicts and instability’ (Shashenkov, 1994: 49).  
     Allison (1994: 15; also see Suzanne Crow, 1993) acknowledges the difficult circumstances of 
Russia’s involvement, identifying that Russian commitment in such regions is ‘vitally bound up 
with its own national interests’, and that while Russia is interested in quelling conflict and 
providing stability, Russia is also ‘intent on pursuing strong political or strategic interests in the 
region’ (Allison, 1994:15). Other scholarship is less balanced in its inspection of Russian 
motivations and drivers. Alongside McNeil (1997), Macfarlane and Schnabel (1996: 309) are 
candid in their assessment of Russian behaviour, stating that ‘Russian peacekeeping is a symbol 
of the inability of these states to sustain their sovereign statehood in the face of an interfering 
regional hegemon and of Russia’s intention to assert its position as the primary power in the CIS’. 
Lynch (2000: 4) is in agreement, in that the Russian operations differ from international practices 
because they do not necessarily reflect the will of the international community to maintain peace 
and security – but more the unilateral will of the Russian government to assert its influence 
abroad’. 
 
2.4 Re-assessing Russia’s response  
This section will highlight the broader contributions of the present writers’ research and then 
outline the thesis’ argument in light of the existing literature discussed above.  
 
Contributions and positioning  
By focusing on Russia’s approach towards complex intra-state conflicts, this research is 
concerned about how Russia has attempted to manage an increasingly fragmented external 
environment because of the processes of globalisation; and how this has contributed towards the 
shaping of Russia’s political and security relationship with the system of European security 
governance. This research makes an empirical contribution by providing a rigorous insight into 
Russian security behaviour in the policy area of conflict management. The existing literature has 
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failed to provide an empirically informed and rounded analysis of Russia’s approach towards 
conflict management in the European security milieu. This thesis fills this gap in the existing 
research by offering an extensive empirical treatment of Russian behaviour in the policy area of 
conflict management. This is based on rigorous empirical research based on elite interviews and 
extensive documentary analysis, which goes beyond the empirical reach of existing scholarship. 
     This empirical contribution is combined with the thesis’ conceptual significance concerning 
the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline of 
IR and Security Studies. In the former, the project complements existing research agendas in the 
security governance literature as broadly outlined in chapter 1. To recap, these research agendas 
focus on: (1) the link between the Westphalian to the Post-Westphalian state, particularly in 
Europe and its periphery, to the growing relevance and practice of security governance; (2) and 
to the assessment of the evolution of security governance across time and space in the European 
regional context (see Sperling, 2014: 3-4). In this regard, the project applies these existing 
research agendas in the security governance literature to the context of Russia’s political and 
security relationship with the central actors of European security governance. However, it offers 
a contribution beyond existing works which have only offered a general level of analysis 
regarding Russia and issues of European security governance (Webber, 2000, 2007; Mirwaldt and 
Ivanov, 2007; Averre, 2010). Yet, while providing an insight into the wider contours of Russian 
foreign and security policy, none of these studies offer an extensive treatment of Russia’s 
behaviour regarding policies of security governance. They do not ‘bore’ into the specifics of an 
issue area to provide a close conceptual and empirical inspection of Russia’s understanding of 
and approach towards security governance. This thesis will therefore assess Russian foreign and 
security policy in accordance with the Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security 
governance literature, and through this will examine Russia’s interaction with the evolution of 
security governance across time and space in the specific policy area of conflict management.  
     In the latter, this thesis contributes towards the wider disciplines of IR and Security Studies by 
using security governance to frame the research project. It is acknowledged that security 
governance still possesses a degree of obscurity and has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance 
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and attention as its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and 
regimes, and global governance. Despite this, there is ample empirical evidence that security 
governance is a ‘real-world’ phenomenon that requires further explanation and provides a fruitful 
research programme and framework for understanding contemporary security issues and ‘the 
evolutionary trajectory of […] international [and] [regional] systems’ (Sperling, 2014: 3). The 
project will therefore add to and demonstrate the conceptual and empirical purchase of the 
security governance literature to the disciplines of IR and Security Studies. As shown in the 
previous chapter, security governance sits alongside, complements, and in some cases, goes 
beyond established ways of thinking about decision-making and policy implementation in the 
realm of security.  
     To reiterate, the aim of this research is to analyse continuity and change in Russian doctrine, 
policy, and practice in accordance with the norms and processes of security governance developed 
in European conflict management. Therefore, this thesis is driven by the following research 
question: 
 
• To what extent has Russian policy and doctrine corresponded with developments in 
security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in practice by 
other European actors?  
 
This thesis has arrived at this question because the focus of much of existing literature on Russian 
conflict management is restricted to Russia’s behaviour in its immediate regional space during a 
narrow timeframe between the early to mid-1990s. This severely limits our understanding about 
how Russia has responded to complex intra-state conflicts and how this has informed Moscow’s 
wider relationship with the system of European security governance. An exploration of the 
evolution of Russia’s regional and wider European experiences is required to understand Russian 
conflict management in the European context. The first component of this limitation relates to the 
unbalanced nature of existing analysis. The literature has failed to provide a complete narrative 
of Russia’s engagement in conflict management in the European context. Emphasis is 
predominantly placed on Russia’s regional experience whilst largely overlooking Russia’s 
experience across the wider European neighbourhood. Russia’s engagement in the Balkans is a 
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vital episode in its experience of conflict management and the minimal attention it has received 
is a significant drawback in the analytical integrity of existing scholarship.  
     This study will therefore employ a rigorous multi-case study research agenda to elucidate 
Russia’s behaviour across these spaces. Through a comparative analysis of these case-studies a 
more comprehensive insight into Russia’s policy and understanding of conflict management will 
be provided. This will allow comparisons to be drawn between Russia’s behaviour in and outside 
of its immediate regional space, which will offer a more rounded understanding of Russian 
conflict management in the European context. This is crucial as the existing literature discussed 
in the previous section has emerged primarily independent of each other demonstrating limited 
comparative analysis. This is particularly problematic as existing understandings of Russian 
conflict management have largely become synonymous with its regional experience, where the 
legacy of existing frameworks and analysis have been imprecise. As discussed above, while a 
degree of ambiguity in Russia’s response has been recognised, the majority of existing literature 
has difficulties providing a nuanced understanding of Russian behaviour, where it has largely 
leaned towards an interpretation of Russian conflict management as an exercise of coercion. Yet, 
as will be argued below, Russia’s experience of conflict management in the European context is 
linked to a considerably more expansive set of principles and practices than currently understood. 
     Even where attempts have been made to engage in an analysis of Russia’s wider European 
experience, these have largely been limited in empirical scope (Ullman, 1996; Gow, 1997; 
Antonenko, 1999, 2007; Baranovsky, 2000; Levitin, 2000; Lynch, 1999; Headley, 2008; Averre, 
2009; Hughes 2013). Yet, where rich empirical investigations are provided they have only 
emphasised the impact of Russia’s wider foreign and security thinking on Moscow’s policy 
implementation in the Balkans (Thorun, 2008; Headley, 2009). While this has offered an 
informative insight into the contours of Russia’s general Balkan policy, it has not systematically 
linked a discussion on Russian policy to a detailed and rigorous inspection of developments in 
Russian doctrine and practice within the broader context of European conflict management. There 
are others in this body of literature which have even marginalised this area of enquiry and pointed 
to its lack of empirical utility in contributing towards a deeper understanding of Russian conflict 
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management, claiming that Russia failed to learn any expertise from its Balkan experience 
(Antonenko, 1999, 2007). This is highly problematic as Russia’s consistent and deep level of 
engagement in the Balkans – even after Moscow’s withdrawal in 2003 of its military contingents 
from the operations in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo – Russia maintained an interest in the 
developments of the peace processes in each region.  
     The second component of the existing literature’s limitation relates to the timeframe in which 
research has focused upon. The majority of major studies which specifically focus on Russian 
conflict management doctrine and practice tend to focus on the narrow window of Russia’s 
experience between the early to mid-1990s. While this has been unavoidable for certain 
scholarship because they were written during this timeframe, others have deliberately continued 
to focus on this phase of Russian conflict management. Russia’s approach to conflict management 
has been misunderstood because there has been very little consideration of potential change in 
Russia’s behaviour in accordance with evolving European (international) norms and processes 
beyond this timeframe. This has misrepresented Russian conflict management because there has 
been very little consideration of potential change and development in Russia’s understanding and 
behaviour. Furthermore, this limitation has been further intensified as existing analysis has not 
taken into consideration changes in norms and practices in European approaches (alongside the 
UN) when analysing Russian behaviour. The literature has interpreted a narrow set of static 
principles and practices, which fails to consider the development in means to manage the impact 
of an increasingly fragmented external environment since the end of the Cold War. An 
informative understanding of Russia’s behaviour can only be achieved if its responses to these 
transitions in security policy are taken into consideration. This has a wider impact in that the 
failure to appreciate the fluidity of norms and practices in this policy area, restricts our 
understanding of their impact on Russia’s broader political and security relationship with the 
central actors of European security governance.  
     Thinking about Russian conflict management in terms of security governance can go far in 
helping to correct existing limitations in the current literature, in terms of how Russian behaviour 
has been approached analytically and in relation to the sets of conclusions formulated. Security 
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governance will help to organise the analysis and bridge an enquiry between Russia’s behaviour 
in its immediate regional space and in the wider European neighbourhood. By offering a coherent, 
though not uncontested, framework drawn from the security governance literature this study will 
identify and elucidate the behaviour of Russia across these two spaces to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of Russian doctrine, policy, and practice. As security governance 
captures the fluidity of the European security environment and the complexity of the response 
towards insecurity, security governance will assist in the identification of changes in Russian 
security behaviour in accordance with the approaches developed in European conflict 
management. This framework allows for the possibility that Russian behaviour has engaged in 
trends of European conflict management elucidated by security governance, moving beyond 
narrow interpretations that render Moscow’s response as narrow self-interested and destabilising 
acts.  
Argument 
This thesis argues that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state 
conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in 
European conflict management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s 
approach showed that it was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised. Its 
behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core aspects of the norms and 
processes of security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. 
Crucially, Russian approaches have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian and Post-
Westphalian security behaviour, with a selective subscription to the methods and aims across the 
spectrum of operations developed in the European experience. This has been driven by a policy 
that combines the staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests with a declared 
commitment to collective European approaches that have attempted to manage the impact of 
globalisation in the policy area of conflict management. In this regard, while Russia’s wider 
policy agenda may gravitate towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact 
of globalisation, its behaviour in conflict management has shown a more nuanced picture of its 
security preferences. Indeed, both ‘Westphalian and post-Westphalian states often share an 
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interest in effective security governance efforts that can turn failed states into functioning units’ 
(Wagnsson and Holmberg, 2014: 326).   
     To manage globalisation and its attended consequences, such as the complexity and 
fragmentation of the external European environment, European actors have engaged in policies 
of security governance. Security policy in European conflict management has moved from a 
Westphalian to a Post-Westphalian character, which follows from the assumption that security 
policy has shifted from government (state-centred hierarchical security policy) to governance 
(fragmentation of policymaking and political authority) (Webber and Sperling, 2014: 128). As 
discussed above, it is understood that the operations Westphalian actors participate in are typically 
predicated on limited engagement, strict adherence to sovereignty, and remain wedded to the 
notions of consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These operations have limited goals 
of establishing peace through a cease fire. At the other extreme, operations post-Westphalian 
actors participate in tend to be based on extensive engagement, employ a flexible view of 
sovereignty, and understand the necessity of the recalibration of the notions of consent, 
impartiality, and the use of force. These operations include a range of methods, have wider goals, 
and possess not only short but long term aims in establishing peace through cease fires and the 
facilitation (and enforcement) of democratic polities and economies in the host country (Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin, 2010: 36; also see MacQueen, 2006). These divergent approaches, based 
largely on actor preference, demonstrate the differences in policies adopted to manage the impact 
of globalisation.  
     In the case of Russia, the existing scholarship discussed above has either situated its behaviour 
towards the Westphalian end of the continuum arguing that its operations have shown limited 
methods and narrow aims (Baev, 1996: 139), or in its more critical form has argued that its 
approach is located on an entirely different spectrum in terms of doctrine, policy, and practice. 
As noted above, this body of literature has contended that Russia’s behaviour remains part and 
parcel of ‘conflict-waging’ (Baev, 1998: 216) largely devoid of humanitarian and peacebuilding 
processes and aims (Baev, 1997: 116), and employed primarily to serve narrow Russian interests 
(Macfarlane and Schnabel, 1995). However, Russia’s engagement in the wider European 
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neighbourhood, principally in the Balkans, demonstrated a largely consistent approach that 
gravitated towards a middle-ground between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security 
provision. In Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow exercised a purposeful approach that 
was rooted in and shaped by the specific circumstances and developments of the conflict. This 
was not, as is typically argued, informed by a superficial thinking to protect its ‘Serbian brothers’ 
or merely an appendage of predetermined political and strategic aims vis-à-vis the emerging 
system of European security governance. While these aims cannot be ruled out particularly from 
the mid-2000s onwards, they did not override Russia’s contribution towards European security 
governance through an interpretation of conflict management in Croatia and Bosnia & 
Herzegovina that showed convergence with European approaches.  
     Russia was deeply embedded in the peace efforts in both Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina 
and in Kosovo. Indeed, many of the lessons and thinking that Russia cultivated in Croatia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina – such as the maintenance of collective action through various channels 
of stakeholder interaction – were carried through into its experience in Kosovo. Although for 
Russian policymakers Kosovo represented a watershed in Moscow’s relations with the central 
actors of European security governance and while Russia’s approach demonstrated a deepening 
divergence on certain aspects of European conflict management – particularly in relation to the 
use of force beyond the tactical level –, Russia maintained a consistent degree of convergence 
with other aspects of security governance. These related to the facilitation of the humanitarian 
and security-related processes in the areas of peacebuilding, the delivery of aid, and the 
maintenance of security. Moscow employed a policy throughout the conflicts that was shaped 
largely by principle rather than self-interest and balancing behaviour against its European 
counterparts.   
     In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has demonstrated a degree of ambiguity 
although this has not been a consistent characteristic of its response. Russia’s involvement in 
regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal 
understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The 
period in the early to mid-1990s demonstrated a considerable degree of ambiguity because of 
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transition in policy and due to the chaos created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the 
mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, Moscow demonstrated a degree of engagement in policies of 
security governance to mitigate the underlying tensions that remained in the conflict zones. 
Contrary to existing scholarship, Russia did not employ a policy to freeze the settlement processes 
during this phase, but was heavily involved in negotiations to facilitate a settlement. Furthermore, 
Russia was relatively consistent with its understanding of the role of force – although this was 
used in 2008 for political reasons. Alongside this, Russia attempted to expedite the humanitarian 
and settlement processes in the various zones of conflict. Its invitation to external actors has been 
qualified, but Russia has shown more willingness to engage in collective action at the operational 
and diplomatic levels with the UN, the OSCE, and other actors than typically recognised.  
     From the mid-2000s onwards, the tension between its contribution towards European security 
governance and the safeguarding of its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s 
approach towards the former Soviet space. Russia found it increasingly difficult to accept the 
widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. Consequently, its 
approach included the manipulation of methods attributed to policies of security governance, 
while at the same time reflected elements of its behaviour towards conflict in the wider European 
neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which largely interprets Russia’s regional 
experience as a highly calibrated response in the service of national interest. Russia’s behaviour 
has demonstrated a degree of continuity with its behaviour in the Balkans.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The approach employed in this thesis is driven by an agenda to understand the Russian experience 
of conflict management from 1991 to the end of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012 in the 
context of the European milieu. To explore this experience, this thesis has developed a research 
question which examines the extent Russian policy and doctrine has corresponded with 
developments in security governance as broadly understood in the literature and applied in 
practice by other European actors. To answer this question, this thesis has employed the 
framework of European security governance to bridge an analysis between Russia’s behaviour 
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across its regional space and the wider European neighbourhood, and to ‘map’ its behaviour in 
accordance with the evolution of norms and processes of European security governance. In doing 
so, this thesis demonstrates that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-
state conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed 
in European conflict management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s 
approach showed that it was far more expansive and complex than currently recognised. Its 
behaviour demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core norms and processes of 
security governance which have evolved in European conflict management. This thesis provides 
an original and distinctive contribution by offering an exhaustive empirical assessment of Russian 
conflict management beyond the parameter of existing scholarship, and offers further conceptual 
insight into the literature of security governance by applying the framework rigorously to an 
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3.0 Introduction  
 
The international peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina has been considered ‘the 
paradigm case, from which different lessons are drawn, the example which is used to argue out 
different general positions, and, at the same time, a laboratory in which different ways of 
managing the new wars are experimented’ (Kaldor, 2007: 6). The spread of this violence in the 
early 1990s during Yugoslavia’s disintegration – precipitated by Croatia’s and Slovenia’s initial 
declarations of independence which was quickly followed by Bosnia & Herzegovina’s – triggered 
mass atrocities within and between local communities that had for decades peacefully coexisted. 
The tragic events which gripped this corner of Europe were a bitter reminder of the inevitable 
reality of chaos attributed to war – yet this time, deeply protracted intra-state violence. As 
discussed in chapter 2, to mitigate these intra-state conflicts European actors began to engage in 
certain trends to tackle the violence and to facilitate a ‘durable’ peace.        
     Russia was a central participant in this learning process, contributing towards its failures and 
successes, with one former Russian UN Military Observer (UNMO) suggesting that ‘Russia learnt 
a lot in the operations in the Balkans […] under the influence of the European way of 
peacekeeping’.47 This chapter will unpack Russia’s response and argue that Russia’s contribution 
was largely within the mainstream of the approaches exercised by the international peace effort. 
                                                          
47 Interview conducted with Professor Yuri Morozov, Moscow, 27 October 2014.  
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While there were points of divergence especially regarding the use of force and in relation to 
Russia’s grievance concerning international bias against the Bosnian Serbs, Moscow exercised a 
sophisticated approach which showed conformity with European conflict management as 
captured by the evolving norms and processes of European security governance. Contrary to 
existing scholarly opinion, the chapter will point out that Russia’s involvement in the international 
peace effort was essential for the consolidation and realisation of its official understanding of 
conflict management.  
     This chapter is divided into two principal sections covering Russia’s engagement across the 
pre- and post-Dayton phases of the peace effort in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. This 
analysis is organised with reference to the dimensions of European security governance which 
have given rise to the evolutionary trends in European conflict management. 
 
3.1 Pre-Dayton: managing intra-state violence 
3.1.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity 
 
The UN-led intervention into Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina was by the time of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 the largest and most complex operation ever undertaken. This 
included overlapping missions and aims in addition to multiple actors and channels of stakeholder 
interaction.48 Figure 3.1 outlines this complexity and Russia’s engagement in stakeholder 
interaction complexity demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty. Most 
analysis considers Moscow’s engagement in collective action as travelling along a trajectory from 
cooperation to independence. This is usually explained because of the cooling of relations with 
the central actors of European security governance during the early to mid-1990s due to 
Moscow’s increasing awareness of its national interests (Headly, 2009: 4; also see Thorun, 2008). 
While there is merit in this argument, Foreign Minister Kozyrev was aware of the value ascribed 
                                                          
48 The diplomatic level consisted of formal actors such as the Security Council, the UNSG (and the 
UNSGSR), and the EC, alongside the ad hoc arrangements of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICFY) and the Contact Group. At the operational level the central actor was the 
UNPROFOR which conducted the mission alongside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a host of NGOs. NATO was also 
an important actor, gaining an influential role as the conflict evolved. 
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to collective action and was adamant that attempting to ‘solve the Yugoslav problem single-
handedly’ was an illusion and that Russia did ‘not intend to solve this problem through its own 
efforts’.49 Certain commentators have pointed out that even on the occasions where Russia acted 
unilaterally, there was no indication that Moscow was purposefully seeking to undermine Western 
positions or policies (Ullman, 1996: 30). As noted in Chapter 1, while there was a change in 
relations, Russia still maintained a policy of cooperation with its European and wider Western 
counterparts.  
     Moscow’s view was that while it was not a formal member of NATO or the EC, it was a 
legitimate actor within the negotiating process. The Kremlin’s effort in steering collective action 
away from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions was not a deliberate policy of obstruction. 
Rather, it was to facilitate a more inclusive dependence on wider international organisations based 
on or closely affiliated with the UN or the CSCE. This did not rule out cooperation with actors 
such as NATO, but demonstrated that Moscow was more comfortable when interacting through 
organisations or informal arrangements where it could legitimately contribute towards the shaping 
of the peace effort. Operationally, Russian forces were under the institutional auspices of the UN 
and made efforts to engage with NGOs and external agencies, although these were largely part of 
the UN System rather than independent actors. 
                                                          






During early 1992 Moscow’s involvement in the debate over Yugoslavia’s future membership in 
the CSCE emphasised the importance of collective action, with Russian officials stating that ‘We 
wanted Russia’s voice to be heeded on these issues […] [and] held within a triangular framework 
– the EC, the US and Russia’.50 Russia considered the UN as the ultimate arbiter where actions 
taken were subordinate to the decision-making process at the Security Council.51 While Russia 
was clear about the hierarchical nature of the Security Council, as long as its wider procedural 
authority over the peace process was taken into consideration this did not rule out Moscow’s 
                                                          
50 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, no. 19, 1992, Izvestiya, 13 May 1992.  




advocacy for multiple channels of interaction. Russia’s involvement throughout 1993 with the 
promotion of the ICFY’s Vance-Owen Plan (VOP) demonstrated this. Agreeing to the 
establishment of the ICFY as a coordinating body within the legal framework of the Security 
Council (Gow, 1997: 195), Russia participated in complex channels of interaction. The ICFY 
aimed to create diplomatic unity between the EC and the UN to facilitate a final settlement to the 
conflict (Sloan, 1998: 46). Even after the rejection of VOP by Pale in early May 1993 Russia 
engaged in a further diplomatic tour of the Balkans and European capitals to gather support for 
the VOP.52 The ICFY retained a place in the negotiations during the latter years of the conflict 
and maintained its diplomatic relations with Moscow over issues of the UNSG’s authorisation of 
NATO airstrikes in mid-1994.53 
     Alongside the ICFY, Russia’s engagement in the diplomatic process was also through the 
Contact Group from 1994 onwards. Via the Contact Group, Kozyrev stated that all those involved 
in the peace effort must pool their resources together to establish a ceasefire.54 However, Kozyrev 
made the primacy of the UN clear, arguing that all initiatives of the Contact Group had to reflect 
the principles of international law and be in unison with the Security Council.55 The Contact 
Group aimed to emulate the authoritative weight of the Security Council, whilst streamlining the 
decision-making process through the relevant central powers. As four of the participating states 
in the Contact Group were permanent members of the Security Council a degree of continuity 
was maintained.  
     The Contact Group was a central diplomatic forum based on a loose co-ordinating committee 
of representatives from the central participating powers (Leigh-Phippard, 1998: 307-309).56 By 
mid-May 1994, the Contact Group members had proposed a settlement plan which Russian 
                                                          
52 Remarking on Moscow’s level of interaction, Owen expressed that ‘It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that without Russia’s assistance, the current progress in settling the conflict would not have been 
achieved’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 20, 1993, Izvestiya, 18 May 1993. 
53 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol xlvi, no. 18, newspaper n/a, n.d.a, 1994. 
54 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1935 B/5, 2 March 1994, Itar Tass, 28 February 1994. 
55 Itar Tass, 6 July 1995, accessed 12 March 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3386475. 




officials were instrumental in expediting via diplomatic negotiation with Belgrade and Pale.57 Yet 
with the failure of the Plan and an increase in the fighting, cracks began to appear between the 
central powers because of divisions over whether to lift the arms embargo across the region.58 
Throughout 1995 Moscow continued to promote the Contact Group although diverging views 
shaped many of the ministerial meetings regarding the use of force and NATO’s greater role in 
the peace effort.59 The advent of the NATO bombings in late 1995 triggered a flurry of Russian 
diplomacy to re-establish the political character of the peace effort in accordance with the Contact 
Group.60 With the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in early October 1995, Moscow 
facilitated negotiations via the Contact Group which helped to lay the groundwork for the Dayton 
Accords in December 1995.61 
Operational level 
Russia supported the facilitation of the operation through UNPROFOR and its various agencies. 
While this did not rule out Russia’s cooperation with actors outside of the UN system, Moscow 
was conscious of external actors such as NATO undermining the integrity of the UN’s authority. 
Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev argued that UNPROFOR’s replacement by NATO was 
unnecessary as the Alliance was not yet a ‘peace organisation’ and that ‘peacekeeping functions 
are operated by units from different countries under the auspices of the UN’.62 Being integrated 
                                                          
57 Russia contributed considerably to the details of the Plan, with President Yeltsin claiming that ‘we 
[Russia] have seized the initiative to a significant extent’. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 
vol. xlvi, no. 17, 1994, Izvestiya, 30 April 1994.  
58 For instance, during an October meeting in New York, Churkin expressed that ‘no one is able to find 
approaches to a solution. There is still a rather substantial distance between the sides’ positions. It isn’t 
clear how the pieces can be put together so as to ultimately form a single, integral picture’. See the 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 42, 1994, Sevodnya, 19 October 1994.  
59 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2318 B/10, 1 June 1995, Interfax, 20 May 1995; and BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2324 B/10, 8 June 1995, Itar Tass, 6 June 1995. 
60 On the order of Yeltsin, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov conducted a phase of shuttle 
diplomacy liaising with Croat and Bosnian Muslim officials in Zagreb and chaired the September Contact 
Group meeting in Geneva. See Itar Tass, 14 September 1995, accessed 14 March 2014. 
61 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2437 B8, 18 October 1995, Itar Tass, 16 October 1995. 
62 This view was echoed by the Deputy Chairman of the Upper Chamber of the Federal Assembly of the 
Russian Federation, which was very much in accordance with anti-NATO domestic political 
opinion. After an official visit by the delegation of the Federation Council to the region, the Deputy 
Chairman asserted that ‘NATO is not a peace organisation. It has completely different goals and 
objectives. In neither case should NATO be allowed to get into this conflict’. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 
July 1994, accessed 14 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3378729. 
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into the UNPROFOR chain of command, Russian forces conformed to the same operational 
channels of interaction as the other troop-contributing countries.63  
     Russian units adhered to Security Council Resolution 776 (1992) (Krysenko, 1993) and 
regularly interacted with the UNHCR and NGOs in ensuring the smooth delivery of humanitarian 
supplies.64 This fell within the remit of UNPROFOR which was tasked to provide protection at 
UNHCR’s request.65 This coordination was also required in protection of the various designated 
safe areas throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina. Adapting to the multidimensional nature of the 
operation was both a new experience for Russia and its partners; however, despite Russia’s 
interaction with many of these actors, Moscow was sceptical of their integrity. Colonel Andrei 
Demurenko, who was Chief of Staff Sector Sarajevo in 1995, claimed that only agencies of the 
UN system were proficient in their duties, where many other organisations lacked accountability, 
profited from black market activity and learned how to exploit the ethnic factor of the conflict to 
their benefit.66  
     This scepticism also underpinned Russia’s concern about decision on the use of force. 
Although Moscow accepted the dual-key system, this side-lined the authority of the Security 
Council and with it Moscow’s veto.67 Therefore, Kozyrev sent a letter to Boutros-Ghali in 1994 
and declared that the question of airstrikes should be the subject of further consultations with the 
permanent members of the Security Council.68 The extent of this exclusion became apparent 
                                                          
63 Russian units were stationed in Croatia from mid-1992 and in Bosnia & Herzegovina from early 1994. 
In the former, a Russian military contingent took control of United Nations Sector East which was a 
Serbian-held area of eastern Croatia, while in the latter Russia contributed troops to Sector Sarajevo 
alongside multinational forces under UN command. To provide coherence within the command structures 
of UNPROFOR, a detachment of Russian officers was also based at the HQ of each sector their troops 
were stationed, and at the general HQ of the UN in Zagreb. See Krysenko, 1993. 
64 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1935 B/11, 2 March, 1994, Itar Tass, 26 February 1994. 
65 See Secretary General Report 24540 (S/24540), 10 September 1992, paragraph 3. Also note that it was 
the UNHCR’s responsibility to liaise and coordinate with other NGOs if they required an escort from 
UNPROFOR forces when carrying out their humanitarian missions. See Secretary General Report 24540 
(S/24540) 10 September 1992, paragraph. 4.  
66 As Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo, Colonel Demurenko was in a central position to comment on the 
conduct of certain NGOs operating in this Sector. He explains that some local NGOs would receive 
kickbacks by cooperating with criminal elements operating in Sarajevo and its surrounding region. See 
Thomas (1996).  
67 This gave the Secretary General (and representative) the final decision over the use of force when 
requested by the commander of UNPROFOR and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC). 




during NATO’s bombing campaign in late 1995, when Boutros-Ghali relinquished authority over 
the use of force to UNPROFOR and NATO.69 Yeltsin declared that ‘They go beyond UN Security 
Council decisions’, with the Russian political elite regarding them as unilateral.70  
     Russia strictly applied the procedural rules of the UN offices towards the various actors of the 
UN involved in the mission. Moscow was content with the Secretary General exercising 
diplomatic weight through formal channels, but held reservations when these involved decisions 
on the use of force. Alternatively, others took a more permissive stance towards the mechanics of 
the decision-making process. Credible arguments were made by the Secretary General and the 
central NATO countries that authorisation for the use of force had already been granted at the 
Security Council through the various Chapter VII Resolutions where the employment of military 
measures had been explicitly mentioned.71 It was argued that referring back to the Security 
Council on every occasion would disrupt the decision-making process and render the utility of 
force in-effective.72 Russia’s views related to the wider context of its relationship with NATO 
where it was sensitive in becoming ‘the junior partner in the system of European security 
governance’.73 The Russian leadership also exercised legitimate arguments regarding the pooling 
of collective approaches in a conflict where Russia had as much at stake as other participating 
actors (Sloane, 1998: 58).  
3.1.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
 
The peace effort was guided by a principal collective interest: to stop the killing of innocent 
civilians based on a ceasefire between the opposing parties. Russia traversed the boundaries 
                                                          
69 Security Council Meeting 3575 (S.PV. 3575), 8 September 1995, p. 3. 
70 Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 September 1995, accessed 20 March 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3389327; also note that the Chairman of the State Duma 
Parliamentary Group of Deputies on Relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Sergei Glotov, 
prepared a report on the results of his trip to the Balkans. In the report Glotov condemned the ‘unilateral 
actions of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and called for further diplomatic action through the UN 
Security Council and the Contact Group. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 October, 1995, accessed 20 March 
2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3386583.  
71 Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 February 1994, accessed 15 February 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3374623.  
72 Security Council Meeting 3336 (S/PV.3336), 14 February 1994, p. 19. 




between Westphalian and post-Westphalian forms of security provision which resonated with 
many of Moscow’s Western partners. One commentator pointed out that Russian policy 
‘remained within what might be called the parameters of the international consensus. As its voting 
record in the UN shows, Russia rarely stood alone’, further arguing that Moscow was not ‘acting 
unilaterally and in defiance of Western interests’ (Bowker, 1998: 1245-1246). Russia’s behaviour 
was ascribed to a particular understanding of the regulation of intra-state conflict, which was 
largely consistent throughout the conflict.  
The role of force 
 
Russia’s cautious approach towards the conflict was due to its concerns about sovereignty and 
interference. Moscow pointed out that ‘To take the side of one of the parties to the conflict 
reflexively or, worse yet, out of selfish temptations would mean to automatically put oneself in 
conflict with others, both inside and outside of Yugoslavia. And the conflict would grow into an 
all-European one’.74 Yet despite Russia’s insistence on using sovereignty to shape the conduct of 
the operation, Moscow was also alert to the importance of protecting human rights.75 As the 
conflict evolved, Russia exercised a largely consistent position opting for an approach which one 
former UNPROFOR commander referred to as the ‘traditional weapons of peacekeeping, 
patience, persistence, and persuasion’ (Rose, 1999: xix). This was based on a doctrinal awareness 
which strictly adhered to the notions of consent and impartiality. The use of force was understood 
by Russia as possessing a limited role in the operation because of the consent-divide, while other 
methods such as the separation of the warring sides and the delivery of humanitarian aid were 
considered key components in the facilitation of the peace effort.76 The logic of Russia’s 
conservative interpretation was directly related to the promotion of the diplomatic process, where 
the facilitation rather than the enforcement of peace was the primary goal.77  
                                                          
74 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. xliii, No. 26, 1991, no newspaper or date available.  
75 See Russia’s 8-point peace plan which it presented to the UN Security Council in February 1993 in 
support of implementing the Vance Owen Plan. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, 
no. 8, 1993, Izvestiya, 26 February 1993. 
76 Security Council Meeting 3543 (S/PV. 3543), 16 June 1995, p. 9.   




     UNPROFOR was established based on a strict mandate of consent, impartiality, and limited 
force.78 With the escalation of the conflict, the Security Council took a significant step by 
invoking Chapter VII in Resolution 770 (1992) and requested actors to take all necessary 
measures in the delivery of aid in accordance with the UN.79 With the adoption of this approach 
in Resolution 776 (1992) the Security Council referenced Resolution 770 but made no mention 
of Chapter VII which effectively diluted the enforcement component of the operation (Boulden, 
2001: 90). Besides a concern about potential reprisals to UNPROFOR troops if large-scale 
military action was taken, the mandates of the evolving operation were also driven by the 
normative positions of the central powers. In Moscow’s view, while in support of Security 
Council Resolution 770 (1992) where it was prepared to take forceful action against the parties.80 
Churkin commented that ‘It’s true that there are press reports of a plan to use force in Yugoslavia’; 
however, arguments for the permissive use of force ‘are at odds with the views of many members 
of the international community’.81  
     This interpretation was relevant for the enforcement of the NFZ established in October 1992,82 
and in relation to the maintenance of the safe areas throughout 1993. Regarding the former, 
although Russia supported every resolution to maintain the integrity of the NFZ,83 this was linked 
to a specific understanding of how the enforcement of the NFZ would assist in diplomacy.84 
                                                          
78 This was proposed by the early concept paper introduced by the Secretary General’s Special Envoy, 
Cyrus Vance, and the Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, in late 
1991. See ‘The Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia’ which was 
provided in Annex III of the Secretary General Report 3280 (S/3280), 11 December 1991. The Secretary 
General’s support for this position was not only derived from his understanding of peace operations but 
also because he considered the practicalities of an ‘intervention force’ to be wholly unrealistic. See 
Secretary General Report 2390 (S/2390), 12 May 1992, paragraph. 27, p. 9. 
79 This was further articulated by the Secretary General’s report in late 1992 which advised that 
UNPROFOR should follow existing peacekeeping principles, but that this is to include the use of force in 
self-defence in situations where ‘armed persons attempt by force to prevent the United Nations troops 
from carrying out their mandate’. See Secretary General Report, 24540 (S/24540), 10 September 1992, 
paragraph 9, p.3.  
80 Security Council Meeting 3106 (S/PV. 3106), 13 August 1992, p. 101.  
81 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, No. 51, Izvestiya, 22 December 1992.  
82 Operation Deny Flight was based on Security Council resolution 781, which considered ‘that the 
establishment on the ban of military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes an 
essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the 
cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. See Security Council Resolution 781 (S/RES/781), 9 
October 1992, p. 2.  
83 See Security Council Resolution 781 (S/RES/781), 9 October 1992, Security Council Resolution 786 
(S/RES/786), 10 November 1992, and Security Council Resolution 816 (S/RES/1992), 31 March 1993. 
84 Security Council Meeting 3191 (S/PV. 3191), 31 March 1993, p. 216.  
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Moscow’s support for the enforcement of the NFZ was thus contingent upon there being strict 
provisions on the use of force, and was considered one instrument in a tool kit designed to expedite 
the political settlement. Kozyrev took a very cautious line, stating that while the leadership in 
Belgrade and Pale ‘bears substantial, if not primary, responsibility for the bloodshed’, Russia is 
‘resolutely opposed to any broadening of the conflict’, and steered clear of condoning a military 
response towards violations of existing Resolutions such as the NFZ.85  
     This understanding also shaped Moscow’s approach towards the safe areas which were 
devised in 1993 by the Security Council due to Bosnian Serb attacks on the civilian population.86 
While force was initially used to ensure the freedom of UNPROFOR’s movement when carrying 
out its mandate to assist in the delivery of aid rather than to protect the safe areas per se, increasing 
military offensives against places such as Sarajevo and Gorazde forced the Security Council to 
pass Resolution 836 (1993) which authorised UNPROFOR to use force to defend the safe areas.87 
Despite this, the rules of engagement were still restricted; Moscow considered the creation and 
expansion of the safe areas to be ‘an important factor for stabilizing the situation in these areas 
and for lessening the suffering of the civilian population’ through the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, but that this must be predicated on the consent of the conflicting parties.88 This provision, 
advised by the Secretary General, was in accordance with the thinking of many actors 
participating in the international peace effort.89 
     As in the case of the NFZ, the establishment of the safe areas were considered part of a wider 
framework to implement VOP. A French diplomat pointed out that 
                                                          
85 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. xlv, No. 3, 1993, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 January 
1993.  
86 Srebrenica was the first safe area to be created by Security Council Resolution 819 (S/RES/819) on 16 
April 1993. This was followed by the extension of the safe areas throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina by 
Security Council Resolution 824 (S/RES/824) on 6 May 1993.  
87 Security Council resolution 819 demanded ‘that all parties guarantee the safety and full 
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR and all other United Nations personnel as well as 
members of humanitarian organizations’; Also see Security Council Resolution 836 (S/RES/836), 4 
June 1993, paragraph. 9, p. 3. 
88 Security Council Meeting 3228 (S/PV. 3228), 4 June 1993, p. 294; Security Council Meeting 3241 
(S/PV. 3241), 18 June 1993, p. 304. 
89 The Secretary General was very clear that ‘The operational concept for keeping the safe areas safe, and 
the number of troops required for this purpose, will be determined by the degree of cooperation which it 
is assumed that the belligerent parties will provide’. See Secretary General Report 25939 (S/25939), 14 




the designation and protection of safe areas is not an end in itself, but only a temporary 
measure: a step towards a just and lasting political solution. This must be understood as 
a positive contribution to the process begun by the Vance-Owen Plan, which remains the 
basis for any settlement.90 
 
 
This, however, was challenged by the Clinton administration with the promotion of the ‘lift and 
strike’ policy.91 Madeleine Albright was emphatic in affirming that ‘My government’s view of 
what those tougher measures should be has not changed’.92 From the outset, Washington 
interpreted the conflict as a conclusive demonstration of Bosnian Serb aggression against a 
defenceless Muslim population. Thus, it was argued by Washington, that sanctions should be 
lifted so ‘that the victims of aggression are finally permitted to defend themselves’.93 This policy 
was encouraged by Washington’s permissive stance on the role of force.94 Yet this was not greeted 
enthusiastically by many European actors which either supported or were directly engaged in the 
promotion of the VOP. The UK’s representative cautioned against Washington’s policy and 
opposed associating the purpose of the safe areas with the lifting of the arms embargo.95 
     Kozyrev acknowledged the dilemma faced by the international peace effort, noting that on the 
one hand lifting the arms embargo would help the weaker side to defend itself; however, this 
would lead to further violence and would ‘be acknowledging that the conflict can be resolved 
only though military means’.96 In 1994 Lavrov was very clear about Russia’s interpretation of the 
conditions governing the permissibility of force, explaining that force could only be used if 
humanitarian convoys are attacked or if the NFZ was violated.97 Hence, Moscow supported the 
shooting down of several Serb fighter jets by NATO in late February 1994. This aside, 1994 
witnessed mounting tension between Moscow and its partners over the role of force in upholding 
the safe areas. However, as one Russian newspaper pointed out ‘We [Russia] can show as much 
                                                          
90 Security Council Meeting 3228 (S/PV. 3228), 4 June 1993, p. 287. 
91 This proposed for the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia & Herzegovina and the use of 
airstrikes in support of the Muslims. 
92 Security Council Meeting 3228 (S/PV. 3228), 4 June 1993, p. 295.  
93 Security Council Meeting 3367 (S/PV. 3367), 21 April 1994, p. 49. 
94 Security Council Meeting 3367 (S/PV. 3367), 21 April, 1994, p. 50. 
95 Security Council Meeting 3228 (S/PV. 3228), 4 June 1993, p. 297. 
96 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 17, Izvestiya, 29 April 1993. 
97 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 4, 1994, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 January 1994. 
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indignation as we like, but the mandate for the NATO bombing in the name of the UN was 
sanctioned earlier by Russia’s vote, among others’.98 Nevertheless, Moscow attempted to 
prescribe a formula to deal with other episodes of violence during 1994. In the case of the first 
Sarajevo market bombing, Russia acknowledged the mortar attack’s depravity, but remained very 
cautious and advocated that policy must ‘refrain from any action that might fan the flames of war, 
and, at last, make the breakthrough to a settlement to the conflict, guided first and foremost by 
the logic of peace’.99 This was in disagreement with Washington and the main European troop-
contributing countries who although pointed out the necessity of a political settlement, were 
becoming more sceptical of the non-use of force in the international response.100 Instead, Moscow 
placed considerable pressure on the Bosnian Serbs who moved their heavy ordinance outside of 
the demilitarised zone around Sarajevo, argued for an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid 
to the enclave, and complemented this by a decision to send a battalion of peacekeepers to 
Sarajevo. 101   
     In Tuzla, Russia employed extensive diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to allow access 
to its airport to facilitate an outlet of humanitarian aid to the area.102 Moscow acknowledged that 
the mitigation of the humanitarian problem around Tuzla would directly assist in the 
implementation of the settlement process. Moscow also recognised that this success was only 
achieved through a combination of diplomacy, the deployment of Russian observers to monitor 
the delivery of supplies, and the threat of force, which in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs had become 
                                                          
98 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 15, 1994, Izvestiya, 20 April 1994.  
99 This view was also held by the Russian MoD, with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, 
Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, affirming that the aerial bombing of Bosnian Serb position around 
Sarajevo would not speed up the peace process as it could lead to ‘a hardening of the positions of the 
parties’ and ‘to a new escalation of the war in the Balkans’. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 March 1994, 
accessed 12 February 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3374684. 
100 Security Council Meeting 3336 (S/PV. 3336), 14 February 1994, p.14-23. 
101 Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 March 1994, accessed 12 February 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3374684; also see Security Council Meeting 3344 (S/PV.3344), 4 
March 1994, p. 12. 
102 The Russian diplomatic team managed to free up Tuzla airport for the delivery of much needed 
humanitarian supplies. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1936 (B5) 3 March 1994, Itar Tass, 
1 March 1994; alongside this, Moscow also provided ten Kamaz trucks and thirty drivers and mechanics 
to deliver the humanitarian supplies to Bosnia & Herzegovina. See the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, vol. xlv, no. 2, 1993, Izvestiya, 10 January 1993; Russia also participated in the airlifting of 
supplies at the initiative of the US to the isolated areas around Tuzla. See the Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 9, 1993, Izvestiya, 4 March 1993. 
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a reality since the shooting down of several of their fighters earlier in the year.103 This 
demonstrated Russia’s recognition of force linked to the implementation of a specific mandate in 
comparison to the deep reservations held by Moscow regarding the enforcement of the safe areas, 
where the potential for the escalation of force via NATO airstrikes was a distinct possibility.104  
     This thinking also shaped Russia’s response towards the Gorazde safe area in April.105 While 
Churkin bitterly commented during a press interview that NATO airstrikes became inevitable as 
the Bosnian Serbs continued to play ‘with fire’ despite Moscow’s attempts to persuade them 
otherwise,106 Moscow consistently advocated for resolving the conflict by diplomatic means.107 
Instead, Russia encouraged diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs through direct talks in Pale 
and in Belgrade, alongside the proposal of sending peacekeepers to the safe area as a form of 
reassurance to the civilian population.108 Moscow’s position was again associated with a concern 
that the use of force would escalate the conflict.109 Russian official opinion was also influenced 
by the first UNPROFOR hostage crisis, when several hundred peacekeepers were held captive by 
the Bosnian Serbs and used as human shields against further airstrikes.110 
     With the change in the balance of power in favour of the Croats and Muslims, military 
offensives were launched against Bosnian Serb forces in mid-1995. This precipitated Bosnian 
Serb attacks on the safe areas and in response NATO directed airstrikes against Bosnian Serb 
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105 During an international conference in Madrid, President Yeltsin asserted that ‘The problem cannot be 
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ammunition depots which, under previous UN Security Council Resolutions, were permissible. 
Russia argued that these airstrikes were compromising the safety of UNPROFOR because of a 
second round of hostage taking by Bosnian Serb troops.111 To enhance UNPROFOR’s security, 
the Security Council voted for the creation of the RRF to support the force in emergency 
situations.112 Moscow held reservations about its impact on UNPROFOR’s mandate, the 
replacement of a genuine commitment towards the political settlement with a reliance on the 
wider use of force, and the potential use of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) against the Bosnian 
Serbs.113 Moscow supported the continuation of UNPROFOR, while emphasising, in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Secretary General, the need for a mutually acceptable agreement 
between the belligerents on the conditions of the safe areas.114 Russian officials defended this 
logic stating that the alternative based on UNPROFOR acting like a fireman putting out 
subsequent fires would ignore the wider diplomatic aim.115 This was contrary to the views of the 
central Western powers with an article in Izvestiya pointing out that ‘no matter how many 
resolutions are approved by the Security Council on the situation around [the] [safe] [areas] they 
have absolutely no effect’.116  
     The fall of the Srebrenica safe area and the systematic killing of the male population 
precipitated a further use of force. NATO command introduced a plan which included pre-
emptive airstrikes and widespread strategic bombing of Bosnian Serb targets. The UNSG pointed 
out that this would fundamentally depart from the existing spirit of UNPROFOR’s mandate, while 
Moscow pressed for an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid and an increase in political 
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112 Security Council Resolution 998 (S/RES/998), 16 June 1995; Security Council Meeting 3543 (S/PV. 
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pressure on the parties for the hastening of a settlement.117 Although the facilitation of a settlement 
was the ultimate aim, there are grounds to suggest that at this stage of the conflict Russia’s 
approach did not sufficiently take into consideration the imminent danger of the civilian 
population. Without a firm guarantee from the Bosnian Serbs that existing agreements on the safe 
areas would be respected, according to the West this gave the interveners little choice but to use 
force to prevent further massacres.118 This came with the second bombing of the market place in 
Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 and the initiation of ODF. Russia strongly objected to the air 
campaign arguing that it ran roughshod over the notions of consent and impartiality by punishing 
one of the parties to the conflict whilst victimising the other, breached the mandate of the RRF, 
and undermined the settlement process because ODF clearly represented ‘a qualitative change in 
the nature of the use of force’.119 
Sanctions and embargos 
 
Russia considered sanctions and embargos central to the facilitation of the political settlement, 
and argued that there should be sufficient flexibility in their use to allow for an incentivised 
process. Moscow also argued that their application should be strictly based on the notion of 
impartiality and not, as in Kozyrev’s words ‘a tool of vengeance or punishment of entire 
peoples’.120 The debate that emerged in the CSCE and the Security Council in 1992 over the 
suspension of Belgrade’s membership from both organisations, in order to pressure the Serbian 
political leadership from abandoning its support for the Bosnian Serb war effort, revealed 
disparate views between Moscow and its Western partners. Russia took a firm stand in the debate 
over Yugoslavia’s future membership in the CSCE, opposing the suspension of Yugoslavia’s 
membership but condemning the actions of the Belgrade authorities and the Yugoslav National 
Army (JNA).121 After a fierce debate in the council of the CSCE, which threatened to erupt into 
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a wider CSCE crisis, Moscow’s proposal was adopted. Russia’s ambassador argued that its 
position was based on a logic that ‘expelling from the CSCE process one of the parties to the 
conflict is hardly in the interests of settling the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.122  
     In the Security Council, Russia opposed the Washington-led policy of expelling the new FRY 
from the UN. The adoption of Resolution 777 (1992) allowed the FRY to continue its participation 
in the UN but excluded it from the body of the General Assembly. This compromise 
accommodated Moscow’s view that while the FRY, like the other former Yugoslav republics, 
would have to apply for UN membership, it was recognised that Belgrade’s complete exclusion 
from the UN ‘would have negative consequences for the process of the political settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis, as it would break the channels of communication between our Organization and 
Belgrade’.123 While Moscow was clearly out of step with its Western counterparts, its proposals 
were credible in expediting the violence and were advocated in the collective spirit of ending the 
conflict. The Security Council adopted Resolution 757 (1992) which applied a range of sanctions 
against the FRY because of Belgrade’s support for the Bosnian Serb offensive in mid-1992.124 
Moscow’s support for the Resolution demonstrated a concern about the further destabilisation of 
the region.125 Russia’s representative declared that because Belgrade failed to comply with the 
demands of the international community ‘It has thereby brought upon itself sanctions by the 
United Nations’.126  
     This support, however, was not without two qualifications. First, Russia argued for the gradual 
implementation of sanctions beginning with an embargo on air service to the FRY.127 Although 
domestic public opinion influenced the formulation of Russian policy towards Belgrade, the 
                                                          
122 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, no. 19, Izvestiya, 13 May 1992. 
123 Security Council Meeting 3116 (S/PV. 3116), 19 September 1992, p. 111. 
124 These ranged from economic and trade sanctions to the suspension of scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation, in addition to a prohibition on travel and a ban on the participation of the FRY in 
international sporting events. See Security Council Resolution 757 (S/RES/757), 30 May 1992. 
125 Security Council Meeting 3082 (S/PV. 3082), 30 May 1992, p. 89. 
126 One scholar notes that the Russian leadership could equally have advocated the employment of 
sanctions against Zagreb for their part in the fuelling of the Croat offensive against Bosnian Serbs and 
Muslims, but instead chose to remain silent and followed the international consensus directed against 
Belgrade (Bowker, 1998: 1252).  
127 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, no. 21, 1992, Izvestiya, 27 May 1992. 
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utility of sanctions was also based on an incentivised process.128 Second, while Russia supported 
the initial sanctions against Belgrade, Moscow was aware of their negative humanitarian 
consequences. The Russian leadership postponed the imposition of sanctions for one month and, 
in relation to its humanitarian concerns, opposed a suspension of shipments of food and medicine 
to the FRY.129 However, with the sustained violation of existing sanctions by Belgrade, the 
Security Council tightened them further by adopting Resolution 787 (1992). Moscow supported 
this round of sanctions to dissuade Serbian interference in the conflict.130 The Russian leadership 
stated that it was not playing ‘an independent game’ and understood the use of sanctions to 
expedite the diplomatic effort.131 Moscow desperately aimed to give the Serbian parties a last 
chance to reach an agreement in acceptance of the VOP.132 At Russia’s insistence the Security 
Council postponed its vote on the decision to further increase sanctions only for them to be applied 
once the Bosnian Serbs had rejected VOP. Russia supported this decision and did not hide its 
dismay with Pale and Belgrade. 133     
     Russia began to question the existing sanctions against Belgrade which began to consider the 
deployment of international observers along its border.134 This did not obtain broad support from 
the other participating members in the peace effort, who argued that sanctions should be lifted or 
eased once the deployment of observers had actually been completed.135 The Russian leadership 
continued to push for a lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade, but was clear that sanctions 
should still be applied against Pale for their continued military offensives against the safe areas.136 
                                                          
128 Security Council Meeting 3082 (S/PV. 3082), 30 May 1992, p. 89. 
129 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, no. 26, Izvestiya, 27 June 1992. 
130 Security Council Meeting 3136 (S/PV. 3136), 16 November 1992, p. 150. 
131 Churkin also explained that ‘I think it necessary to refrain from rash actions and decisions that could 
have an effect opposite to the one intended. After all, the common objective is to bring about a political 
settlement, not to cause a further escalation of the conflict. In this connection I am disturbed by the 
intention to put a resolution imposing new sanctions against Yugoslavia’. See the Current Digest of the 
Post-Soviet Press vol. xlv, no. 15, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 April 1993. 
132 Security Council Meeting 3200 (S/PV. 3200), 18 April 1993, p. 224. 
133 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlv, no. 15, 1993, Izvestiya, 14 April 1993.  
134 New York Times, 18 May 1993, accessed 8 March 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/18/world/serb-is-taking-sincerity-test.html. 
135 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xlvi, no. 33, Sevodnya, 19 August 1994. 
136 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2085 (B7), 27 August 1994, Itar Tass, 25 August 1994. 
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One former Russian UNMO was emphatic when acknowledging that ‘there is no right or wrong. 
All of them – Croats, Bosnians and Serbs – were guilty, especially at the top level’.137  
     These debates continued into 1995, with Russia opposing the policy of partial suspension of 
sanctions against Belgrade. Moscow argued that because Belgrade had allowed the delivery of 
humanitarian aid across its territory and finally agreed to the stationing of a UN Border Mission 
along its border with Bosnia & Herzegovina, there should be a complete suspension of 
sanctions.138 The central Western countries agreed that sanctions should be implemented on an 
incentivised basis, but argued that while Belgrade had made steps in the right direction, further 
commitments in advancing the peace process by pressuring the Bosnian Serbs in the aftermath of 
ODF were required if there was to be a complete relief of sanctions.139 It was clear, therefore, that 
although a division had emerged between Moscow and some of its Western partners on the extent 
and duration of the sanctions, Russia refrained from obstructing decisions in the Security Council 
for their continued implementation. This demonstrated an awareness in Moscow for the 
preservation of unity.140 Moscow maintained this behaviour even after ODF with its abstention 
from Security Council Resolution 1022 on 22 November 1995, which lifted the arms embargo, 
as it feared the further militarisation of the region.141  
The settlement process 
 
The settlement process in Bosnia & Herzegovina highlighted the pragmatism shaping the debate 
over self-determination. As one scholar put it ‘At the heart of the debate over Bosnia’s future was 
the problem of reconciling the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity’ (Goodby, 
                                                          
137 Interview with a former Russian United Nations Military Observer (UNMO), Moscow, 13 April 2015. 
138 Throughout 1995 Moscow continued to press its case in the Security Council asserting that 
maintaining sanctions against Belgrade ‘is not consistent with the principle of positive and negative 
incentives previously agreed in the Contact Group and in the Security Council; according to the principle, 
those that support the peace plan would be encouraged while pressure would be exerted on those that 
reject it. That principle was intended to be an effective tool in the effort to reach a peaceful settlement. It 
might be appropriate today, though, to ask just how effectively that tool is being used’. See Security 
Council Meeting 3522 (S/PV. 3522), 21 April 1995, p. 13-14.  
139 Security Council Meeting 3522 (S/PV. 3522), 21 April 1995, p. 21. 
140 Russia abstained rather than vetoing the proposal of continuing limited sanctions against Belgrade, 
where Security Council Resolution 988 (S/RES/988), 21 April 1995 and Security Council Resolution 
1003 (S/RES/1003), 5 July 1995 were adopted. 
141 Security Council Meeting 3595 (S/PV. 3595), 22 November 1995, p. 12-13. 
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1996: 502). Slovenia was the first republic in the SFRY’s dissolution to be recognised by the 
West with the EC sponsoring the Brijuni Accords in July 1991. Zagreb’s separation, however, 
proved to be an entirely different situation with the Belgrade-controlled JNA unwilling to 
compromise on Croatia’s attempt to secede. This was met with international discord within the 
ranks of the central European powers who were divided over the potential consequences of 
acknowledging Croatia’s declaration of independence. Despite this initial division – mainly 
exacerbated by what some considered as Germany’s premature unilateral recognition of Croat 
independence in December 1992 – a consensus in support of independence quickly followed. This 
gained momentum within the EC and Washington as Belgrade was perceived increasingly to be 
impeding the settlement process by narrowly acting on behalf of Serbian interests (Caplan, 2005: 
22). Croatian independence was formally recognised by the UN official in May 1992.  
     The recognition of Bosnia & Herzegovina by Washington and the EU – precipitated by the 
Badinter Commission’s ruling that it satisfied the primary criteria for sovereignty on the condition 
that all major parties agree – in early April 1992 followed this development. With the holding of 
a referendum, in which the Bosnian Serbs refused to participate, fighting immediately broke out 
because of both President Izetbegovic’s declaration of Bosnian independence and Radovan 
Karadzic’s promotion of independence of the Republika Srpska (RS). Some commentators argued 
that both Washington and Brussels gave all three parties in Bosnia & Herzegovina the incentive 
to posture and prepare for war, enabling the strongest party to be in the most stable political 
position at the moment of recognition (Woodward, 1995: 283). According to others, this gave the 
Bosnian government the expectation that Washington would come to Bosnia’s defence as a 
sovereign state with full rights under the UN charter (Greenberg and McGuiness, 2000: 44).  
     The approach Moscow adopted towards the initial settlement process has been divided into 
two phases conditioned by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is considered a major fault 
line shaping the political leadership’s interpretation of the self-determination debate. It has been 
widely recognised in the academic literature that under the leadership of President Gorbachev 
Moscow’s policy advocated non-interference for fear of precipitating the USSR’s dissolution 
(Edemskii, 1996: 30; Arbatova, 1997: 410). This apprehension in the Russian political elite also 
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related to concerns about the internationalisation of the conflict.142 This was supported by 
Washington which also feared the escalation of the conflict and its possible impact on the 
territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. In late July 1991 both Moscow and Washington signed a 
joint declaration condemning the internal use of force and called for a negotiated peace. This, 
however, did not rule out the acceptance of potential scenarios of separation if determined by the 
peoples of Yugoslavia.143 Moscow stated that any political changes should be facilitated through 
the Helsinki process, which supported the territorial integrity of the state and the transformation 
of the state based on a strictly internal and inclusive process.144 The respect for minority rights 
was also acknowledged by Moscow to avoid intra-state violence.145 Therefore, Moscow’s policy 
refrained from opposing the acts of declaration by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, which was 
further hastened by political change in the Kremlin in December 1991. While acts of 
independence would complicate an already fragile situation, the inevitability of separation was 
recognised as it was not only ‘a matter of opposition between republics and the centre, but the 
opposition between republics themselves’.146 It was pointed out by officials that Russian policy 
had changed because it had been out of touch with the realities of the situation.147 Yet, while the 
new presidential administration was less cautious in acknowledging the individual republics of 
the SFRY, interpretation of the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination remained relatively consistent.  
     Moscow’s diplomatic engagement intensified with the implementation of the VOP. The VOP 
aimed to establish several regions or ‘cantons’ based on ethnic majorities, but constitutionally 
                                                          
142 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1126 B/4, 17 July 1991, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 July 1991. 
143 BBC Summary World Broadcasts, SU/1231 B/2, 27 July 1991, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 July 1991; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1026 B/5, 21 March 1991, Moscow Home Service, 19 March 
1991. 
144 Demonstrating further nuance in Russia’s understanding, Russia’s representative at the UN highlighted 
the dilemma of this debate, recognising the dangers in ‘separatism and national extremism, not only for 
each individual country, but also for entire regions’. Yet, it was also acknowledged that ‘Another lesson 
to be learned from the events in Yugoslavia is the need to respect the rights of national minorities’ as a 
means to ‘avoid the experience of a stream of refugees, armed conflicts, hatred among nationalities and 
the destruction of people, towns and villages’, further emphasising that we have ‘to ensure strict respect 
for the rights of minorities on the part of all peoples in its territory. See BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, SU/1324 A/8, 3 August 1991, Izvestiya, 5 August 1991. 
145 Security Council Meeting 3009 (S/PV. 3009), 25 September 1991, p. 71. 
146 BBC Summary World Broadcasts, SU/1461 B/7, Izvestiya, 7 December 1991.  
147 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. xliv, no. 5, 1992, Izvestiya, 6 February 1992. 
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designed as multi-ethnic (Gow, 1997: 235). Lord Owen declared at the UN in November 1992 
that a crude division of the region into three individual provinces would endorse ethnic 
cleansing.148 Further peace plans were proposed, including the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan and the 
Contact Group Plan, although these also failed. The Dayton Accords were finally finalised in 
November 1995, which like the Contact Group Plan promoted a constitutional arrangement 
between the separate ethnic entities within Bosnia & Herzegovina.149 The Agreement situated the 
settlement in the framework of the Helsinki Final Act and attempted to establish a compromise 
between the opposing parties regarding the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity.150 This constitutional arrangement was instigated in large part by Washington and while 
it was side-lined at Dayton, Russia continued to support the settlement due to its replication of 
the Contact Group Plan.151 Moscow demonstrated that it was flexible regarding the issue of self-
determination and that the leadership was conscious of ensuring that Bosnia & Herzegovina 
would become a functioning actor in European security governance.  
 
3.2 Post-Dayton: building a ‘lasting peace’ 
 
The nature of the peace effort following Dayton became more intricate as the level of stakeholder 
interaction complexity increased. While criticism can be levelled at the post-Dayton peace effort, 
this has not invalidated the shift towards the integration of civilian and military dimensions. As 
introduced in chapter 2, through an engagement in the dimensions of security governance, 
European approaches began to focus on post-conflict peacebuilding. Summing up the purpose of 
the peace effort, Germany’s representative at the UN pointed out that ‘Our aim is not only a 
negative peace, which is the absence of tension, but also a positive peace which is the presence 
                                                          
148 ‘Speech by Lord Owen to the UN Security Council’, 13 November 1992, in Ramcharan, Vol. 2 (1997: 
1216). 
149 Officially known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
150 The Agreement preserved the territorial integrity of Bosnia & Herzegovina as an autonomous 
sovereign actor whilst acknowledging its constituent entities. See Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, 
Article III (3), p. 60. Each entity was provided the ability to exercise authority over major aspects of its 
governance Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, Article III (1), p. 63. 
151 Security Council Meeting 3595 (S/PV. 3595) 22 November 1995, p.12-13. 
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of justice’152. The following sections will focus on the extent of Russia’s contribution towards the 
post-Dayton phase of the peace effort.   
3.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the pooling of sovereignty via stakeholder channels of interaction 
complexity. With so many actors implementing various components of the peace effort, there was 
an intentional effort to facilitate a ‘loose’ form of coordination, particularly relating to the civilian 
dimension, through deeper forms of governance (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 41). The Security 
Council provided the legal framework for the implementation of the military and civilian 
dimensions of the operation. For Russia, the Security Council continued to play a pivotal role in 
the settlement process, helping to compensate for its status as a non-member in NATO and the 
EU by ensuring the Kremlin’s ability to influence the conduct of the peace effort. Through 
Security Council Resolution 1031 adopted on 15 December 1995 the Implementation Force 
(IFOR) was established and under Resolution 1035 adopted on 21 December 1995 authority was 
transferred from UNPROFOR to IFOR, in addition to the authorisation of a civilian International 
Police Task Force (IPTF). Moscow also supported Resolution 1031 (1995) which invited a 
number of UN agencies, NGOs and international institutions to assist in the peace effort. The 
Security Council remained a principal institutional actor during this phase, where the participating 
central powers and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) would regularly discuss the 
progression of the operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina.  
                                                          






Russia continued to support the authority of the Security Council in the peace effort. Channels of 
interaction were established between the Security Council on the one hand and the OHR and the 
Peace Implementation Council (Steering Committee) (PIC) on the other.153 The PIC incorporated 
the ICFY and all parties which had a vested interest in the processes of peace implementation.154 
This strategic oversight was coordinated through the Steering Committee and chaired by the OHR 
                                                          
153 Devised from the London Peace Implementation Conference in late 1995. 
154 Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, paragraph 21(a).  
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to ‘keep the PIC fully informed of progress’. 155 Working alongside the UN and the OSCE, the 
Steering Committee aimed to be as inclusive as possible but ‘remaining small enough to be agile 
and decisive’ (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 41). In Moscow’s view, the PIC replaced the Contact 
Group where the relevant P5 members of the Security Council could participate. 
     The PIC oversaw the OHR which implemented the civilian component of the operation.156 
While Russia accepted the provisions of the DPA regarding the OHR, supported the enhancement 
of the OHR’s powers in 1996 during the military transition from IFOR to Stabilisation Force 
(FOR) which were further consolidated in 1997 through the establishment of the so-called ‘Bonn 
Powers’,157 Moscow interpreted the OHR’s increasing autonomy as a direct hindrance to an 
internally facilitated peace between the belligerents, and as an obstruction to the spirit of 
collective action. Russia held reservations about how the OHR’s powers were not originally 
envisaged in Dayton or in any Security Council Resolution, and that the use of these powers was 
neither limited by time nor were they clarified.158 Throughout the post-Dayton phase, the Russian 
power ministries largely viewed the behaviour of the OHR as overstepping its jurisdiction and 
undermining the central pillars of authority premised on the PIC and the Security Council.159   
 
 
                                                          
155 The Steering Committee included representatives of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). See Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, paragraph 
21(a).  
156 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 10, Article I.  
157 A December meeting of the PIC in 1997 extended the powers of the OHR to include the use of 
‘interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force 
until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace 
Agreement on the issue concerned’ and the implementation of ‘other measures to ensure implementation 
of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth 
running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public 
office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High 
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for 
its implementation. See OHR, ‘PIC Bonn Conclusions’, Chapter XI, paragraph 2 (b) and (c), 12 
December, 1997, accessed 1 September, 2015, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182&amp;11#11. 
158 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 February 2007, accessed March 8 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/11537901.  
159 Security Council Meeting 5147 (S/PV. 5147), 23 March 2005; also see the Secretary General Report 





The nature of Russia’s military participation at the operational level also reflected apprehensions 
about the monopolisation of the peace effort by Western military actors. These concerns were 
largely attributed to the necessity of operational effectiveness. Kozyrev declared that while 
opposing NATO’s domination of the operation’s military dimension was a central aim of 
Moscow, it was vital that Russia did not ‘react allergically to all NATO operations’ as the ‘balance 
of interests of East and West should be observed’.160 Based on this thinking Moscow aimed for a 
mutual partnership with NATO in the forthcoming operation in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Kozyrev 
affirmed that a more inclusive arrangement should be developed ‘to enable Russia to play a 
substantial role, on equal terms’.161 
     There was a divergence between Russia’s and NATO’s interpretation of how sovereignty was 
to be pooled into the collective command structures of the operation’s military dimension. 
Moscow aimed to prevent NATO from retaining a ‘gate-keeping’ role over the conduct of the 
operation’s military dimension by promoting the centrality of the UN. A lengthy debate between 
Moscow and its Western counterparts took place regarding the operation’s appropriate command 
structure.162 A unique arrangement was finally agreed which avoided placing Russian forces 
directly under NATO’s chain of command but did not harm the potential for cooperation and 
integration.163 While there were conflicting views in the Russian military about the utility of this 
                                                          
160 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2428 B/8, 7 October 1995, Itar Tass, 6 October 1995. 
161 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU2423 B/8, 2 October 1995, NTV Moscow, 30 October 1995; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SU2437 B/8, 18 October, 1995, Itar Tass, 16 October 1995. 
162 Washington and NATO had become deeply sceptical about the effectiveness of UN-led operations. 
Instead, while officials in Washington and NATO recognised the wider authority of the UN Security 
Council, but argued that NATO should take ownership of the military conduct of the operation where 
non-NATO members were welcome to participate under NATO command. However, Grachev suggested 
a rotating command structure by NATO and Russia for the multinational forces which would be deployed 
in the conflict area after the signing of the DPA Accords. This was rebuffed and NATO was being far 
from unreasonable as it was contributing the majority of the troops to the operation. 
163 The Russian brigade would serve in Task Force Eagle inside the US First Armour Division’s 
headquarters as part of Multi-National Division (MND) (North). They would be commanded by General 
Joulwan and General Leonty Shevtsov Russian deputy commander at NATO’s headquarters in Mons, 
Belgium (Kipp and Warren, 2003: 49). This was known as OPCON/TACON (operational control/tactical 
control) where SACEUR exercised OPCON of the Russian brigade through the Deputy SACEUR for 
Russian Forces, while the Russian brigade was subordinate for TACON but under MND(N). Although 
this gave the Commander of MND(N) the responsibility for setting priorities within the Russian brigade 
sector, he did not possess de jure authority to assign missions to the Russian brigade. Rather, the 
Commander MND(N) would assign missions and tasks to the Russian brigade through daily and mission 
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arrangement, Russian troops maintained excellent relations with NATO, particularly US forces 
due to their close proximity within Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) where there was 
cooperation in patrolling, training, and intelligence sharing.164 After the completion of IFOR, 
General Leonti Shevtsov (1997) praised the cooperation between NATO and Russia which helped 
to expand ‘mutual understanding and confidence’.  
     The complexity of this cooperation was channelled through Russia’s participation in the Joint 
Military Commission (JMC), where Russian representatives cooperated with the OHR and the 
NATO commander who exercised final authority on the military aspects of the settlement.165 The 
JMC was established to review complaints or questions regarding the modalities of the peace 
settlement, to receive reports and make decisions on suitable actions as a means to ensure 
compliance with Dayton, and to assist the military commander in determining and implementing 
a series of transparency measures between the belligerent parties.166 In this context, a 
representative from the OHR regularly attended the Commission to offer advice on ‘political-
military’ issues and, like the military commander, was able to request a meeting of the 
Commission.167 Shevtsov (1997) pointed out the operational necessity of the JMC, stating that it 
was ‘a real godsend’ because all of the parties were able to ‘contribute to the search for ways to 
normalize the situation and resolve disputes’, and at the same time they learnt ‘to talk with each 
other and trust one another’.168  
     However, the degree of Russian engagement in the JMC was not replicated in the Joint Civilian 
Commission (JCC). The purpose of the JCC paralleled the aims of the JMC in formally 
coordinating the civilian dimension of the operation.169 The IPTF was under the authority of the 
                                                          
orders. This arrangement allowed the Russian commander to clear any tasks given to the brigade with the 
Deputy SACEUR for Russian Forces in Mons or with the MoD in Moscow (Kipp and Warren, 2003: 50). 
164 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 April 1997, accessed 1 April 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/299711. 
165 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraphs 6 and 8. 
166 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraph 2. 
167 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 1-A, Article VIII, paragraphs 6 and 8. 
168 This view was further emphasised in a joint publication ‘Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of 
IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of 
Europe after IFOR’ between the Foreign Military Studies office (FMSO), Centre for Army Lessons 
Learned, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and the Centre for Military-
Strategic Studies (CMSS), General Staff of the Armed Forces, Moscow. See 2nd edition, 2000, p. 36. 
169 Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 11, Article II, paragraph 8. 
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UNSG, but subject to the coordination and guidance of the OHR.170 In Russia’s case, ‘[b]ecause 
the Russian armed forces do not have designated civil-affairs units, Russian cooperation in this 
area was limited’.171 Yet, while this prohibited Russia from engaging in the JCC, this did not 
prevent Russian forces from interacting with NGOs it viewed as constructively contributing 
towards the peace effort, and neither did it signify a disregard for the value of implementing 
civilian aspects of the peace operation through the pooling of sovereignty with multiple actors. 
With the withdrawal of the Russian brigade from SFOR in 2003 Moscow’s engagement in the 
processes of interaction complexity decreased. However, Russia continued to support and 
participate in the IPTF and later the EUPM in 2002.172  
3.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
Coercive measures and the role of force 
 
Russia maintained its staunch opposition towards strategic force. While Russia’s military 
command recognised that those participating in the operation were authorised to use force through 
a Chapter VII mandate in order ‘to compel the parties to peace’,173 Russian troops were only 
authorised by the Council of the Russian Federation to use force in a limited capacity.174 Russia’s 
military command agreed, pointing out that ‘the use of force would immediately undermine the 
credibility of the peacekeepers’ and ‘most importantly, would [result] in casualties’.175 Clearly, a 
deep level of apprehension concerning the notion of the consent-divide still shaped Moscow’s 
behaviour. This was in comparison to many Western actors – primarily through the 
                                                          
170 The authority of the UN Secretary General over the IPTF was implemented through a UN official (at 
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with the OHR, and report directly to the Secretary General. See Secretary General Report 1031 (S/1031), 
13 December 1995, section III (A), paragraph 12.  
171 See ‘Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future 
Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR’, p. 72.  
172 Itar Tass, 11 December 2002, accessed 3 March 2014, available at 
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174 Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 December 1996, accessed 19 December, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3392930. 




institutionalisation of approaches in NATO as discussed in chapter 2 – which had become more 
alert to the utility of strategic force conceptualised through peace support.176  
     Although Russia’s awareness of consent was embedded in the promotion of state sovereignty, 
its understanding should not be reduced to such a narrow interpretation. Moscow was conscious 
of the humanitarian dimension in Bosnia & Herzegovina and continued to advocate what it 
considered a responsible approach towards the implementation of the military aspects of Dayton. 
This was via wider peacekeeping methods to assist in the mitigation of the violence and the 
maintenance of security in cooperation with NATO forces. As Headley (2008: 299) puts it 
‘Russian policy displayed a familiar pattern: attempting to find a common line with Russia’s 
Western partners against nationalists in Bosnia, but ruling out the kinds of methods that Western 
governments believed were necessary to achieve these ends’. 
     The question of pursuing indicted war criminals emerged as a complex issue between Russia 
and NATO. Initially, IFOR refrained from participating in the forceful pursuit of indicted war 
criminals, adamant that it would not perform any policing duties (Cousens and Cater, 2001: 57). 
Policies quickly changed, with Washington’s initial recommendation to coercively pursue 
indicted war criminals during IFOR’s transition to SFOR.177 Javier Solana, as the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declared that ‘the painful chapter in 
Bosnia’s history can only be closed’ until all indictees ‘answer the charges made against them’.178  
     Sporadic missions were conducted by SFOR and while many of these operations were 
executed successfully, several caused controversy due to their coercive nature. These included 
incursions into Serbia to capture indicted persons and the killing of those who violently resisted. 
Russia was vehemently opposed to the conduct of these operations, arguing that such actions were 
                                                          
176 Rupert Smith’s seminal account of the role of force in the operation is a testament to this change in 
thinking, see Smith (2005). For an excellent analysis of the evolution of British and US approaches 
towards the use of force in pre-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina and Somalia, see Cassidy (2004).  
177 Security Council Meeting 3723 (S/PV. 3723), 12 December 1996. 
178 Security Council Meeting 4303 (S/PV.4303), 22 March 2001, p. 14. Moreover, at the Security Council 
the UK delegation stated that ‘We regard the operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) as completely 
legitimate, because cooperation with The Hague Tribunal is key to Bosnia’s integration into the 
international community’. See Security Council Meeting 44847 (S/PV. 4484), 5 March 2001, p. 14. 
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arbitrarily interpreted and outside of SFOR’s mandate.179 Moscow was, therefore, adamant that 
the work of SFOR and the ICTY must strictly conform to the mandate provided by the Security 
Council.180 Moscow persistently opposed the expansion of SFOR’s mandate to include law 
enforcement powers for fear that NATO would further manipulate the interpretation of its 
responsibilities.181 There was also a degree of apprehension about potential reprisals against the 
troops participating in the mission. Despite this, taking a more passive approach in certain 
scenarios would have failed to expedite the issue of detaining indicted war criminals, and contrary 
to Russian protestations, NATO and the ICTY also targeted Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats 
suspected of war crimes.  
     Another recurring issue was Russia’s opposition towards what was viewed as NATO’s 
increasingly unilateral behaviour.182 In late 1997 after the forcible detention of indicted war 
criminals in the town of Vitez in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), Lavrov stated 
that the OHR was only informed of the arrest after the fact and that such actions may cause further 
instability. Moscow was clear that Russian forces would not participate in any of the detention 
raids pursued by SFOR. The political leadership stated that any extradition of indicted war 
criminals to The Hague should be decided in cooperation with the entities of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. Both the positions of NATO and Russia on the issue of detaining suspected war 
criminals for the ICTY were credible and, yet, neither attempted to accommodate the other’s 
approach. While it did not explicitly stipulate in the DPA or in any Security Council Resolution 
that SFOR could coercively pursue indicted war criminals, there was scope for interpretation.183 
NATO directly linked the implementation of this responsibility with its ability to use coercive 
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measures, as specified in the DPA and Security Council Resolutions.184 While Russia agreed that 
an integral part of the peace process was the bringing to justice of suspected war criminals, it 
opposed NATO’s forceful methods. 185   
     It was clear that the use of force on certain occasions failed to foster an atmosphere of 
reconciliation between the more hard-line groups of the opposing parties, such as during the 1997 
Bosnian Serb political crisis. During this internal power struggle, SFOR troops in support of 
Biljana Plavsic took control of several police stations in the fragile pocket of Brcko (where SFOR 
troops clashed with crowds of Bosnian Serbs), Banja Luka and Bijeljina from pro-Radovan 
Karadzic police forces. Russia’s response was predictable, arguing that the international presence 
in the country can and must offer assistance in settling the conflict but without any interference 
or use of force. Contrary to Russia’s approach towards the mitigation of the crisis, SFOR seized 
control of four Bosnian Serb radio and television transmitters in early October 1997 due to 
inflammatory reporting by pro-Karadzic stations in various regions of the RS which reneged on 
previous agreements to halt contentious nationalistic propaganda. Moscow considered this as 
another irresponsible response towards the management of the mass media. Moscow was 
concerned that these actions would derail the recent agreement signed in Belgrade between the 
opposing parties of the Bosnian Serb political elite to hold elections in November 1997. Yet, as 
some commentary points out, while SFOR’s behaviour was invasive, such interventions were 
necessary to facilitate equal media access and balanced media coverage (Bideleux and Jeffries, 
2007: 368). 
     Other instances of SFOR’s coercive behaviour occurred in April 2001 against a group of ethnic 
Croats in Mostar who were involved in regional transnational crime. This provided a financial 
basis for the Croats to bankroll their campaign via the Hercegovaka Banka to establish a separate 
Croatian entity and cement further ties with Zagreb (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 379). The initial 
round of SFOR operations in Mostar provoked major riots where Croat mobs stoned SFOR troops 
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and attacked employees of international organisations and NGOs. Notwithstanding, SFOR 
continued its missions and seized arms depots held by the Bosnian Croats since the war which 
precipitated the blockading of SFOR bases by Croatian war veterans, despite condemnation from 
the Croatian government in Zagreb. SFOR made a final raid on the Hercegovacka Banka which 
resulted in new administrators being installed at the bank to prevent it from continuing to fund 
the Bosnian Croat’s drive for self-rule.  
Implementing the political process 
 
The central purpose of the DPA was to re-construct Bosnia & Herzegovina into a viable and 
functioning state.186 The integration of Bosnia & Herzegovina into the EU became a central aim 
for those actors contributing towards the peace effort.187 The Russian leadership recognised the 
importance of rebuilding the democratic institutions of Bosnia & Herzegovina, and supported its 
integration into the EU.188 Managing the political process that followed was a challenging task 
with the constant presence of nationalism in the RS and the Bosnian Croat entity in the FBiH. 
This was also complicated by Bosniak political manoeuvring which pushed for further 
centralisation as a means to mutually-dominate the central political structures. Soon after the 
signing of the DPA there was an urgency to begin implementing the core aspects of the peace 
effort – particularly with Karadzic’s replacement of the moderate Bosnian Serb RS Prime 
Minister, Rajko Kasagic, with the hard-line nationalist Gojka Klickovic in May 1996. Washington 
pressed for the holding of early elections and while the OSCE reluctantly gave its final approval 
of elections in Bosnia & Herzegovina on 14 September 1996, the OSCE was very clear that 
conditions for the successful facilitation of elections were not present.189 Although it was 
conceded by many that conditions to hold a viable election were far from ideal due to the coercion 
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of the electorate from the political parties, it was deemed better to have a government begin 
operating, than wait until fairer elections could be held.190 Moscow was in agreement with this 
approach, with Foreign Minister Ivanov recognising that elections were necessary to establish 
local government.191 While the voting behaviour still confirmed the presence of a stark ethnic 
divide in the country which the DPA has been widely regarded as reinforcing, it was 
acknowledged by the OSCE that they offered a step in the right direction.192  
     The next challenge came with the power struggle in the RS as previously noted. In strict 
accordance with the DPA, throughout the political crisis Moscow supported the preservation of 
RS’s territorial integrity within Bosnia & Herzegovina. Moscow recognised that RS media outlets 
bore a huge responsibility for the deterioration of the political process during the crisis with their 
attacks on SFOR and Bosnian Serb politicians, but ardently supported the principle of non-
interference and advocated for a solution based on political compromise.193 During a July meeting 
in Pale, Russia was satisfied that the RS would continue to implement the DPA and called for the 
holding of early elections to assist in what Moscow considered as the legitimate mitigation of the 
crisis via democratic means, administered by the OSCE, and based on the DPA.194 With Slobodan 
Milosevic’s intervention to hold elections in November, the crisis ended with the election of the 
moderate and progressive Milorad Dodik as the new Prime Minister. Russia and its Western 
counterparts were satisfied with the electoral outcome.195 Although Russia’s policy was 
successful, events demonstrated that there was a fine line to negotiate between almost blindly 
accepting the credibility of the ultra-nationalist political element in the RS – who were corrupt 
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and intransigent (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 361) – and maintaining an excessive reliance on 
the ability of the democratic electoral process to facilitate a progressive RS. 
     Russia understood that any unilateral change to the political process – whether by one of the 
entities or by what it increasingly came to consider as the interference of the OHR – would violate 
the fragile balance between territorial integrity and self-determination as originally enshrined in 
the DPA. This did not rule out, however, Russian support for the intervention of the OHR on the 
occasions it considered as major constitutional crises.196 In February 2001 the Croat member of 
the tripartite presidency, Ante Jelavic, announced that the Bosnian Croats could no longer 
participate in the FBiH because the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia & Herzegovina had 
increasingly cut the Croats out of the picture by electoral changes implemented by the OHR 
(Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 378). The Croat leadership called on all Croats to resign their jobs 
in the military and other public services to establish an autonomous Croat ‘statelet’ for eventual 
union with Croatia (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 378). During the course of the crisis, the OHR 
dismissed several high-ranking Bosnian Croat officials, including Jelavic, for their role in 
breaching the constitution (Jeffries, 2002: 167-168). While Russia’s representative recognised the 
political crisis and failed to provide any immediate suggestions on ways to tackle the emergency, 
after a further discussion in the Security Council the President was instructed to make a statement 
on behalf of the Council which condemned this unilateral move of self-rule as it contradicted the 
DPA. The statement also expressed its support for the OHR to take action against officials who 
violate the DPA.197 
     It was, however, the frequency of the OHR’s intervention which continued to trouble Russia.198 
It was the pro-activeness of Paddy Ashdown between 2002 and 2006 which triggered 
consternation in Moscow. Ashdown was prepared to impose legislation and changes to the 
constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina, alongside the widespread sacking of officials for various 
violations of the DPA (Pond, 2006: 162). Ashdown justified his actions as a means to ‘create 
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institutions of a modern state that could enter the European Union’, adding that ‘there was very 
little time. The door was closing, and I wanted to get through before it shut’.199 Following 
Ashdown, the Russian leadership persistently pushed for the termination of the OHR and the 
transferral of powers to the EU. This understanding was not shared by other actors in the peace 
process as it was consistently argued that the OHR’s powers were still required to steer Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’s political process towards European integration. The benchmark conditions for 
integration was set out in the PIC in early 2008 via the 5+2 Agenda.200  
     Implementation of these conditions proved to be a challenge. The constitutional crisis which 
occurred in late 2007 and continued deep into 2008 because of the OHR’s attempt to impose 
major changes without consulting either politicians or the public on Bosnia & Herzegovina’s state 
institutions, caused considerable tension between the entities (Chandler, 2007). These changes 
would mean that decisions made by the governing institutions would no longer require support 
from all three of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s segmented ethnic communities which effectively ruled 
out the opinions of Serb representatives of RS (Chandler, 2007). At a PIC meeting in October 
2007 Russia voiced its concerns, arguing that the use of external mechanisms to influence the 
situation would cause instability.201 David Chandler (2007) argued that the OHR’s stance was 
highly authoritarian and that ‘the Serbian government, a Dayton signatory, is entirely within its 
rights to argue against the unilateral imposition of major changes to the agreement, as is the 
Russian government’. Russia’s caution in managing the political process was based on an 
obstinate default position against the invasiveness of the OHR’s interventionism, and concerned 
the ability of Bosnia & Herzegovina ‘to get on its own two feet, to free itself from sponging 
attitudes and to learn how to exist not so much at the expense of donors, but on its own domestic 
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resources’.202 This logic was echoed in Russia’s view of the crisis which erupted after the 2010 
October elections and froze the political process throughout 2011 due to a stalemate between 
Croat and Bosniak parties who refused a reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposal 
(International Crisis Group, 2011: 1). Complicating these issues further, was the continued 
disagreement between Russia and its Western partners during Medvedev’s presidency on the 
timing of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s integration into the EU.  
Reconstruction and reconciliation 
 
Reconstruction and reconciliation were central aspects of the international peacebuilding strategy, 
and were in large measure facilitated by the agencies of the UN System. Moscow acknowledged 
the importance of rebuilding the country’s economy as central to the plan of implementing a 
durable peace.203 It was also recognised that such economic assistance should be impartially 
implemented and equally distributed amongst the entities of the country.204 Moscow’s 
contribution engaged in local level projects although these were limited in scope and practice.205 
Initiatives based on Russia’s participation in reconstructing and privatising the country’s 
enterprises were also promoted.206 Foreign Minister Ivanov suggested to the country’s media that 
there may be potential scope for further privatisation of Bosnian enterprises with Russian 
companies. 207 
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     Russia’s peacekeeping contingent were also active in projects aimed at rebuilding the 
country’s transport infrastructure, including bridges, roads and railways.208 Yet, this did not 
extend to wider and deeper forms of reconciliation and reconstruction which many of the other 
participating forces in IFOR/SFOR were engaged in.209 Although Russian forces lacked the 
expertise and culture to cultivate such forms of civil-military cooperation, this did not rule out 
Moscow’s capacity to engage on an informal basis with certain NGOs. Local projects, however, 
were facilitated at the diplomatic level in Moscow predominantly through the auspices of the 
MFA.210 Throughout the 2000s Moscow maintained its investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
via energy and industrial projects.211 Russia continued to develop its economic relations with the 
RS and was also focused on cultivating economic cooperation with Sarajevo’s political 
institutions. These relations were largely premised on energy exports, and consolidated through 
free trade agreements in the mid-2000s. However, while Russia maintained its economic 
cooperation with the RS, this was not the case with the FBiH and according to certain Russian 
officials was not due to a lack of impartiality, but was a result of Sarajevo’s and Mostar’s limited 
political will in cultivating strong internal relations within the FBiH in addition to external 
economic partnerships.  The fact that the RS had striven for economic privatisation in comparison 
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to the stagnation of the FBiH because of political intransigence, made it difficult for Moscow and 
others participating to establish effective economic relations.    
     Yet despite these instances of aid and projects at the local level, they were attached to the 
broader aspects of Russia’s bilateral relations with Bosnia & Herzegovina. The emphasis placed 
on the use of state level economic assistance and trade served to accomplish two simultaneous 
aims: assistance in the wider peacebuilding process through the consolidation of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’s economy, and the cultivation of bilateral state relations. This conflation had a 
significant impact on Moscow’s engagement in peacebuilding, in that the focus on bilateral trade 
largely overlooked the potential in grass-root projects at the local level. To add further 
complication, Moscow would traditionally expect a payment in return. This was particularly the 
case regarding the delivery of gas and oil to the region, where the continuation of deliveries were 
contingent upon the meeting of payments. To an extent, this compromised Russia’s participation 
in the peacebuilding effort as profit and self-gain – besides a degree of altruism in assisting the 
country’s re-development – became contributing factors conditioning Russia’s engagement.  
     Another issue confronting the peace effort, involved the return of refugees and displaced 
people, which was considered an important objective by the DPA.212 However, implementation 
was met with varying degrees of success as the peace effort had the unenviable task of ensuring 
that the conditions for those who wanted to return were secure. Ultra-nationalist intransigence, 
local political opposition, a lack of infrastructural reconstruction and economic incentive, and 
widespread fear amongst the divergent ethnicities of the population prevented a smooth process 
of returns (Belloni, 2007: 128). Consequently, the immediate years following the signing of the 
DPA witnessed the intimidation of returning refugees and ethnic minorities, with largely Croats 
and Bosnian Serbs preventing the free movement of people across the country.213 This was 
recognised in the Security Council and the PIC to be a serious problem for the post-Dayton peace 
process. Russian officials agreed that a key problem of the settlement as the returns process.214 
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Nevertheless, during these formative years there were large-scale returns by both refugees and 
internally displaced persons – although these were predominantly to areas where their own 
ethnicity was a majority. 215 The early to mid-2000s marked a turning point which saw 
considerable increases in minority returns both with the assistance of the UNHCR and on their 
own initiative, due to the growth of more moderate political forces in the country. Russia’s view 
of these surges in returns was positive, with Lavrov remarking in mid-2006 that ‘Dayton is an 
undoubted success for all the peoples inhabiting BiH and for the international community’.216 Yet, 
as many practitioners and scholars pointed out, many returns have not yet been greeted with 




The case of Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina has demonstrated Russia’s engagement in the 
broad trends of European conflict management. These were largely consolidated over the course 
of the 1990s and reflected the evolution of the norms and processes of European security 
governance. Although Moscow’s engagement was selective and uneven, its behaviour was neither 
uniquely Russian nor distinct. As the conflict developed, Russia’s behaviour was complex 
demonstrating a convergence with and divergence from European approaches to conflict 
management. First, Moscow’s selective interaction with other participating actors was aimed at 
steering collective action at the diplomatic and operational levels away from an exclusive reliance 
on Western actors and arrangements, and instead towards a more inclusive process based on 
international institutions and agencies centred in or closely affiliated with the UN and OSCE 
where Russia could assist in the shaping of the peace effort. Second, the use of coercive methods 
including force and sanctions remained a contentious issue throughout the pre- and post-Dayton 
phases of the operation. Attempting to normatively reconcile sovereign consent and human rights, 
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Moscow aimed to promote softer and limited measures which diverged considerably from the 
qualitative change in thinking by the West where sovereignty was relaxed and wider coercive 
measures supported to safeguard human rights. Third, Russia remained largely in accordance with 
its partners concerning the political process and the pragmatic debate over self-determination, 
where a compromised-based solution was advocated. This, however, was not free from 
disagreement as the West promoted a pro-active policy to push the peace effort forward, while 
Russia considered this to be intrusive to the ‘natural’ political progression of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina. Fourth, Moscow recognised the process of peacebuilding and engaged in the 
reconstruction and reconciliation of Bosnia & Herzegovina alongside its Western counterparts – 
although this engagement also served its wider foreign policy interests.  
     Crucially, this did not necessarily place Russia on the fringes of the peace effort; rather, 
Moscow remained a foremost actor in both the pre- and post-Dayton phases of the operation. 
Accordingly, Russia played a role in shaping the direction of the peace effort, albeit largely during 
the initial rather than the latter stages, and was in-turn influenced by events. For Russia, its 
involvement in the international peace effort was essential for the consolidation and realisation 
of its wider approach towards conflict management, and should not be taken as an isolated case 
in Russia’s experience as it directly shaped Moscow’s involvement in the second phase of the 
Balkan wars between Kosovo and Serbia. Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina should also be 
considered a case study of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign and security policy. Moscow’s 
involvement was indeed an expression of its wider political and security relationship with the 
central actors of European security governance, which from the early 1990s to the end of 
Medvedev’s presidency was increasingly based on Russia’s constructive engagement in security 
governance but on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests 
(which were not necessarily incompatible with the interests of the central European actors). Points 
of disagreement over the conduct of the operation Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina related to 
wider contestation over certain regional norms of European security governance, including the 
relaxation of sovereignty vis-à-vis a human-centric conception of security and the institutional 
geography of Europe. This was further complicated by Russia’s increasing willingness to pursue 
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national interests in the face of what Moscow considered as the creeping erosion of its legitimate 
path to great power status, which remained a central feature driving the leadership’s response 
towards the management of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo.  
     
 
 






















Following the bloody conflict which tore through the Balkans during the early to mid-1990s, 
Europe was confronted with another gruesome episode of intra-state violence in the FRY – this 
time between the small province of Kosovo and Serbia. The conflict was significant not least for 
its demonstration that corners of post-Cold War Europe remained a place of war, but also for the 
triggering of an international response which in its aftermath the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK) (2000: 19) described as ‘a turning point’ based on several issues 
of international importance that were framed by the intervention. According to the IICK (2000: 
19), these included the reconciliation regarding the protection of human rights in relation to 
sovereignty and legal restrictions on the use of force, the legitimacy of the Post-World War II 
global order based on the UN Charter and the capacity of the UN to act as a peacekeeper, in 
addition to the ramifications of self-determination (IICK, 2000: 19). Although these issues had 
emerged during the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo reaffirmed the 
importance of these debates by controversially confronting them head on. Commenting on the 
significance of the approaches developed in Kosovo, Aidan Hehir (2010: 1) observes that 
‘International engagement with Kosovo since 1999 has gone through three distinct phases: 
intervention, statebuilding and, most recently, independence. During each phase, international 
policy towards Kosovo challenged prevailing norms, and ‘Kosovo’ has been cited as an exemplar 
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for a new broad trend in international relations’. Kosovo represented a watershed in how the 
central actors of European security governance began to understand and manage intra-state 
violence.  
     Moscow was at the centre of these debates, with the controversies surrounding the strategic 
use of force and the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, this brought Russia’s 
relationship with the central pillars of European security governance to breaking point. In this 
context, the chapter will interrogate to what extent the case of Kosovo represented a fundamental 
departure in Russia’s understanding of European conflict management. The chapter will argue 
that while differences deepened in some respects, Russia’s participation in both phases of the 
peace effort also showed a level of convergence with the evolving trends of European conflict 
management. 
 
4.2 (Pre-) Intervention  
4.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity  
 
Figure 4.1 provides an outline of the degree of this complexity during the (pre-) intervention phase 
of the peace effort in Kosovo, where the roles and responsibilities of many actors converged in 
the operation. At the diplomatic level, formal actors such as the UN Security Council, the UNSG 
(and representative), the OSCE, and the EU were central to the peace process. The Group of 8 
(G8) also played an important diplomatic role during NATO’s bombing campaign. Furthermore, 
NATO exercised a more prominent role due to the consolidation of its raison d'être in Croatia 
and Bosnia & Herzegovina as the leading security actor in European security governance. The 
establishment of the PJC as a channel of cooperation between Russia and NATO was also central 
to the diplomatic process. The Contact Group endured as the main informal negotiating forum 
below the Security Council and played a pivotal role in attempting to facilitate a settlement pre-
OAF. At the operational level the UN System, alongside the ICRC and a host of independent 
NGOs, were engaged in mitigating the humanitarian crisis caused by the fighting between Serbian 
forces and the self-proclaimed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This was complemented by the 
OSCE’s Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) which later transitioned into the Kosovo 
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Verification Mission (KVM), alongside NATO’s Air Verification Mission (AVM). The Alliance 
would also play a controversial role by initiating OAF in March 1999.  
     Moscow was deeply engaged in certain channels of this interaction complexity. Some political 
commentators have argued, however, that ‘Russian proclivities for multilateralism were and 
remain a strategic response to its structural weakness within the international system, not a 
normative commitment’ (Hughes, 2013: 1013). While there is merit in this argument, Moscow’s 
behaviour revealed a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty and considered 





According to Oksana Antonenko (1999: 125), Russia’s engagement in interaction complexity was 
not based on its formal relations with NATO – although important – ‘but Russia’s relations with, 
and membership of non-NATO institutions’, which she contends ‘provided the framework for 
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Russia’s constructive engagement in resolving the Kosovo crisis’. Russia’s understanding of the 
pooling of sovereignty and its engagement in interaction complexity largely remained consistent 
with its behaviour in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. While Russian suspicions of NATO had 
markedly increased due to the Alliance’s actions in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow’s approach 
towards the peace effort in Kosovo reflected a policy which aimed to engage ‘in Western 
institutions to protect Russian interests, institutionalize a Russian voice in Europe and constrain 
Western actions that might threaten Russia’ (Lynch, 1999: 58).  
     This was present in Russia’s effort in steering collective action away from an exclusive 
reliance on Western institutions. This was not a deliberate policy to obstruct collective action, but 
sought to facilitate an inclusive dependence on wider international organisations and 
arrangements based on or closely affiliated with the UN and the OSCE. This did not rule out 
cooperation with particular Western actors such as NATO, but demonstrated that Moscow was 
more comfortable when interacting through organisations or informal arrangements where it was 
a participant of the decision-making process and could legitimately contribute towards the 
shaping of the peace effort. This engagement served Russia’s great power complex, and reflected 
the promotion of collective solutions.  
     With the escalation of the conflict in early 1988, Russia was deeply engaged in diplomacy 
through the Contact Group.217 Indeed, for Russia, the Contact Group was essential for the 
facilitation of peace in the region.218 One scholar points out ‘Russia did not object to the widening 
of its remit, since the Group was an institution that would allow co-ordination of the major 
powers’ policies towards conflict in the region and one in which Russia would play an active role’ 
(Headley, 2008: 317). While Russian diplomats considered the efficacy of the Contact Group 
paramount to the negotiating process, this forum had to strictly reflect the broader principles of 
international law. Moscow also participated in the OSCE and was in consensus with its 
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counterparts in condemning the early use of violence by both parties to the conflict.219 The Serbian 
leadership opposed internationalisation and held a referendum on 24 April 1995 which resulted 
in support for government policy. In the context of further clashes between the opposing sides 
and further Serbian aggression in mid-1998,220 Moscow became increasingly frustrated with 
NATO’s launching of operation Determined Hawk which is viewed as undermining collective 
action.221 Moscow was outraged that it was not consulted prior to this operation and suspended 
its membership in the PJC for a second time in October 1998 as NATO continued to press for the 
use of force.222 Despite this, a sustained level of Russian engagement continued with the 
Milosevic-Yeltsin meeting in mid-June 1998. This attempted to put further pressure on Belgrade 
to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo and paved the way for the establishment of the OSCE’s 
KDOM.223 Moscow continued to maintain its diplomatic participation in the Contact Group with 
a meeting in Bonn on 8 July. The synergy between the Contact Group and the Security Council 
remained a significant aspect conditioning the interaction complexity during this phase of the 
conflict. Russia, through the Contact Group, also remained supportive of the OSCE’s diplomatic 
efforts in the monitoring of events in Kosovo and in the organisation’s contribution towards 
negotiations.224  
     Russia continued its diplomatic engagement in 1999 during the conference in Rambouillet, 
France.225 Meetings were also arranged with the OSCE Chairman in Moscow.226 However, with 
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the failure of the peace talks throughout February and March, NATO began to bomb en masse 
Serbian military targets. Moscow was irate over its exclusion from the decision-making process 
which occurred outside of the channels of the Contact Group and the UNSC. These 
pronouncements were linked to wider concerns about the resilience of the rules regulating 
European security governance.227 This did not prevent Russia from continuing to steer the 
collective effort at the diplomatic level through the auspices of the Contact Group. Ivanov 
appealed to the powers for an urgent meeting to be held in Moscow – although Washington failed 
to give consent.228 Instead, the European participants invited Ivanov to the EU, under the formal 
auspices of the PCA, to explore a political resolution. Moscow’s persistent drive for an inclusive 
and collective response beyond the parameters of the NAC was also demonstrated by Russia’s 
failed move to push through the Security Council a Resolution which demanded the cessation of 
the use of force and a return to negotiations. With the arrival of Russia’s special representative 
Victor Chernomyrdin to the negotiations, Moscow aimed to reassert the primacy of the UN and 
to curtail NATO’s dominance of the peace agenda (Lynch, 1999: 71). At this stage of the conflict 
Russia’s involvement was ‘a real tightrope act’ as Moscow did not want to isolate itself but 
equally could not be seen to support NATO’s policy (Lynch, 1999: 72).  
Operational level  
 
The operational level presented Russia with further opportunities for collective action. Moscow’s 
engagement was shaped by its policy of maintaining the international response towards the 
conflict within the parameters of an inclusive framework. This also revealed wider concerns about 
the impending shift towards a NATO-centred system of European security governance. Russia 
promoted this operational complexity via the channels of the OSCE in coordination with UN 
agencies involved in the humanitarian effort. The emergence of deeper forms of stakeholder 
interaction complexity emerged during the summer of 1998. Russia arranged a ceasefire 
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agreement with President Milosevic on 16 June 1998, which enabled the establishment of the 
KDOM on 6 July 1998 under the auspices of the OSCE and the Security Council.229 Set up by the 
OSCE,230 the KDOM transitioned to the KVM in October 1998 and was to coordinate with the 
other actors of the peace effort.231 Firmly embedded in an inclusive hierarchical process via the 
OSCE and the UN, Russia was a leading contributor of observers to the KVM which was 
complemented by NATO’s AVM.232  
     The KVM established close links with the UNHCR to assist in expediting the humanitarian 
process.233 Moscow was comfortable with the KVM’s channel of coordination with the UNHCR 
because it would not have to directly cooperate with NGOs. However, because of unacceptable 
levels of violence and the forthcoming bombing campaign, the KVM was pulled out of Kosovo 
on 20 March 1999, which proved to be a major impediment to Russia’s participation in collective 
action.  
4.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
 
Headley (2008: 319) points out that the major actors involved in the peace effort aimed for an end 
to the violence and agreed on the major principles of a settlement, but disagreed on its 
implementation. In the case of Russia, it traversed the boundaries between Westphalian and Post-
Westphalian security behaviour when participating in the (pre-) intervention peace effort in 
Kosovo. Russia acknowledged and supported the humanitarian effort through the delivery of aid 
                                                          
229 OHR, BiH TV News Summary, 15 June 1998, accessed 19 March 2014, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/summaries-tv/bhtv/default.asp?content_id=1190; 
Security Council Resolution 1199 (S/RES/1199), 23 September 1998, paragraph. 8, p. 4. The mission 
consisted of observers from the US, the European Union, Canada, and Russia, with offices based in 
Pristina. As a central actor contributing towards the KDOM, Russia participated alongside its partners in 
many weekly observation trips and reported to the Contact Group, the representative countries of the EU 
Presidency, and the OSCE Chairmanship. See Annex Information on the situation in Kosovo and 
measures taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, submitted pursuant to 
paragraphs 13 and 16 of Security Council Resolution 1160 (S/RES/1160), 31 March 1998, p. 11. 
230 OSCE, Permanent Council Decision No. 263, 25 October 1998, accessed 1 May 2014, available at 
http://www.osce.org/pc/20595?download=true. 
231 The Kosovo Verification Mission was established by the Permanent Council in October 1998 and was 
dissolved in June 1999. See OSCE, KVM, n.d.a, accessed 12 May 2014, available at 
http://www.osce.org/node/44552. 
232 By 5 February, 1999 Russia’s contribution towards the KVM in Kosovo amounted to 85 personnel. 
233 Secretary General Report 1068 (S/1068), 12 November 1998, paragraph 45, p. 11; Secretary General 
Report 1221 (S/1221), 24 December 1998, paragraph 27, p. 6. 
138 
 
and the management of the refugee crisis. Moscow’s overall understanding of the political process 
remained consistent with the other contributing actors participating in the peace settlement. Yet, 
this convergence was offset by Russia’s uncompromising position on the inviolability of the 
FRY’s sovereignty, which was closely intertwined with Moscow’s ardent opposition towards the 
use of coercive measures when managing the conflict.  
Coercive measures and the role of force 
 
Averre (2009: 575) notes that in Russia ‘OAF excited a fervent debate that went to the heart of 
post-Cold War European security governance and still resonates today’. The Allied bombing 
campaign was a turning point in Russia’s relations with the central actors of European security 
governance, and raised significant questions regarding the norms and processes of European 
conflict management. Building on its experiences in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, OAF 
reaffirmed for Russia the dangers of applying force at the strategic level and brought into sharper 
contrast the emerging distinctions between Moscow’s understanding and that evolving in Europe.  
     Serbian actions in Kosovo began to escalate in late 1997 with police and security forces 
assaulting peaceful demonstrations in Pristina and Belgrade also initiated the detention of known 
opponents throughout the province. The KLA began to openly confront Serbian forces and armed 
skirmishes began to increase in 1998 (IICK, 2000: 67). During a Contact Group meeting in 
Moscow on 25 February 1998 members reaffirmed their commitment to uphold human rights, 
including peaceful demonstrations, and condemned Belgrade’s repressive behaviour and KLA 
terrorist action.234 Despite this, disagreements began to emerge between Russia and its NATO 
partners over the role of coercive measures to impose a settlement (Latawski and Smith, 2003: 
93). These began with the discussions over the use of sanctions against Belgrade in early 1998. 
The Contact Group agreed to place a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, supported a 
moratorium on the supply of arms to the FRY, denied visas to senior Serbian representatives, and 
placed a freeze on government financed export credit support for trade and investment, including 
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government financing for privatisation in Serbia.235 Moscow supported the first elements of this 
package as they targeted both parties to the conflict, but refused to countenance the latter two 
measures.236 Russia argued that the use of sanctions should not be used to punish Belgrade, but 
should include specific measure to induce a resolution.237 
     Russia understood that both parties were responsible for the continuation of the violence and, 
hence, no party should receive preferential treatment whilst the other was punished. Although it 
was noted in the Contact Group statement that ‘if there is no progress towards the steps called for 
by the Contact Group, the Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss all the above 
measures’, this was not taken seriously by Moscow. 238 Russia promoted the use of political 
measures to resolve the conflict, opposing coercion.239 Diplomatic negotiation was required but 
effective international pressure on Milosevic also required a threat of stronger measures (Headley, 
2008: 323). Moscow’s actions were inconsistent with its behaviour during the pre-Dayton phase 
of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, where Russia supported the use of sanctions 
against Belgrade to coercively induce its compliance with the settlement process. Moscow’s 
decision not to employ sanctions against Belgrade this time was closely linked to an overriding 
level of anxiety about the triggering of a potential road towards the use of force. This constrained 
Moscow’s behaviour in that it was unwilling to consider sanctions.  
     A further factor influencing Russia’s policy at this juncture was the divisive issue of 
internationalising the conflict. Moscow refused to consider the conflict a threat to international 
security, which ran counter to the perceived collective humanitarian responsibilities present in 
Western framings of the conflict.240 In April 1998 there was a notable decrease in the violence 
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from the previous months although the situation remained tense’.241 This comparative ease gave 
Russia further impetus to oppose internationalisation and Moscow submitted a report to the 
UNSG highlighting Belgrade’s constructive role in reducing its security forces in Kosovo and 
pointed towards the destabilising activities of the KLA.242 Yet, with the escalation of the conflict 
and its inability to prevent the conflict’s internationalisation, Russia began to encourage greater 
involvement to counter NATO’s push for more coercive measures.  
     In late spring, this was further accompanied by the blocking of aid to the civilian population 
by the Belgrade authorities.243 While diplomacy failed to cultivate a compromise between Pristina 
and Belgrade, Moscow recognised this as a ‘positive first step’, and urged both sides to commit 
to a ceasefire.244 Belgrade lifted the blockade on 21 May allowing supplies to be delivered to 
Kosovo, but continued to refuse direct international involvement.245 NATO supported these 
political measures to facilitate an end to the fighting – although, NATO’s Secretary General Javier 
Solana further clarified that ‘all options are open in Kosovo, including the immediate military 
intervention in this Serbian province’.246 At a ministerial meeting in Geneva on 4 June 1998, 
Primakov outlined Russia’s position considering the recent developments, acknowledging that 
for future stability a status-quo could not be allowed to persist, but clarified Moscow’s growing 
divergence with its partners on how best to solve the current conflict. Primakov gave a resounding 
nyet to the use of military measures against Belgrade.247 Russia remained unconvinced about the 
role of strategic force in the conflict due to its further destabilising effects and its uncertain long 
term impact on sovereignty.  
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     This contrasted with the central Western powers acting through NATO. Demanding the 
withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and a resumption of negotiations, NATO launched 
a sizeable military exercise over Albanian and Macedonian airspace as a warning to Belgrade that 
NATO was willing to support its rhetoric with force.248 Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev 
announced that the current conflict should be settled by political means which have yet to be 
exhausted, and that all decisions on the use of force should be taken ‘under the auspices of the 
UN Security Council’.249 As a reflection of this diplomatic drive, a meeting between Yeltsin and 
Milosevic took place in Moscow on 16 June 1998 where a set of conditions were finalised. It was 
agreed that the conflict should be resolved peacefully within an ethnically-inclusive political 
framework, that Belgrade should cease all repressive actions against the civilian population, 
create conditions for the return of refugees to the region, allow for the unhindered delivery of aid, 
alongside a call for the discontinuation of the KLA’s terrorist activities.250  
     This was an attempt to shift the direction of the peace effort away from a military response 
and was therefore a direct challenge to NATO’s emerging policy. This approach was dependent, 
however, on the integrity of Milosevic’s promises and possessed no means of coercive persuasion 
in an incentivised framework. This did not demonstrate a change in Russia’s thinking on the use 
of coercion, but revealed the extent Russia was willing to go to prevent NATO’s use of force. 
There was in fact a decrease in the violence following the Milosevic-Yeltsin agreement with 
Belgrade reducing its troop levels in Kosovo.251 The KLA took advantage of this vacuum and 
began to consolidate positions throughout the province from which to launch attacks.252 During 
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this phase, while in some respects the gulf between Russia and its Western partners widened due 
to the EU’s increase in sanctions against Belgrade,253 there was a degree of convergence on the 
further internationalisation of the peace effort.254 Although this demonstrated a change from 
Russia’s initial approach, this should not be characterised as a muddled policy (Levitin, 2000). 
Instead, this demonstrated a progressive policy linked to a growing anxiety about the potential 
use of force.  
     Fighting continued, in late 1998 with the OSCE reporting that as the fighting drew nearer 
Pristina its intensity increased and the KLA ‘removed any ambiguity as to its intentions to bring 
the province under its control’.255 Russia aimed to steer the peace effort towards a diplomatic 
course of action via the establishment of the KDOM alongside its existing support for the delivery 
of humanitarian aid. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) under Chapter VII 
was still of a diplomatic character and Although Moscow acknowledged that if the demands of 
the Security Council were not met the Security Council would consider further action, coercive 
methods were not being considered by the Security Council.256 The management of the conflict 
continued to be conducted through ‘softer’ measures with the establishment of the KVM, which 
facilitated the humanitarian effort and ensured Belgrade’s compliance with the UN.257 As 
stipulated by the UNSG ‘The Mission will not enforce compliance, nor will it respond to local 
disturbances, react to hostilities or enforce access by relief organisations’. The KVM was also 
complemented by NATO’s AVM which provided aerial reconnaissance.258 As Milosevic refused 
military intervention into Kosovo and while there was little enthusiasm in the UN and NATO to 
put boots on the ground without a robust mandate, there was no option than to support these 
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missions. Russia’s abstention from this Resolution demonstrated a concern that the use of force 
against Belgrade was becoming more likely. Moscow’s refusal to veto this Resolution also 
highlighted an unwillingness to prevent the initiation of the observer mission to which it was 
contributing personnel.  
     While a ceasefire predominantly held throughout the latter months of 1998, the diplomatic 
effort failed due to renewed violence in January with the infamous Racak massacre. The 
diplomatic effort continued in Rambouillet throughout February 1999 and commenting during 
the initial stages of the talks, Russia’s Foreign Ministry stated that ‘Experience gained in resolving 
the Bosnian conflict shows that voluntary mutual pledges are much more effective than persistent 
arm twisting’.259 Russian officials justified this by arguing that the parties should be given more 
time to negotiate free from coercion because ‘you have to use very high negotiating skills in order 
to get out on an acceptable text’.260  
     With the failure of diplomacy and the refusal of Belgrade to accept NATO’s demands, OAF 
was launched on 24 March 1999. Russia’s Western partners considered the use of force the only 
viable option at this stage, which stemmed from an understanding that diplomacy should be 
backed by force. This was a continuation of a policy based on a shift in doctrinal understanding 
that emerged during the latter part of the conflict in Croatia and Bosnian & Herzegovina, which 
was followed by the development of peace support and beliefs in the duty of humanitarian 
intervention. During a meeting at the UN on 29 March 1999, the Canadian representative made a 
credible argument when stating that those participating in the peace effort had, prior to the 
bombing, made extensive attempts to negotiate through several diplomatic channels and had 
deployed an observer mission.261 Russia was outraged, with Yeltsin declaring that ‘We are 
basically talking about an attempt by NATO to enter the twenty-first century in the uniform of 
the world’s policeman. Russia will never agree to that’.262 Moscow also argued that NATO’s 
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actions were a threat to the durability of the UN as an institution and to international law enshrined 
in the Charter. 263 Russia argued against the claims that NATO’s actions became inevitable due to 
the obstructionist behaviour of Moscow and Beijing in the Security Council, with Lavrov 
declaring ‘no proposals on this topic were introduced in the Security Council by anyone. There 
was never any draft resolution; there were no informal discussions, not even in the corridors – 
and not with one permanent member of the Security Council, namely, Russia’.264 Russia would 
most certainly have vetoed any motion advocating the use of force.  
     Russian opinion also protested the humanitarian consequences of the bombing.265 Russia’s 
special envoy to Yugoslavia, Victor Chernomyrdin, commented in the Washington Post that 
NATO has destroyed ‘civilian infrastructure – in particular, electric transmission lines, water 
pipes and factories’, and he questioned whether thousands of people should ‘be killed because of 
one man’s blunders’. 266  Leading Russian academic opinion acknowledged this view, pointing 
out that ‘From a purely humanitarian point of view, there is no difference between ‘hundreds’ and 
‘tens of thousands’ killed as a result of atrocities. But in justifying a military intervention that 
devastated half a country and resulted in new victims among the civilian population, numbers 
matter’ (Arbatova, 2001: 65). NATO made substantial efforts to avoid causing civilian casualties, 
but some serious mistakes were made, such as the bombing of Korishe where more than 80 
Kosovars were killed (IICK, 2000: 94), and after four weeks of continuous bombing Belgrade 
had still not responded to the negotiation proposals set out in Rambouillet. It was decided during 
a NATO summit in Washington on 23 April 1999 to intensify and expand the airstrikes to include 
military-industrial infrastructure, media, and other targets in Serbia itself.267 However, a UK 
House of Commons report acknowledged that ‘We believe a very serious misjudgement was made 
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when it was assumed that the bombing wold not lead to the dramatic escalation in the 
displacement and expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population’.268 The IICK (2000: 88-89) 
provides a balanced verdict of the impact of NATO’s bombing campaign on Belgrade’s behaviour 
and the humanitarian situation: 
 
We cannot know what would have happened if NATO had not started the bombing. It is 
however certainly not true that NATO provoked the attacks on the civilian Kosovar 
population — the responsibility for that campaign rests entirely on the Belgrade 
government. It is nonetheless likely that the bombing campaign and the removal of the 
unarmed monitors created an internal environment that made such an operation feasible. 
The FRY forces could not hit NATO, but they could hit the Albanians who had asked for 
NATO’s support and intervention. It was thus both revenge on the Albanians and a 
deliberate strategy at the same time.  
 
 
     Moscow, only saw the destabilising impact of OAF and argued that painstaking negotiation 
was required which had still not be exhausted. 269 This was supported by softer methods such as 
the observation missions and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, which it began to 
unilaterally deliver to Belgrade during the bombing campaign.270 At the UN, Lavrov pointed out 
that ‘It is essential to fight for respect of human rights and norms of international humanitarian 
law, but solely through political and legal methods on the firm basis of the United Nations Charter 
and the relevant multilateral instruments’.271 Indeed, OAF demonstrated a major point of 
divergence between Russia and its Western partners in the peace effort. This had been steadily 
building since the summer of 1998, but did not reflect a complete Russian withdrawal from the 
evolving trends of European conflict management. It was noted during the escalatory phase of the 
conflict that ‘Russia played a central role in causing Milosevic to concede’.272 This was 
particularly important when nerves began to show in Western capitals as the sustained bombing 
campaign failed to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. 
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     Between April and June 1999, Russia engaged in intense diplomatic activity to halt the 
bombing and to pressure Belgrade into a ceasefire and to agree to the presence of an international 
force in Kosovo.273 A final plan was agreed between the negotiators, and Milosevic eventually 
agreed to the proposal which was was endorsed by the Serbian assembly on 3 June 1999. The 
plan allowed a limited number of Serbian forces to return to Kosovo after the international 
military presence had established itself in the region. It also stated that while the international 
military presence would be under UN auspices, it would be deployed under NATO chain of 
command.274 Besides the disagreements concerning the military element of the intervening force, 
Russian official opinion was content as ‘the draft resolution’s [1244] main significance lies in the 
fact that it restores the Kosovo settlement to the political track along with the central role of the 
United Nations’.  
The settlement process 
 
For the Kosovo Albanians, their attempt to achieve international attention for independence began 
with the initial break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.275 However, the settlement process 
only gained momentum once major hostilities had broken out and there was a deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation in late 1997. The Contact Group made its first statement in September 
1997 on the dispute over Kosovo’s political status, supporting the territorial integrity of the FRY 
but with an enhanced status for Kosovo.276 Moscow’s policy remained consistent with its partners 
in the peace effort, supporting Security Council Resolution 1160 which called for Kosovo’s 
greater autonomy within the FRY.277 This consideration was reaffirmed in the Milosevic-Yeltsin 
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(S/RES/1160) 31 March 1998, paragraph 5, p. 3. 
147 
 
meeting on 16 June 1998 where it was agreed that Belgrade would ‘resolve existing problems by 
political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo’.278  
     Those participating in the international peace effort intensified their attempts to facilitate a 
settlement during mid-1998.279 US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, was chosen to 
lead the negotiations (from now on referred to as the Hill Process) in facilitating a political 
compromise between Kosovo (and the KLA) and Belgrade. According to Weller (2009: 90), the 
proposal was directly influenced by the Contact Group and ‘represented a genuine attempt at 
balancing the divergent interests of the parties’. The draft avoided altogether the issue of the status 
of Kosovo and rather focused on a practical assignment of powers to different levels of 
administration. Yet, as Weller notes (2009: 90), this was problematic for both parties as this did 
not explicitly mention Belgrade’s continued territorial integrity and for Kosovo the source of 
public power would be in its local municipalities meaning that Pristina would not possess a 
concrete legal personality, hindering its ability to pursue an enhanced future legal status (Weller, 
2009: 90, 2008: 14).   
     Alongside the Hill Process, Richard Holbrooke obtained an agreement with Milosevic on 13 
October 1998 under the threat of an imminent airstrike from NATO. The agreement was published 
by Belgrade, which in contrast to the Hill proposal outlined the wider autonomy of Kosovo within 
the territorial framework of FRY (Weller, 2009: 92). This gained wide support from the central 
actors of the peace effort, with a Russian spokesperson welcoming the ceasefire agreement which 
was formally endorsed by the UN Security Council. The second Hill proposal was introduced on 
2 November 1998, enhancing the status of Kosovo as a legal entity in its own right, but also 
entrenching the municipalities which were of essential concern to the FRY (Weller, 2009: 92). 
With a non-committal by the authorities in Belgrade, a third draft was produced which gave more 
power to Belgrade – although this was also rejected.  
                                                          
278 Security Council Resolution 1199 (S/RES/1199), 23 September 1998, paragraph 5 (a), p. 3. 
279 Commentating at the time, one notable commentator declared: ‘The irony is that the outcome which 
the major powers are so insistently demanding now—the restoration of some form of autonomy for 
Kosovo within Yugoslavia—is the very same goal which they so faintly endorsed in the build-up to the 
current crisis’ (Caplan, 1998: 756). 
148 
 
     Moscow’s support for Kosovo’s wider autonomy continued to inform the basis of the 
forthcoming negotiations in accordance with its Western counterparts. This was further 
demonstrated by its involvement in the formulation of the Contact Group’s negotiator’s proposal 
which the central powers insisted must form the bedrock for the settlement process at 
Rambouillet.280 As part of a general list of non-negotiable principles and elements, the Contact 
Group advocated for the territorial integrity of the FRY, further autonomy for Kosovo based on a 
high degree of self-governance, and a final settlement after an interim period of three years.281 At 
Rambouillet on 23 February 1999 this was formalised in the Interim Agreement for Peace and 
Self-government in Kosovo. Russia firmly opposed the Kosovo Albanian interpretation of the 
interim settlement mechanism based on a binding referendum for independence after three years. 
The Kosovo delegation considered the existing language of the text ‘on the basis of the will of 
the people’ to be ambiguous.282 Russian officials claimed that ‘the Albanian delegation, while 
seemingly accepting the text, is making this contingent on certain conditions that could give rise 
to a dual interpretation of the text’.283 The final result of the Rambouillet talks were inconclusive, 
however. The Kosovo Albanian party argued that it had accepted the outcome of the negotiations, 
but that this had to be formally acknowledged by further consultation in Kosovo. Belgrade, on 
the other hand, regarded the process of negotiations as being far from over (Weller, 1999: 233).  
     The follow-on talks in Paris began in mid-March 1999 with the Kosovo delegation accepting 
the final version of the interim agreement. The Serbian delegation arrived in Paris with a new set 
of proposals which countered many of the non-negotiable interim principles. While Moscow 
recognised the intransigence of the Serb side, it was noted that Russia’s delegation was too 
inclined to defend Belgrade (Weller, 1999: 251). There are grounds to suggest that Russia was 
attempting to introduce a level of flexibility during this stage of the negotiations by searching for 
further compromises to accommodate Belgrade’s intransigence. Yet, as Moscow had signed up 
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to the non-negotiable political aspects of the interim agreement its course of action did in fact 
undermine the credibility of the Contact Group’s position.  
     Moreover, as Russia was left out of the decision-making process relating to the military aspect 
of the interim agreement, this created a likelihood of failure as only an international front would 
have persuaded Yugoslavia to accept (Headley, 2008: 358). It is almost certain, however, that if 
Russia had been involved in the discussion it would have opposed the idea of NATO having 
access to all areas of the FRY. This condition has generated a heated academic debate, with some 
commentators arguing that this was an ultimatum by NATO designed to obtain a Serb refusal to 
provide a pretext for the authorisation of airstrikes.284 Others have suggested that the interim 
agreement offered ‘the best possible chance for long term peace in the region’ and that it was the 
FRY who ‘showed no intention of engaging in serious negotiation’ (Bellamy, 2001: 31). The 
intransigence of both NATO and the FRY contributed towards the breakdown of talks. Belgrade 
could not countenance an external military actor’s access to all areas of the FRY, whilst NATO 
was unwilling to relinquish its control over the forthcoming international military effort to the 
UN. Following OAF, Moscow supported the G8 document and the final settlement proposal 
accepted by Belgrade in early June 1999, which was endorsed by Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999.  
 
4.3 Post-conflict peace effort 
 
Drawing from experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was an emphasis on the importance 
of building peace in Kosovo and the FRY. Yet, due to the absence of key elements for a ‘post-
conflict’ status this made the peacebuilding mission extraordinarily complex. As one scholar 
pointed out ‘Kosovo’s indeterminate political status is at the root of many of its most intractable 
threats to public security, including endemic violence against ethnic minorities, particularly Serbs, 
and the consequent emergence of polarized ethnic enclaves’ (Cockell, 2002: 484). The following 
sections will interrogate the nature of Moscow’s involvement in the post-conflict peace effort.  
                                                          
284 For an overview of the academic debate see Bellamy (2001).   
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4.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity  
 
Figure 4.2 provides an outline of the pooling of sovereignty and channels of interaction 
complexity between the various actors participating in the peace effort. Actors participating in its 
implementation learnt from their experiences in Bosnia & Herzegovina; however, due to its size 
and scope certain problems with the operation were inevitable.285 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
     As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the Security Council remained the supreme arbiter over the 
military and civilian aspects of the mission. Despite this, there was room for various channels of 
stakeholder interaction complexity to shape the mechanics of the peace effort. NATO, alongside 
external actors such as Russia, would form the military dimension of the operation and provide 
security in the region for the civilian population and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). While 
KFOR was directly bound by the decision-making at the level of the Security Council, it 
possessed a degree of operational scope. Alongside KFOR, UNMIK was directly answerable to 
                                                          
285 There has been considerable disagreement within the academic debate regarding the efficiency of this 
coordination, with some scholars contending that UNMIK and KFOR became the most ‘successful 
complex Balkan operations […] for interorganizational interaction’ (Cockell, 2002: 483). While others 
have been less complimentary, arguing that the structure of UNMIK and KFOR has caused problems due 
to a lack of cooperation (Heinemann-Gruder and Grebenschikov, 2006: 45). 
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the UNSG and the UNSC when implementing the civilian dimension. In consultation with the 
Security Council, UNMIK’s Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) was 
responsible for facilitating Kosovo’s political status, which would later be centralised through the 
Steering Committee pursuant to the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 
(CSP), otherwise known as the Ahtisaari Plan. The SRSG directed the civilian dimension at the 
operational level, which included missions from an array of institutions and agencies, alongside 
the work of NGOs.286 To provide coordination between the civilian and military dimensions of 
the operation, a UNMIK Military Liaison Office was established to coordinate with KFOR.287  
     Prior to the withdrawal of its military contingent from KFOR in mid-2003, Moscow 
demonstrated a nuanced understanding of the pooling of sovereignty via certain channels of 
interaction complexity. At the diplomatic level Russia acted through the Security Council, the 
Contact Group, and the PJC/NRC, while at the operational level Russian forces participated 
through a special arrangement in KFOR. With the withdrawal of its forces, Russia’s operational 
engagement in Kosovo decreased. Some expert commentary argue that this withdrawal also 
occurred at the diplomatic level with Russia having a negligible impact on the peace effort 
(Antonenko, 2007: 101). Moreover, where there has been a degree of institutional embedding at 
the diplomatic level, this is considered a reflection of ‘a strategic interaction to counterbalance 
and compensate’ for its weaknesses vis-à-vis NATO (Hughes, 2013: 993). Explanations for 
Russia’s behaviour based on its wider foreign policy aims cannot be overlooked. Yet, Russia did 
constructively participate in other mechanisms such as the Contact Group and the Troika. This 




With Putin coming to power in 2000, Russia reaffirmed its foreign policy concept a commitment 
to a UN-centred international order and opposed a NATO-dominated European system of security 
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287 Secretary General Report 672 (S/672), 12 June 1999, paragraph 7, p. 2. 
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governance. Russia’s ardent promotion of Security Council Resolution 1244 reflected this 
thinking which it considered the cornerstone of a settlement to the Kosovo issue.288 Moscow 
remained a central participant in the format of the Contact Group which became a principal 
negotiating body in facilitating Kosovo’s ‘Standards before Status’ process initiated by the UN. 
However, it was recognised by the members of the Contact Group that the Security Council would 
remain the key international actor in the negotiations.289 In 2003, Russia expressed its readiness 
to continue its active involvement in common efforts for ‘a just and lasting solution to the Kosovo 
problem’.290 Moscow continued to liaise with the SRSG to reiterate Resolution 1244 and to 
promote the authority of the Security Council.291 This coincided with Russia’s withdrawal from 
SFOR and KFOR; however, Moscow pointed out that it was reorienting its involvement by 
increasing its participation at the diplomatic level.292 
     Despite the impetus given to the Standards before Status process, widespread violence erupted 
throughout Kosovo in March 2004. This organised and targeted campaign was led by Kosovo 
Albanian extremists against the minority communities.293 In the wake of this violence, the Contact 
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293 In total, 19 people died in the violence, including 11 Kosovo Albanians and 8 Kosovo Serbs, and 954 
persons were injured during the course of the clashes. In addition, 65 international police officers, 58 
Kosovo Police Service officers, and 61 KFOR personnel suffered injuries. Approximately 750 houses 
153 
 
Group declared in a joint statement to step up its engagement in Kosovo through regular meetings 
and closer diplomatic cooperation with the international presence in the region. Moscow’s 
position was clear: ‘The Russian side is convinced that coordinated efforts by the international 
community in Kosovo alone can ensure the consolidation of stability and security there’.294 This 
coincided with an agreement that local representatives of the Contact Group would participate in 
the joint mechanism to steer the standards process alongside UNMIK and the Provisional 
Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Russia’s approach towards the implementation of the 
Status process remained consistent, placing the Contact Group and the Security Council at the 
centre of the decision-making process.295 During a meeting with a UK official in May 2005, 
Lavrov’s special representative emphasised the Security Council's pivotal role in all stages of the 
Kosovo settlement.296  
     In October 2005, it was formally announced in the Security Council that the Offices of the UN 
would steer the negotiations complemented by the Contact Group. Russia agreed to this 
arrangement which allowed for coordination in the Contact Group within the hierarchical legal 
framework of the Security Council. The initial period of 2006 featured a degree of consensus with 
Russian officials engaging in the Contact Group in support of UN-led negotiations (Gow, 2009: 
243). The implementation of the Status process was supported by the UN Office of the Special 
Envoy for the Future Status Process of Kosovo (UNOSEK). This body consisted of expert 
advisers representing the individual members of the Contact Group, with Weller (2008: 26) 
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observing that ‘the core team of advisers appeared to be carefully balanced, giving the key Contact 
Group states a direct voice and representation in the process’. Far from being side-lined, during 
this stage of negotiations Russia could engage in diplomacy through the Contact Group and the 
UNOSEK. 
     Nevertheless, although Russia supported the settlement process, its position became more 
guarded by late 2006; Moscow was clear that the UN-led effort should respect Resolution 1244 
and the Security Council. With negotiations continuing into 2007 the settlement process became 
increasingly chaotic with a hardening of Belgrade’s position in the face of a Western push for 
Kosovo’s independence. While Russia continued to participate through the Contact Group, it 
began to rely on the Security Council where it could threaten to veto proposals which departed 
from the foundations of Resolution 1244. To break the deadlock between the opposing sides and 
between Moscow and the rest of the Contact Group, a Troika was organised which included 
Russia, the EU, and the US. Despite the Troika’s diplomatic efforts, it failed to facilitate a 
compromise between Belgrade and Pristina. In fact, Washington and Brussels continued to act 
unilaterally to impose a solution even during the duration of the Troika negotiations (Hughes, 
2013: 1010).  
     Moscow grew frustrated with what it perceived as attempts to undermine collective action. 
Russian arguments about the side-lining of the UN were reminiscent of its protestations against 
the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. A statement made by the MFA in December 2007 
declared that ‘The authority of the UN is at stake. Kosovo settlement cannot occur outside the 
Security Council, the UN’s main body responsible for international peace and security’.297 
Although the reason for the circumvention of the Security Council was to avoid Moscow’s veto, 
Lavrov defended Russia’s position by arguing that acting outside of the Security Council is to 
‘take liberties with decisions adopted by consensus’ and that the use of the veto is not because 
‘we want to assert ourselves by being nasty to everyone, but because vetoes are the core ingredient 
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for international law’.298 Coinciding with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 
February 2008, Moscow was deeply troubled by increasing Western pressure on the UNSG for 
the initiation of the EU’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) mission and for the ‘beefing up’ of 
KFOR’s mandate in circumvention of the Security Council.299   
Operational level 
 
The discussions over the structure of an international security presence in Kosovo mirrored the 
debates in Bosnian & Herzegovina. According to one Russian scholar, Russia wanted to 
‘participate on an equal footing’ and that it ‘didn’t want to be involved only symbolically’ as there 
is a ‘status problem, the problem of recognition’.300 This thinking was based on grievances about 
the dominance of NATO in Europe. Russia’s drive to prevent the forthcoming operation from 
becoming NATO-dominated were exacerbated by the Alliance’s willingness to use force and its 
readiness to employ military measures outside of the legal framework of the Security Council. 
     Serious discussions about the structure and composition of the intended operation in Kosovo 
began with Chernomyrdin’s initial proposals during a meeting with Talbott and Ahtisaari. First, 
it was suggested that Russian troops should take command of a northern zone of Kosovo 
bordering the FRY, where most of the Serbian population resided. This received an outright 
refusal from Talbott as it was perceived to threaten a de facto partition of Kosovo which would 
contravene the G8 principles. Chernomyrdin’s second proposal advocated the use of NATO 
troops from members who did not participate in the bombing campaign, such as Greece and 
Portugal. Again this received a firm rejection from Talbott who stated that NATO troops were 
                                                          
298 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Interview Granted by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the 




299 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement by Mikhail Kamynin, Spokesman for Russia’s 




300 Interview with Dr Nadya Arbatova, Institute for World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO), 5 September 2014. 
156 
 
part of one command without national distinctions.301 Chernomyrdin finally conceded, but was 
insistent that NATO forces should possess a Security Council mandate and, therefore, operate 
under the wider auspices of the Security Council. Talks continued in Bonn with Russian 
representatives from the MoD proposing that the international force should be under UN 
command with NATO’s role being limited to a security presence on Kosovo’s border with 
Albania (Headley, 2008: 397). NATO officials refused and it was agreed to footnote the specifics 
of Russia’s participation in NATO’s command and control arrangements for a further round of 
consultations. In the final ten-point peace plan offered to Milosevic it was stipulated that the 
military and civilian presence would be under UN auspices, but with ‘substantial’ NATO 
participation which must be ‘deployed under unified command and control’.302  
     With the dash to Pristina, a compromise was eventually reached. While Russia did not receive 
a sector, its forces would be spread throughout Kosovo in highly important areas, with command 
and control arrangements reflecting those devised in post-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina. Russian 
forces mirrored their behaviour in Bosnia & Herzegovina, where cooperation with other military 
contingents was facilitated via joint patrols, exercises and weekly meetings. Russian battalions 
also coordinated with UNMIK and NGOs engaged in the humanitarian and peacebuilding effort 
through the provision of escorts and the sharing of information. However, in comparison to its 
Western counterparts, Russian forces had still not developed civilian liaison officers to assist in 
cooperation and coordination. 
 
4.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
Coercive measures and the role of force 
 
Resolution 1244 set out the broad legal parameters of the operation’s coercive measures.  
Acknowledging that the situation in the region continued ‘to constitute a threat to international 
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peace and security’, the Resolution was based on a Chapter VII mandate. 303 It stipulated that ‘with 
all necessary measures’ the operation was to deter renewed hostilities between the opposing sides, 
maintain and where necessary enforce a ceasefire.304 The KFOR commander would be given 
autonomy on decisions relating to the use of coercive methods to carry out Resolution 1244.305 
For NATO, KFOR was a peace support operation with robust rules of engagement; yet each lead 
nation of a Multinational Brigade (MNB) had the right to place caveats on rules of engagement 
(Dziedzic, 2006: 341).  
     Russia maintained a strict understanding of the rules of engagement and although supporting 
Resolution 1244, it was unsettled by OAF. Lavrov made it very clear that  
 
The draft resolution’s reference to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter relates 
exclusively to ensuring the safety and security of international personnel and compliance 
with the provisions of the draft resolution. It does not even hint at the possibility of any 
use of force beyond the limits of the tasks clearly set out by the Security Council.306 
 
Indeed, where NATO had largely moved beyond the consent-divide, Russia was still shaped by 
this thinking. Although the utility of force was not ruled out, Moscow was unwilling to support 
force at the operational and strategic levels.307  
     The immediate post-conflict environment in Kosovo was considerably more challenging than 
in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The KLA took advantage of the power vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and unleashed ‘a wave of violence against the Serb 
population, other minorities, and their perceived rivals within the Kosovo Albanian community’ 
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(Dziedzic, 2006: 350). KFOR confronted the KLA and newly established paramilitary groups. In 
the early 2000s in MNB-East, Russia and US troops were confronted by the Liberation Army of 
Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) who were attempting to gain independence from 
Belgrade. With sustained warnings by the leadership in Belgrade about the initiation of action 
against the UCPMB, Foreign Minister Ivanov expressed his concern to G8 leaders in March 2000, 
urging KFOR troops not to ‘allow provocations’ and warned against ‘a repeat of the scenario of 
last year’.308 While not explicitly referring to the use of force, Ivanov’s request did not rule out 
this option. There were several instances where KFOR troops, including the Russian contingent 
in MNB-East, used force against the UCPMB.309 Russia also supported the actions of UNMIK 
and KFOR in their attempts to subdue Albanian spoilers in Kosovo and in Serbia’s Preševo 
Valley.310  
     Moscow supported the use of force to tackle Albanian extremists; however, this was situated 
at the tactical level and was limited. Even KFOR understood that force was not always the 
appropriate response. The ethnically-divided city of Mitrovica also proved to be a major challenge 
for KFOR, where violence occurred almost daily from Albanian and Serb extremist groups. 
Russia disagreed with KFOR’s use of force to solve the issue and emphasised diplomacy.311 This 
can be considered as Moscow supported a robust approach when tackling the security issue in the 
Preševo Valley where Belgrade’s sovereignty was threatened, but in this instance promoted softer 
measures towards Kosovo Serb spoilers. However, as in the policy towards the UCPMB, Lavrov 
reaffirmed the importance of a political solution, without ruling out the use of limited force. 
     This approach was reflected in the response to the violence that erupted in mid-March 2004, 
in what the UNSG described as ‘an organized, widespread, and targeted campaign’ led by Kosovo 
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Albanian extremists ‘against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities of Kosovo’.312 The 
international response included the reinforcing of KFOR with additional troops and the launch of 
an effort ‘to apprehend those involved in the violent actions’.313 KFOR increased its fixed 
checkpoints throughout the minority community enclaves and static patrols were introduced in 
many areas. There was a consensus in the Security Council in support of this robust approach, 
with a Presidential Statement on behalf of the Security Council recognising KFOR’s effort to 
restore security.314  
     Russia provided a sizeable contingent of law enforcement officers from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MOI) to UNMIK and supported pro-active approaches to law enforcement.315 
Commenting on the responsibilities of the foreign law enforcement officers operating in Kosovo, 
the former Commander of the Russian police contingent participating in UNMIK stated that ‘We 
staged all sorts of police operations, from road patrolling to the arrests of criminals. In addition, 
we taught local police how to operate on […] Kosovo territory’.316 This also included the use of 
limited and defensive force when carrying out operations.317 This went beyond the role of law 
enforcement in post-Dayton Bosnia & Herzegovina, where Moscow staunchly opposed the 
expansion of the IPTF’s mandate to include robust search and arrest operations. 
Reconstruction and reconciliation 
 
The reconstruction and reconciliation of Kosovo were central responsibilities of the peace effort. 
The responsibilities of Resolution 1244 were centralised through four co-dependent pillars: (1) 
Interim civil administration; (2) Humanitarian affairs; (3) Institution-building; (4) Reconstruction. 
Alongside the UN and its various agencies, the EU would play a pivotal role in reconstruction 
whilst the OSCE would centre its efforts on institution-building. This section will focus on the 
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latter three pillars leaving an analysis of Russia’s engagement in the political process of Kosovo’s 
status for a discussion in the final section.  
     Russia declared that it supported and was taking ‘an active part in the efforts to find a 
comprehensive approach to the social and economic reconstruction, stabilization and 
development of the Balkan region’.318 Moscow’s engagement in these pillars was complicated, 
however, by the unresolved matter of Kosovo’s settlement. This cut across key areas of 
peacebuilding in Kosovo, such as the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the 
the electoral process. This was especially from 2006 and onwards where an active political 
process to determine Kosovo’s final status was implemented. While Moscow was concerned with 
the general rehabilitation of Kosovan society, its focus was on the security of the Serbian minority. 
     The period following OAF witnessed the return of substantial numbers of Kosovo Albanians 
to the province and the voluntary and/or forced exodus of the non-Albanian population to the 
surrounding Balkan republics. A large portion of the ethnic minority population also became 
internally displaced areas of Kosovo. The Security Council authorised a mission between 27 and 
29 April 2000 to gain a clearer picture of the developments on the ground.319 The mission was 
comprised of several countries’ representatives, including Russian ambassador Lavrov. Emphasis 
was placed on the plight of the minority population where it was noted that regular but isolated 
attacks continued to be directed against Kosovan Serb civilians, and that ‘Inadequate physical, 
social and economic security remains a major concern’, which ‘hampers the return of internally 
displaced persons’ and ‘impedes the integration of ethnic minorities into public life’.320 The report 
also acknowledged that while the initiation of the electoral process was a positive development 
in the building of peace in Kosovo, the low participation of the Kosovo Serb community ‘due to 
the current lack of physical security and freedom of movement’ was deeply problematic.321  
     Russia supported the peacebuilding measures but held some significant reservations. This was 
related to the humanitarian effort and where UNMIK and KFOR argued that uncontrolled returns 
                                                          
318 Security Council Meeting 4011 (S/PV. 4011), 10 June, 1999, p. 8. 
319 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 2, p. 1.  
320 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 24, p. 5. 
321 Secretary General Report 363 (S/363), 29 April 2000, paragraph 30, p. 6. 
161 
 
could destabilise the security situation due to the competition for scarce housing and resources. 
Lavrov stated, however, that ‘the problem of the return of internally displaced persons is not being 
resolved’, and that the mission ‘did not see that there was even a general concept of a return of 
displaced persons to Kosovo. I think this is a serious omission on the part of the UNMIK 
command’.322 While the central Western members of the Security Council acknowledged the 
importance of minority returns, it was put forward that reconciliation could not be achieved 
overnight and that the mission was an enormous task.323  
     Russian pronouncements became more frequent with the initiation of the Standards before 
Status process which Moscow welcomed to cement the security of the Kosovan people. With only 
minor refugee returns by the time of the inter-ethnic violence in early 2004, Moscow became 
highly critical of what it viewed as UNMIK’s inability to ensure the safety of the minority 
population in Kosovo and to expedite returns. To mitigate the humanitarian crisis, Moscow 
delivered humanitarian supplies, provided medical assistance, facilitated contacts across the 
ethnic divide, and provided escorts to the OSCE and NGOs.324 Russia’s level of assistance 
increased after the episode of ethnically motivated violence in 2004.325 Refugee camps with 
pharmacies and shops were erected in Serbia for refugees, and humanitarian supplies were 
delivered to the minority population in Kosovo.326 Moscow stepped up its humanitarian assistance 
following Pristina’s declaration of independence in February 2008 and this was repeated 
sporadically during Medvedev’s presidency. While Putin declared that this action was devoid of 
‘political overtones’,327 it was certainly an attempt to enhance Russia’s image and discredit 
Western actors who had supported independence and were still operating in the region.  
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     Institution-building via Pillar 3 was also considered a key area by Russian officials. Russia 
agreed that elections were crucial for building peace in Kosovo, but disagreed with the consensus 
about the timing of their implementation. Russia agreed that certain conditions relating to the 
ethnic minority population should be established prior to the holding of elections. Alternatively, 
the consensus in the peace effort led by the successive SRSG’s of UNMIK argued that while 
conditions were not perfect, elections would facilitate security by eroding the ethnic divide 
through the promotion of political dialogue. During the initial years following Resolution 1244, 
Moscow held reservations about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the electoral process. In 
relation to the November 2000 elections UN officials acknowledged that while most local 
Kosovan Serbian leaders agreed to boycott the elections until the security situation improved, 
they should still go ahead. The US representative declared that ‘Elections and a responsible 
governing structure are the best way to temper passions’.328 Russia stated that it was not opposed 
to the holding of elections in principle but that the minimum conditions for their fair and 
transparent facilitation had not been achieved.329  
     With the first municipal election failing to gain substantial Kosovo Serb participation, the 
consensus led by the SRSG was to proceed with the electoral process. Moscow disagreed arguing 
that this would ‘simply strengthen the mono-ethnic nature of Kosovo and heighten the nationalist 
mood in the area’. Even some central European powers, such as France, were not convinced that 
elections should proceed amidst such an insecure environment. With the formal endorsement of 
the Standards before Status process in December 2003, the significance of the elections was 
reaffirmed. Russia recognised the importance of each Standard but continued to argue that 
conditions enabling a substantial number of ethnic minorities to participate must be achieved to 
facilitate a credible election process. The parliamentary elections in October 2004 were a vital 
test for the credibility of the Standards before Status process because of the previous period of 
violence, but Moscow argued that the elections would further fuel tensions. 330 Although the 
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elections ran smoothly and were considered transparent by the OSCE, the participation of the 
minority population remained low. Calls from Belgrade and local Kosovan Serb leadership to 
boycott the elections also had an impact on the decisions of the minority population. Russia’s 
review of the elections was scathing, considering the lack of participation by the Serb minority as 
an indicator that human rights and the safety of ethnic minorities was not being fulfilled. Since 
the events of 2008, Russia has refused to recognise the electoral process in Kosovo regarding it 
illegal and illegitimate due to the lack of ethnic minority participation.331  
     This coincided with attempts to assist in the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo through 
Pillar 4. At the UN, Russia declared that it ‘supports and is taking an active part in efforts to find 
a comprehensive approach to the social and economic reconstruction, stabilization and 
development of the Balkan region’.332 Russia’s engagement in reconstruction efforts in Kosovo 
was largely based on the work of its military contingent stationed throughout the province. This 
included the facilitation of functioning institutions and public organisations, and went beyond the 
measures employed in the post-Dayton phase of the peace effort in Bosnia & Herzegovina to 
include reconciliation projects between the opposing sides. Certain Russian commanders used 
their initiative to ensure that their forces were educated in the customs and traditions of the region 
to work effectively with the civilian population. Russia’s military contingent was also involved 
in reconstruction projects such as the building of roads, and the repairing of schools and hospitals.  
     The implementation of local projects was accompanied by inter-state level economic projects. 
These Russian initiatives were aimed at revitalising the Serbian economy and infrastructure, while 
the EU was Kosovo’s principal donor. Lavrov welcomed this economic relationship, stating in 
2005 that ‘There are opportunities, primarily in trade and the economic and investment spheres 
that need to be used actively’.333 As in the case of Bosnia & Herzegovina, these economic projects, 
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based largely on energy investment, were attached to the broader aspects of Russia’s bilateral 
relations with Serbia.334 The emphasis placed on the use of state level economic assistance and 
trade served to accomplish two immediate aims: assistance in the wider peacebuilding process 
through the consolidation of Serbia’s economy, and the cultivation of bilateral state relations. 
Russian private and state-owned businesses invested heavily in the rebuilding of oil refineries in 
the Serbian towns of Novi Sad and Pancevo destroyed in NATO’s bombing campaign 
(Pivovarenko, 2014). This conflation had a significant impact on Moscow’s engagement in 
policies of peacebuilding, in that the focus on bilateral trade largely overlooked the potential in 
grass-root projects at the local level. To add further complication, Moscow would traditionally 
expect a payment in return. This was particularly the case regarding energy deliveries to the 
region, where the continuation of deliveries was contingent upon the meeting of payments. To an 
extent, this compromised Russia’s participation in the peacebuilding effort as profit and self-gain 
– besides a degree of altruism in assisting the country’s re-development – became contributing 
factors conditioning Russia’s engagement. 
The settlement process 
 
The political aspect of Resolution 1244 was premised in large part on the G8 agreement devised 
in 1999 where it promoted ‘an interim political framework based on autonomy for Kosovo and 
the territorial integrity of the FRY.335 Russia recognised this and was resolute that ‘there must be 
absolute clarity in respect of the concept of what is meant by substantial autonomy for Kosovo 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999)’.336 Moscow was 
also adamant that any agreement on the legal framework in Kosovo ‘must involve not only the 
various groups in Kosovo, but also the direct participation of Belgrade’.337 This compromise was 
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in accordance with the other central actors participating in the peace effort. Even US ambassador 
to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged that while ‘all options remain on the table and sets 
forth a process without dictating a solution’, to establish a long-term solution ‘the terms of any 
eventual settlement must be mutually acceptable to both sides and backed by the international 
community’.338  
     The settlement process began to take momentum in 2004 and 2005, and Eide’s final report in 
the Standards before Status process was submitted to the Security Council in October 2005 
ordering to push ahead with the settlement process.339 Alongside the other Security Council 
members, Russia endorsed this recommendation and authorised the settlement talks on 24 
October 2005. Moscow remained committed to the strict interpretation of Resolution 1244 based 
on Serbia’s territorial integrity. For the two years following this, the diplomatic effort entered a 
period of ‘diplomatic linguistic gymnastics’ as Moscow, Washington, and Brussels ‘battled to 
construct ambiguities which would either reinforce (in the case of Russia) or steadily undermine 
(in the cases of the US and EU) UNSCR 1244’ (Hughes, 2013: 1009). According to Weller (2008: 
25), a division had occurred between Russia and the other members of the Contact Group who 
accepted the inevitability of independence. 
     Throughout 2006 Martti Ahtisaari led an extensive diplomatic effort with a failed attempt in 
Vienna in late July to facilitate a compromise solution between the parties. Russia supported a 
Contact Group statement on 27 July 2006 which called for flexibility between the two parties and 
a negotiated settlement. This was reiterated in a Security Council meeting in mid-September 
where Russia declared that ‘any decision on the future status of the province must be a universal 
one’, and that ‘A negotiated solution on the future status of Kosovo is a priority for Russia’.340 
While compromise was also promoted by many of the central Western actors in the peace effort, 
their push for independence was becoming more apparent as an inevitable outcome for Kosovo. 
With negotiations extending into 2007, Ahtisaari presented his draft settlement proposal to the 
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UN. The ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ proposed that Kosovo be led towards independence on the condition 
that it would be a multi-ethnic state (Hughes, 2013: 1009). While not mentioning independence, 
the Plan included several provisions – including the right to form international agreements and 
hold membership in international institutions, the right to a national army, and the right to national 
symbols – that were interpreted as providing Kosovo with independence. 
     Kosovo accepted the Plan, but Belgrade rejected it. Russia opposed the Plan arguing that an 
acceptable solution is one based on compromise. The Plan has been viewed by some commentary 
as totally disregarding Resolution 1244 and ignoring the humanitarian plight and ethnic cleansing 
of the Kosovo Serb population (Hughes, 2013: 1010). To resolve the deadlock between the 
opposing sides and the international peacemakers, a Troika negotiating format was formed in 
mid-2007. The aim was to promote dialogue and facilitate some form of compromise. Russia 
made its position clear: ‘The most reliable solution to the problem is one that will work out in 
direct talks with the Kosovo Serb side. Russia would support any outcome of such negotiation’.341 
Although Russia was being flexible in supporting an outcome based on inclusive negotiations, it 
knew that the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade would not accept an independent Kosovo. After several 
months of negotiations, the impasse remained, with the Troika reporting its failure to the Security 
Council in December 2007. The Troika also stipulated that ‘There will be no return to the pre-
1999 status’, that ‘Belgrade will not govern Kosovo’ and neither shall it ‘re-establish a physical 
presence in Kosovo’.342  
     Despite this, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and while there were disputes 
between certain members of the EU, most the West recognised Kosovo’s statehood. Russia was 
outraged, viewing it as a repeat of the unilateral behaviour which destabilised Kosovo and Serbia 
in 1999. Russian officials opposed the declaration asserting that it was a breach of international 
law based on Resolution 1244, a breach of the Helsinki Final Act, and of Serbia’s sovereignty. In 
Russia’s view, the erosion of the principal norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity had 
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created a dangerous precedent which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, Russia would 




This chapter has explored the nature of Russia’s involvement in the conflict that erupted in 
Kosovo and its ensuing path to a sustainable peace. The chapter questioned to what extent the 
case of Kosovo represented a further departure in Russia’s engagement in the broad trends of 
European conflict management as captured by European security governance. While there were 
deepening divergences in some respects, there was also a consistent level of convergence. The 
chapter has demonstrated that Russia’s behaviour remained complex. First, Russia continued to 
make a conscious effort to steer collective action at the diplomatic and operational levels away 
from an exclusive reliance on Western institutions, to a more inclusive dependence on wider 
international actors and arrangements based on or closely affiliated with the UN, where it could 
legitimately shape the peace effort. Second, that the understanding between Russia and the central 
actors of European security governance on the role of force diverged even further, with an acerbic 
debate over sovereignty and the increasing entrenchment of evolving humanitarian norms. 
Russia’s compulsion to maintain the direction of the peace effort away from a military response 
had a profound impact upon its behaviour in relation to the use of coercive methods. The anxiety 
over NATO’s readiness to use force for the protection of civilians across state borders, 
compromised Russia’s behaviour to the extent that its conservative understanding of force became 
further ingrained as the conflict developed, and that Russia was not even prepared to support 
sanctions which it had endorsed during in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. This apprehension 
can be traced to Russia’s condemnation of NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian 
Serbs, and which was closely bound up in foreign policy concerns about an increasingly NATO-
centred system of European security governance. This degree of anxiety featured in the post-
intervention phase of the peace effort. Third, Russia demonstrated its use of and support for softer 
and limited measures which Moscow argued were paramount for the facilitation of the 
peacemaking process. This approach also attempted to reconcile the safeguarding of sovereign 
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consent and the support for human rights. Fourth, in accordance with the international peace 
effort, Russia exercised a largely consistent understanding of the debate over self-determination, 
and remained alert to Serbia’s territorial integrity whilst recognising Kosovo’s greater autonomy. 
Yet, this became another key point of divergence between Moscow and its Western counterparts, 
with considerable disagreement over the future status of Kosovo.  
     For Russia, the management of the conflict in Kosovo and the following settlement process 
remained a foreign policy priority. From the late 1990s to the end of Medvedev’s tenure in power, 
Russia considered Kosovo an arena for the negotiation of European security governance. Issues 
such as the mission’s leadership and the normative conduct of the operation directly reflected 
wider concerns in Moscow relating to the first-order norms and institutional design of security 
governance in Europe. Russia’s external policy continued to constructively engage in security 
governance but on its own terms in staunch defence of its sovereign identity and national interests. 
While there was a deterioration in Russia’s relations with the central actors of European security 
governance from the mid- to late 2000s onwards – excluding the minor rapprochement initiated 
by the Obama presidency – this did not necessarily detract from Moscow’s relatively principled 
approach towards Kosovo. This, however, was not the case in Russia’s regional experience where 
foreign and security policy aims became increasingly bound up in its response towards the 
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Russia’s involvement in the conflicts in Georgia has been central to its conflict management 
experience. The acerbic nature of Moscow’s wider relationship with Tbilisi profoundly impacted 
the management of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As covered in chapter 2, 
significant questions have been raised about the credibility of Russia’s involvement in Georgia, 
which has largely been considered a policy of escalating interference and coercion to secure 
Russian national interests. One expert has referred to Russia’s engagement as a campaign to 
‘coerce Georgia to peace’ (Allison, 2008: 1145). This chapter will situate Russia’s behaviour in 
Georgia in the wider context of its experiences in the Balkans and its evolving foreign and security 
policy to highlight continuity and change in its doctrine, policy, and practice. 
     The chapter will demonstrate that while there was a degree of ambivalence in Russia’s 
response towards the conflicts, this did not rule out an engagement in the trends of European 
conflict management as captured by the norms and processes of security governance. Russian 
behaviour developed in stages where its initial engagement was erratic largely because of the 
chaotic decision-making and policy implementation processes between the MoD and the MFA. 
However, Russia’s post-ceasefire behaviour began to traverse both Westphalian and post-
Westphalian security provision, which reflected its behaviour in the Balkans. From the mid-2000s 
170 
 
onwards and the August war of 2008, Russia’s response became more calculated in the securing 
of its national interests; however, Moscow was still alert to the necessity of maintaining some 
form of stability in the regions based on certain aspects of its conflict management experience. 
Where change in Russia’s behaviour occurred, this was driven by political expediency rather than 
by a fundamental revision of how it approached conflict management. 
     To demonstrate this, the chapter begins with an interrogation Russia’s approach towards the 
eruption of intra-state violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia during the early 1990s. Following 
this, the chapter analyses Moscow’s engagement in the post-ceasefire peace effort in both regions, 
including an analysis of Russia’s response to the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 and its 
aftermath.   
 
5.2 Pre-ceasefire phase: responding to violence in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia 
5.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity  
 
Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and channels of interaction complexity were 
inconsistent during this stage of the conflicts. When responding to the conflict that emerged in 
South Ossetia in early 1991 Moscow showed a relatively limited display of collective action. 
However, in the case of Abkhazia from 1993 onwards Moscow engaged in collective efforts to 
terminate the violence which erupted in Abkhazia. As illustrated in figure 5.1 Moscow’s selective 
interaction with other participating actors was aimed at steering collective action away from an 
exclusive reliance on Western actors, and instead towards a dependence on international 
institutions and agencies centred in or closely affiliated with the UN and CSCE. This allowed 
Russia to maintain a central stakeholder position in the peace effort. The aim of this engagement 
served two purposes. The first was to ensure the safeguarding of what Russia considered as a 
region of vital interests. The second was to promote an inclusive process of collective action, 
which was consistent with Russia’s understanding of the conduct of the peace efforts discussed 
in the previous chapters. Moscow’s behaviour was also complicated by the chaotic nature of 




Figure 5.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the 




As figure 5.1 illustrates, Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty via channels of 
stakeholder interaction complexity differed across the two conflicts. Interaction complexity was 
limited in South Ossetia and Moscow’s involvement only increased in mid-1992 with the 
brokering of a ceasefire agreement between the conflicting parties in Sochi. In contrast, Moscow 
showed more engagement in Abkhazia as the conflict unfolded. While Russia’s initial response 
did not actively promote the participation of international actors in the peace effort, from mid-
1993 onwards the settlement process became internationalised with the inclusion of the UN and 
the CSCE. Moscow ensured that it maintained its stakeholder position alongside the UNSGSR. 
This provided Russia with a degree of credibility by facilitating its self-proclaimed role as the 




     With the outbreak of fighting in Abkhazia in mid-1992, Moscow replicated its approach in 
South Ossetia where it monopolised the mediation process.343 Yet, despite the preliminary success 
of this diplomatic effort, the fighting continued with both sides blaming the other for its 
resumption.344 During this stage of the conflict, Russia was accused by Tbilisi for supporting 
Abkhazia. The Russian MoD vehemently denied these allegations, stating that all Russian troops 
stationed in the region were maintaining strict neutrality.345 Further talks between the Defence 
Ministers of Russia and Georgia were arranged in Sochi in early April 1993, where the Georgian 
side proposed the internationalisation of the settlement process and the exclusion of direct Russian 
participation in future talks.346 Russia continued to position itself at the centre of negotiations with 
a presidential meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze in Moscow on 14 May 1993, followed 
by Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s visit to Tbilisi in early June 1993.347 Yet, on 9 July Moscow 
supported Resolution 849 (1993) which requested the UNSG to send the UNSGSR to the region 
to assist in implementing a ceasefire.348 While calculated decision-making was a feature of 
Russia’s response in peace brokering, the legitimation of its role as regional security guarantor 
did not rule out an engagement in collective action to resolve the conflict.  
     The UN’s role in negotiations was vital to facilitate a collective settlement process, where 
Russia co-ordinated with the UNSC and with the UNSGSR. This phase of the settlement process 
began in late July 1998 and although this agreement failed because of Abkhazia’s offensive in 
September 1993,349 a Memorandum of Understanding between the belligerents was signed in 
early December 1993 under the auspices of the UN in Geneva. Russia provided mediation and 
CSCE representatives participated as observers.350 The talks also established an informal working 
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group which convened in Moscow in mid-December and included representatives from the 
opposing sides and specialists from the UN and the CSCE. Its purpose was to maintain channels 
of communication by studying the developments of Abkhazia’s political status. 
     Negotiations were enhanced in 1994 and continued under the auspices of the UN. Russia was 
a central participant in this diplomatic framework, maintaining its engagement in the UN and with 
Washington which had taken a more active diplomatic role. While decision-making was 
implemented via this negotiating format, it was overseen by the Security Council. Moscow 
recognised that if the Council’s wider authority over the peace process was considered it would 
support multiple channels of interaction. Yet with the streamlining of the negotiating format under 
UN auspices, this removed any Russian anxieties about its exclusion from decision-making in a 
region it considered to be of vital interest. This was reflected in negotiations in early 1994 with 
the outbreak of violence in the Gali district in Georgia and the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia.351 
While there was minimal progress on a settlement, the parties signed a quadripartite agreement 
which included the establishment of a special commission on the issue of refugees scheduled to 
begin work in March and the participation of the UNHCR. Russia explicitly supported collective 
action attaching ‘great importance to progress in the negotiating process’, through coordination 
with the UNSGSR and the OSCE Chairman.352 Moscow supported Resolution 906 (1994) on 25 
March which urged all sides to continue negotiations and refrain from violent acts. This sustained 
level of coordination between the negotiators and observers assisted in the signing of a further 
ceasefire agreement in Moscow on 4 April 1994.353  
     The oscillation between these objectives shaped Russia’s approach towards the discussions in 
1994. Certain scholarship contends that from late 1993 onwards Russia’s engagement in 
collective action was overshadowed by a shifting emphasis on national interests in foreign policy 
planning (Allison, 1994). Evidence demonstrates, however, that from early 1994 Russia was still 
engaged with external institutional actors to facilitate a UN operation in Abkhazia via the Security 
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Council.354 During a meeting on 9 March, Russia’s representative refrained from ruling out the 
use of ‘other forces approved by the United Nations’,355 alluding to the deployment of CIS forces, 
but was clear when declaring in a further meeting at the UN on 25 March that UN forces would 
be indispensable for achieving peace.356  
     Moscow’s persistent calls that a decision needed to be made for the deployment of an operation 
were credible because of the precarious situation on the ground. When it became clear that the 
UN was not going to authorise an operation, Russia began to increase the frequency of its offers 
for the deployment of a CIS force. At a CIS summit in Moscow on 15 April, a statement was 
issued declaring that the UN should not hesitate in its deployment of a force but ‘If, for some 
reason, such a decision is not made, the Council is ready to deploy in the conflict zone 
peacekeeping forces comprising military contingents from countries which are party to the 
agreement’.357 Less enthusiastic about the deployment of foreign troops along Russia’s regional 
periphery, Defence Minister Grachev stated that UN forces could not replace those of the CIS. 
Grachev stated that this was because Russia’s neighbours were comfortable with the deployment 
of Russian forces in the vicinity of local ‘hot spots’.358 
     This did not rule out Russia’s support for external actors. Kozyrev declared that ‘It would be 
a mistake to ignore the role of the United Nations and the CSCE, but it would be another extreme 
to abandon this sphere completely to the hands of these organizations. This is a zone of Russian 
interests and this is understood by all sides’ (cited in Shashenkov, 1994: 64). Boutros-Ghali was 
pragmatic and did not oppose the use of Russian forces under the auspices of the CIS in Abkhazia, 
even drawing a parallel with the involvement of Western troops in the Balkans. The UNSG was 
clear, however, that CIS troops would not be given a UN mandate as they would not be under a 
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UN chain of command.359 The signing of an agreement in Moscow on the 14 May 1994 with the 
Georgian leadership was crucial in fulfilling Russian aspirations as regional security guarantor. 
This decision did not signify an indifference in Moscow regarding the participation of external 
actors as Russia put pressure on its CIS partners to contribute forces and lamented their 
unwillingness to offer troops to the forthcoming operation (MacFarlane and Schnabel, 1995: 22). 
Russia’s frustration was exacerbated because it felt that it was not offered the same level of 
support other operations were given. Therefore, Russia argued that under Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter, alongside a CIS mandate, it possessed the legal basis to initiate an operation. This 
indifference to the UN should not be considered a shift in its policy towards a disregard for the 
UN in the former Soviet Union. Rather, this demonstrated an emotional response born out of 
mounting frustration over what Moscow considered a double-standard.360 Russia stressed that it 
did not want to ‘supplant the efforts of the United Nations towards the settlement of the conflict, 
but to help create the most favourable conditions for those efforts’.361 
Operational level 
 
Stakeholder interaction complexity and the pooling of sovereignty into a collective response was 
virtually non-existent. Due to the participation of Russian forces in the conflict on the side of 
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Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, the cultivation of a collective response was limited. While the MFA 
attempted to facilitate a degree of collective action with the OSCE this was also limited.  
5.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
Coercive measures and the role of force 
 
Several reasons can explain the incoherence of Russia’s response during this period which 
contrasted with its handling of the violence in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. First, the 
eruption of violence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia contributed towards the disintegration and 
breakup of the Soviet Union. These divisions within Georgia were reflected in the divisive 
political fault lines that emerged in Moscow, which profoundly disrupted governmental decision-
making and policy implementation processes. This was particularly the case regarding South 
Ossetia, which unfolded amidst political change and upheaval in the Kremlin. Second, the 
reorganisation of Russia’s power ministries and structures, such as the MoD in May 1992, 
contributed towards this turbulence in policymaking. Third, these wider factors were 
accompanied by the relative inexperience of the armed forces and the troops stationed in Georgia 
at the time of the violence. None of the Soviet and later Russian Army units were trained to 
manage intra-state conflict, and many could only draw upon their past experiences fighting a high-
intensity and bloody counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. This improvisation replaced 
coherent institutionalised doctrine from Russia’s power ministries/military establishment, where 
an animated debate unfolded. This doctrinal debate chaotically unfolded along the institutional 
divide between the military and the MFA, and discrepancies occurred within and across the 
boundaries of the central power ministries (Lynch, 1999: 94). This hindered the extent thinking 
at the institutional level informed practice on the ground in the zones of conflict. 
     Fourth, this was followed by independent and ad hoc responses from local commanders which 
contributed towards this confusion. Alongside this, in both the final days of Gorbachev’s Soviet 
Union and under Yeltsin’s new leadership, the conflicts were considered direct threats to national 
security due to their impact on Russia’s territorial integrity. Other interests such as the 
maintenance of regional stability, alongside the safeguarding of strategic interests in the 
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Caucasus, also conditioned Russia’s response. While this array of factors has been taken into 
consideration by existing commentary, the significance of their diversity has largely been 
downplayed with a reliance on more superficial explanations based on Russian strategic and 
political interests. Hence, during this phase Russia demonstrated an ambiguous engagement in 
the trends of European conflict management based on the emerging norms and processes of 
European security governance.  
     Under Gorbachev’s leadership, Moscow’s initial approach towards the deterioration of 
relations between South Ossetia and the Georgian government in 1991 was relatively passive. 
Moscow exercised a policy of non-interference and ignored requests for protection from the South 
Ossetian leadership after their holding of elections on 9 December 1990 for a new Supreme Soviet 
(Ozhiganov, 1997: 355). With an escalation of the violence, however, Gorbachev issued a decree 
in early January, 1991 demanding the withdrawal of all armed units other than USSR interior 
troops.362 While there were accusations of Moscow and individual Ossetian servicemen in the 
Soviet military supplying separatist forces with weapons, there is no evidence to suggest that this 
was ordered by the Soviet leadership. 363 The Soviet leadership was concerned with growing 
regional instability, with existing MVD troops warning Georgian forces against attacking 
Tskhinvali. Moscow had no interest in instability and this was understood by the leadership as 
part of routine procedure to suppress mass disorder (Ozhiganov, 1997: 359). Moscow dispatched 
forces to secure army depots and prevent the theft of armaments.364 The MVD engaged in law 
enforcement rather than use force to tackle the violence.365 Interceding in the conflict, the Russian 
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365 This was demonstrated on 12 February, when the MVD intercepted and forced down a helicopter 
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Congress of People’s Deputies used diplomatic bargaining based on the establishment of treaty 
relations with Tbilisi if South Ossetia’s autonomous status was reinstated, the blockade of 
Tskhinvali was lifted, and refugees could return to their homes. This humanitarian process 
provided a brief respite as hostilities continued into late 1991. The MVD insisted that it would 
remain in the region because it was the only force capable of preventing further violence.366 
     Moscow’s approach remained consistent even with the appointment of Yeltsin to the 
presidency. This was followed by the replacement of Gamsakhurdia with Shevardnadze in 
January 1992, where it was expected that the more moderate policies of the new regime would 
facilitate a compromise with Tskhinvali. The Yeltsin administration continued the policies under 
Gorbachev and made a declaration calling for the parties to halt the fighting.367 Two separate 
Russian-brokered ceasefires in mid-May and mid-June failed due to major Georgian offences.368 
Hard liners in the Russian Parliament demanded that Moscow provide military support to the 
South Ossetian forces surrounded in Tskhinvali.369 This was followed by military clashes between 
Russian forces and Georgian troops with both sides accusing each other of using force. The 
Russian leadership declared that it would use force to protect civilians and maintain the peace.370 
This was largely rhetoric, however, and did not demonstrate a departure from Russia’s existing 
approach. Russia’s erratic response was evidence of the complex factors shaping its behaviour. 
Although Russia’s policy towards its regional space had become more aware of safeguarding 
Russian interests, this confusion was also evident in Moscow’s response to Abkhazia. With the 
eruption of violence in mid-1992 after Abkhazia’s unilateral declaration of independence from 
Georgia, Russian troops and civilians were caught in the fighting suffering casualties, while 
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Russian weapons depots were looted.371 On 3 September 1992, Moscow attempted to broker a 
ceasefire and stipulated the withdrawal of forces from the conflict, the disarming of illegal groups, 
and the exchange of prisoners, alongside the acknowledging of Abkhazia’s autonomy within 
Georgia.372 Despite this, violence quickly erupted in September and October with Abkhaz forces 
launching successful counter offensives against Georgian positions throughout the region, with 
the Georgian leadership accusing Russia of supporting Abkhaz troops and directly engaging in 
military operations.373 Vehemently denying these allegations, the MoD argued that Russian troops 
stationed in the region maintained their neutrality and that any use of force was in self-defence to 
protect military facilities. 374 
     This initial use of force by Russian troops was not related to a humanitarian justification, but 
instead was an act of self-defence. However, Russian forces were prepared to use equivalent 
levels of force in self-defence to overwhelm Georgian positions, which also supported the Abkhaz 
side. In a further statement in December 1992, the MoD justified its retaliatory use of force to 
protect servicemen and their families.375 The MoD also pointed out that Russian forces were 
performing ‘their tasks in an extremely challenging environment’ and that it was ‘increasingly 
difficult to restrain the emotional feelings of soldiers losing their loved ones, friends and 
colleagues’.376 While there was credibility in these statements as Russian units under attack in 
Abkhazia took unilateral action, the MoD’s justifications according to one scholar became useful 
pretexts as the violence unfolded to secure strategic interests in Georgia and its wider position in 
the Transcaucasus (Lynch, 1999: 136).  
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     The violence increased in early 1993 as both sides engaged in heavy fighting for the control 
of Sukhumi. According to several sightings, Moscow provided equipment and weaponry to 
Abkhazia and was directly participating in combat operations around the seismic laboratory in 
the area of Nizhniye Eshery.377 While the MoD denied this evidence suggests otherwise, and the 
military was certainly attempting to force Shevardnadze to accept Russian demands regarding a 
forward military presence in Georgia.378 In January 1993, Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev 
pointed out that Russia was willing to withdraw its troops from Georgia-proper once a bilateral 
treaty had been signed to this effect, but made it clear to Tbilisi that Russian forces would not be 
withdrawn from Abkhazia for the foreseeable future.379 During a visit to Georgia in early 1993, 
Defence Minister Grachev also commented that Russian troops must remain in this strategically 
important region (cited in Lynch, 1999: 137). 
     Despite this, the MFA’s participation in the negotiations and humanitarian process 
demonstrated the ambiguity of Russia’s response. While the MoD facilitated some of these 
negotiations which typically occurred after Abkhaz military gains, the MFA advocated a 
consistent policy of compromise between the opposing sides. This did not necessarily coincide 
with the MoD’s response to the evolving conflict throughout 1993 and 1994; and was therefore 
not a carefully calibrated policy of ‘carrots and sticks’ as existing scholarship maintains (Jonson 
and Archer, 1996; Lynch, 1999). Where political and strategic aims informed the MoD’s 
response, the MFA supported a soft approach and showed a sustained engagement in the 
settlement process particularly from mid-1993 onwards with its support for the UNSGSR’s 
participation in negotiations. The Foreign Ministry also supported the creation of UNOMIG 
which was mandated to verify the parties’ compliance with the ceasefire agreements.380 Russia 
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delivered humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) 
evacuated over 5,000 civilians of Abkhaz, Georgian, and Russian nationality in June 1993.381 
     The MFA continued to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the peace effort. The MFA put 
considerable pressure on Tbilisi and Sukhumi to facilitate the return of refugees, including this as 
a key condition in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Geneva on 1 December 1993.382 
There were further rounds of negotiations in Geneva in late February where the parties agreed to 
sign a quadripartite agreement on the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, alongside 
the establishment of a special commission to expedite this process in March.383 The commission 
would include representatives from the MFA, the UNHCR, and observers from the CSCE.384 
These efforts were consistently hindered by the intransigence of the parties. This was particularly 
the case regarding Abkhazia which would not agree to Tbilisi’s request for the deployment of a 
UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VI to provide the conditions for the UNHCR to begin the 
repatriation process.385 Despite this, the UNSG offered a balanced assessment about Abkhaz 
intransigence. Boutros-Ghali pointed out that while the Abkhaz side was deliberately being 
obstructive, Abkhazia had some credible anxieties, including the potential return of paramilitary 
elements that may instigate further violence, the lack of infrastructure and security in place for 
the returned, and with the return of a large number of Georgian civilians Abkhazia would be 
unable to negotiate acceptable arrangements to guarantee their minority rights.386 
     The MFA continued to promote the humanitarian process in early March 1994 with the 
resumption of the electrical power supply to Abkhazia, the donation of Rb2.5 billion to Sukhumi 
to maintain the regional food supply, and the provision of further humanitarian aid to the Russian 
population in Abkhazia.387 This was followed by the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Moscow 
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on 4 April 1994. The MFA declared that ‘Russia will do everything in its power to help refugees 
from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to return to their homes and restart a peaceful life’, and further 
stressed that it is necessary to attract material resources to help refugees return and to rebuild 
homes.388 However, it was recognised by the UNSG that the return of refugees and displaced 
persons could only take place once an international military presence was deployed.389  
The Settlement Process 
 
Moscow – in accordance with Washington and many of the central European powers at the UN – 
maintained a consistent argument advocating for Tskhinvali’s and Sukhumi’s wider autonomy 
within the framework of Georgia. At the same time, Russian actions demonstrated that this was 
closely intertwined with the idea of Georgia’s qualified sovereignty. This, however, was 
interpreted differently between the MoD and MFA. The MoD was against Abkhazia’s separation 
from Georgia, but conditioned Tbilisi’s territorial integrity on the safeguarding of Russian 
political and strategic aims. The MFA was also concerned about Abkhazia’s separation from 
Georgia due to its potential impact on the maintenance of Russia’s territorial integrity. While this 
approach was closely bound up with the securing of Russia’s interests, the cementing of Russia’s 
role as a regional security guarantor was a paramount concern for the Foreign Ministry. Premised 
on the MFA’s thinking, Russia reserved the right to intervene in the political debates over 
Georgia’s future. This was not necessarily linked to imperial intent as the MFA consistently 
supported arrangements of compromise between the parties.  
     During Gorbachev’s final years in power, Moscow’s policy towards Georgia’s territorial 
integrity was relatively consistent. In the face of Gamsakhurdia’s ultra-nationalist project, the 
Soviet leadership’s decree on 7 January 1991 affirmed that South Ossetia’s autonomy should be 
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respected with the withdrawal of all forces from the region.390 Tbilisi accused Russia for 
interfering in its internal affairs, but Moscow’s intention was not to trample upon Georgian affairs 
but to facilitate a compromise with Tskhinvali and even remained silent with South Ossetia’s call 
to stay within the USSR.391 This silence became more apparent as Tbilisi began to push for 
independence in April 1991. With its declaration of independence on 9 April, Georgia gave 
Abkhazia autonomy but denied this status to South Ossetia.392 The Soviet Federation Council in 
Moscow issued a statement on 4 June affirming that Tbilisi’s handling of the issue of South 
Ossetia’s autonomy and its drive to force ethnic Ossetians out of Georgia was ‘a gross violation 
of the USSR Constitution and international accords on human rights’.393  
     With the power transition in Moscow in mid-1991, the new Russian leadership continued to 
denounce these human rights violations. Moscow’s policy towards the conflict in South Ossetia 
continued in 1992, with the eventual signing of the Sochi Agreement on 24 June 1992.394 
Similarly, Russia brokered a ceasefire agreement in Abkhazia in September 1992 which attempted 
to balance Abkhaz autonomy with Georgia’s territorial integrity.395 There was a further attempt 
to facilitate a political settlement on 27 July 1993.396 The Foreign Ministry continued to expedite 
a settlement that guaranteed the rights of ethnic minorities and assured Tbilisi that existing 
Russian forces stationed in Georgia would remain neutral.397  
     Despite this transparency from the MFA, Shevardnadze was pressured into joining the CIS in 
December 1993, agreed to lease the port of Poti and the Bombara airfield to the Russian military, 
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and allowed the MoD to maintain three bases in Georgia (Lynch, 1999: 139). These gains 
coincided with the signing of a confidence-building measure between the parties in December 
1993 and while the MFA was alert to the promotion of Russian interests, the Ministry’s consistent 
pro-activeness in the pursuit of a compromised-based solution was evidence of its attempt to 
expedite the settlement process. The MFA continued to broker negotiated agreements throughout 
1994, which culminated in the consideration of a document stipulating the mutual delegation of 
powers for joint action in areas such as foreign policy, the economy, and human rights.398 The 
document also specified that while Abkhazia would have its own constitution and legislation, a 
decision on the final status of the parties’ political future would be postponed.399 There was 
disagreement, however, over the issue of Abkhazia’s relationship to Georgia, with the Abkhaz 
side declining to sign any document that recognised Georgia’s territorial integrity, and after 
another failed agreement in April 1994 Russia eventually brokered the Sochi Agreement on 14 
May 1994 which provided a fragile ceasefire, but failed to cement a political settlement. 400   
 
5.3 Post-ceasefire phase 
 
Russia’s response towards the post-ceasefire phases of the conflicts evolved in two stages. The 
chaotic nature of Russia’s earlier approach gave way to a degree of coherence between 1992/1994 
and 2004. Moscow demonstrated a largely consistent approach that conformed to its doctrinal 
understanding, which had developed since its involvement in the Balkans. In many respects, this 
was in accordance with the approaches developed in European conflict management. While 
Russia’s relations with Georgia and the central actors of European security governance hardened 
at times, Russia did not necessarily frame its response through the lens of these relationships. 
Between 2004 and 2012, however, ambiguity began to shape Russia’s response. Moscow framed 
its approach through the lens of its deteriorating relationship with Tbilisi and its European 
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counterparts, as the tension in Russia’s security logics became more acute. Russia’s approach 
diverged from its official understanding of conflict management exercised in the previous phase. 
Despite this, Russia’s concern for regional stability was still present in its thinking towards the 
conflicts.  
5.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity  
 
Commentators argue that Russia exercised an ambivalent attitude towards the participation of 
other actors in the settlement processes in Georgia, and that the main ‘criterion’ in Russian policy 
was ‘whether the international partners were perceived as able to serve Russia’s interests’ (Baev, 
1998: 150). While Russia retained a stakeholder position which served its interests, it was also 
committed to collective action. Russia’s response between 1992/1994 and 2004 demonstrated a 
degree of accommodation to international actors in the peace effort. It was only from 2004 
onwards that Russia’s approach hardened towards external involvement.  
Figure 5.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the 






Russia’s engagement in stakeholder interaction complexity at the diplomatic level was 
multifaceted. This was particularly the case in Abkhazia and although Russia maintained its 
central position in the peace effort this did not rule out its interaction with other external actors. 
Prior to the mid-2000s, Russia consistently coordinated with its partners. In South Ossetia, 
Moscow maintained a degree of cooperation in the JCC alongside the parties to the conflict and 
the OSCE as an observer. Abkhazia reflected a more complex network of stakeholder interaction 
based on the UN’s input. Established in 1997, the Coordinating Council was at the centre of the 
peace effort where settlements would be facilitated. Moreover, Moscow participated in the three 
working groups on humanitarian issues, security, and peacebuilding. Throughout the 1990s and 
early to mid-2000s Moscow was a central actor in expediting the peace effort. Russia even 
encouraged the greater involvement of the UN and the OSCE to the region. However, from the 
mid-2000s onwards Russia’s engagement became increasingly ambivalent due to the tension in 
its foreign and security policy thinking, which was exacerbated by the ‘colour revolutions’ in 
Georgia. Russia’s engagement in the diplomatic mechanisms via the Coordinating   Committee 
became increasingly politicised and with the mounting tension in South Ossetia this halted any 
meaningful form of collective action across both peace efforts. Since the war in 2008, Russia has 




This pattern of Russian involvement continued at the operational level, where Moscow helped to 
steer the operations on the ground. The formats of both peace efforts were designed to cultivate 
some form of collective response. Russian forces also made efforts to cooperate with external 
humanitarian actors. In both conflicts, this engagement in the pooling of sovereignty resembled 
the level of cooperation Russian forces displayed during their involvement in the Balkans. 
However, from the mid-2000s onwards Russia’s engagement became largely uneven at the 
operational level.      
187 
 
     With the signing of the Sochi Agreement on 24 June 1992, a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), 
as illustrated in Figure 5.2, was established and initially comprised of a battalion from each 
opposing party including Russia.401 Moscow understood this format as a vehicle to promote 
cooperation between the parties based on the promotion of consent and impartiality.402 However, 
Moscow could exercise considerable influence in the JPKF as the overall commander was 
Russian. The former Head of the OSCE observer Mission to Georgia, stated that this ‘was very 
much the imposition of a system and a structure whereby Russia had the dominant voice in 
working towards any possible resolutions of the conflict’.403 The JPKF was accompanied by the 
small OSCE Mission to Georgia which arrived in December 1992 and as shown in Figure 5.2 
OSCE observers participated in the JPKF to oversee their activity and patrol independently in the 
security zone.404  
     The years following the deployment of the JPKF a process of regional de-militarisation was 
implemented.405 Several checkpoints were established throughout the designated security zone 
between Russia and the opposing sides. Although the purpose of these checkpoints was to assist 
in the establishment of security in the area, the degree of coordination within the JPKF was 
limited. According to expert opinion, while there was collaboration between the senior military 
command of the JPKF when local conflicts broke out, regular channels of interaction complexity 
were largely absent between the forces of the JPKF as they possessed no technical means of 
communication with one another (Mackinlay and Sharov, 2003: 84). There was, however, a 
consistent degree of cooperation between Russia and the opposing sides via the three-sided Group 
of Military Observers (GMO). The GMO played an important security role by investigating 
incidents and complaints from the local population. This also maintained a degree of collective 
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transparency between the participating actors as the parties could contribute towards the decision-
making process. The GMO was subordinated to the commander of the JPKF but each observer 
was also subordinated to their own national commander (Mackinlay and Sharov, 2003: 83-84).  
     In Abkhazia, the parties consented to the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force (CIS-PKF), 
although Russia was the only member to contribute troops.406 The civilian dimension was 
facilitated through the UNOMIG and the participation of various other UN agencies and NGOs. 
In a report submitted to the Security Council on 12 July 1994, the UNSG set out the parameters 
of UNOMIG’s cooperation with the CIS-PKF as shown in Figure 5.2. According to the UNSG, 
UNOMIG would operate independently but in close coordination with the CIS-PKF.407 It was 
understood that decisions affecting both UNOMIG and the CIS-PKF would be made through 
consultation to cultivate a spirit of collective decision-making.408  
     The report also stipulated that UNOMIG and the CIS-PKF would engage in joint patrols 
throughout their zones of responsibility in the Kodori Gorge and the Gali District.409 This was 
accompanied by weekly meetings of the Quadripartite Commission (QC), which included the 
head of the CIS-PKF, the chief UN military observer, the opposing parties, and the participation 
of the UNHCR.410 UNOMIG also cooperated with the UNHCR, UN Development Programme 
(UNDP), and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), alongside a host of international NGOs. The CIS-
PKF was responsible for protecting these actors during their missions and to participate in 
humanitarian projects.411 The UNSG’s reports to the Security Council regularly stated that 
                                                          
406 Lieutenant General Vasily Yakushev, as the first commander of the CIS-PKF in Abkhazia, voiced 
these concerns stating that a ‘selection of some troops or observers in addition to financial assistance’ 
could be provided. See Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 December 1995, accessed 13 December 2013, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3382959. 
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409 Secretary General Report 818 (S/818), 12 July 1994, paragraph 17, p. 4 
410 This was established by the quadripartite agreement signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994 and meetings 
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725 (S/725), 16 June 1994, paragraph 4, p. 2. 
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‘Exchanges of information, mutual assistance and joint patrolling are taking place regularly and 
the cooperation continues to be very satisfactory’.412 The pooling of sovereignty and the degree 
of interaction complexity was more extensive at the operational level than was displayed in South 
Ossetia. This was because Abkhazia received more international attention as the level of 
destruction was comparatively higher than in South Ossetia. Moreover, as the 1990s progressed 
the UN became more willing to engage in Abkhazia. The political will and expertise of these 
external actors also helped to shape the management of the conflict to foster further collective 
action.  
     The resilience of this interaction complexity was tested in Abkhazia as the peace effort was 
confronted with the outbreak of major hostilities in mid-1998. The CIS-PKF was targeted on 
several occasions by criminal elements throughout the months of April and May 1998 but 
continued to hold meetings with the UNOMIG to facilitate measures of ‘mutual assistance’, and 
maintained its cooperation via joint patrolling throughout the areas of violence.413 This level of 
cooperation continued in the 2000s under the new leadership in Moscow, with the commander of 
the CIS-PKF pro-actively developing a practice of frequent communications with UNOMIG’s 
Chief Military Observer.414 This period of relative calm was interrupted in 2001, with an upsurge 
in the violence in the Kodori Gorge between Abkhaz forces and Georgian paramilitary units 
supported by Chechen fighters.415 While patrols had grinded to a halt due to the unacceptable 
levels of insecurity in the Kodori Gorge, the exercise of joint patrols continued in the Gali District. 
Even during the tense period in Russian-Georgian relations due to Russian airstrikes on insurgent 
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415 A low point for the peace effort came during a period of heightened fighting with the shooting down of 
a UN helicopter on a routine patrol over the Kodori Gorge on 8 October 2001.  The CIS-PKF provided 
security for the search & rescue operation of the bodies, which included several UNOMIG observers. See 
Secretary General Report 1008 (S/1008), 24 October 2001, paragraph 20, p. 4 
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positions in the Kodori Gorge, joint patrols continued in the Upper Kodori Gorge throughout 
2002.416  
     In South Ossetia, the limited degree of interaction between the sides of the JPKF came to a 
standstill by the time of political change in Georgia in late 2003. The new sense of urgency in 
Georgia’s policy towards the settlement process directly impacted the degree of operational 
interaction complexity. Saakashvili aimed to break the deadlock by taking another step in 
restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity. With the outbreak of violence following Saakashvili’s 
attempt to forcefully close South Ossetia’s Ergneti black market, the JPKF provided no collective 
response (International Crisis Group, 2004: i). According to the former Head of the OSCE 
Mission to Georgia, Roy Reeve, ‘the one time which it could have had an active role which was 
to stop the 2004 confrontation […] it just fell apart’.417  
     Following Saakashvili’s failed policy, Tbilisi agreed to a Russian-brokered ceasefire. 
However, the Georgian leadership also made the decision to withdraw its contingent from the 
JPKF in late 2004, followed by a parliamentary resolution adopted in July 2005 for the withdrawal 
of Russian peacekeepers from Georgian territory.418 This brought about a conclusive end to 
Moscow’s innovative project of peacekeeping, with the termination of the JPKF’s spirit of 
collective response. Over the course of the next few years leading up to the war in 2008, the 
Russian contingent continued to be stationed in their zone of responsibility and contributed 
towards a period of increasing tension as Georgia persistently demanded their withdrawal. After 
the war in 2008, Medvedev consented to the deployment of an EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 
in September 2008, but this engagement was qualified and an attempt to further legitimise itself 
as ‘peacemaker’. Moreover, Moscow would not have given permission for the EUMM’s 
deployment if it had not previously achieved its aims based on the military defeat of Georgia and 
the further derailment of the settlement processes. Besides this, while the EUMM’s mandate was 
                                                          
416 See Secretary General Report 1141 (S/1141) 14 October 2002, paragraph 8, p. 2 and Secretary General 
Report 697 (S/697), 17 July 2000, paragraph. 20, p.4. 
417 Interview with Mr Roy Reeve, Former-British senior diplomat and Head of the OSCE Observer Mission 
to Georgia (2003-2008), London, 3 June 2014. 




valid throughout Georgia, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali denied the Mission access to their de facto 
territories.419 Moscow supported this position, arguing that consent from Tskhinvali was a 
precondition for the EUMMs access to the region.420 Although this was justified under 
international law, this obstructionist behaviour served Russia’s interests by maintaining a degree 
of influence over the separatist enclaves and preventing the EU’s engagement in the region. 
Russia’s disengagement was further demonstrated with support for the termination of the OSCE 
Observer Mission’s mandate at the end of 2008. Nevertheless, demonstrating Moscow’s concern 
for regional stability, Russian troops constructively engaged with the EUMM through the Incident 
Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) on matters of security and intelligence exchange.421   
5.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
Coercive measures and the role of force 
 
After ceasefires were signed in the conflict zones, Russia’s doctrinal understanding crystalized 
between the MoD and MFA. Moscow understood the use of force through the consent-divide 
which did not demonstrate a general progression in accordance with European approaches and in 
the case of the conflicts in Georgia, Russia understood the purpose of the operations to create 
conditions conducive to a political settlement via wider-peacekeeping methods. From the mid-
2000s onwards, the decision-making processes on the use of force became increasingly bound up 
with Russia’s political and strategic aims. Moscow also utilised sanctions against Abkhazia which 
also reflected doctrine and political convenience.  
     In the case of South Ossetia, the Sochi Agreement of June 1992 failed to provide specific rules 
of engagement only stating that ‘the Control Commission shall carry out investigation[s] of 
relevant circumstances and undertake urgent measures aimed at restoration of peace and order 
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and non-admission of similar violations in the future’.422 The JCC’s joint protocol on 12 July 1992 
did clarify that the JPKF was to ‘protect the peace in the zone of the armed conflict, [and] the 
lives and personal dignity of the citizens and their property’.423 It was not envisaged that this use 
of force would be at the strategic level to protect civilians. The JPKF was also mandated to use 
‘resolute measures […] in case of a breach of the conditions set in the Agreement or decisions of 
the Joint Control Commission by uncontrolled military units of either of the conflicting parties’.424 
It was understood that force would be employed against ‘spoiler’ elements rather than the 
opposing sides. The structure of the JPKF was designed to promote a strict interpretation of 
consent and impartiality. Because Moscow had devised an arrangement based on the inclusion of 
the opposing parties in the JPKF, this meant that both sides would not take action against their 
own national forces operating outside of the JPKF.  
     In Abkhazia, the CIS-PKF was based on similar rules of engagement with the April 1994 
agreement stating that ‘In the event of an attack or direct military threat against the peace-keeping 
force, it shall take appropriate measures for its safety and self-defence’.425 Whilst it was implicitly 
acknowledged that the CIS-PKF was deployed to provide security, this did not initially include a 
mandate to suppress paramilitary groups operating outside of the opposing parties’ control. These 
changes in the rules of engagement have been considered by existing scholarship as an 
instrumental decision because Russia was now prepared to solve the conflict using softer methods 
once strategic gains had been made.426 Russia, and particularly the MoD, did indeed become more 
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cooperative once regional strategic goals had been achieved, but the specifics relating to 
operational structure and more conservative rules of engagement stemmed from doctrinal 
thinking across Russia’s power ministries which was paramount in shaping the peace efforts from 
the early to mid-1990s onwards.  
     The security environment in South Ossetia remained relatively peaceful with a status-quo until 
the mid-2000s. However, in Abkhazia the security situation was a challenge for the CIS-PKF and 
UNOMIG. The CIS-PKF were targeted by Georgian armed groups operating in the Kodori Gorge 
and the Gali District.427 Criminal activity and the state of the socio-economic situation in the Gali 
District prompted a protracted discussion about the expansion of the CIS-PKF’s mandate to 
include law enforcement. As changes in the mandate required the consent of both parties, 
Abkhazia stonewalled the adoption of these additional responsibilities. Moreover, even Russian 
declarations about the use of more forceful methods were largely rhetoric and defensive.428    
There was an awareness to include robust measures, but the CIS-PKF remained focused on de-
mining and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The CIS-PKF’s commander reaffirmed that when 
discharging these duties ‘always and everywhere we remember the three basic principles of 
peacekeeping: impartiality, neutrality, and openness’.429 It was also recognised that the purpose 
of this effort on the ground was only a means to facilitate the ongoing diplomat effort.430 As in its 
experience in the Balkans, Russia recognised that the use of force may derail this process by 
triggering further violence. This understanding was demonstrated in the CIS-PKF’s response to 
the violence that erupted in the Gali District in mid-1998. Although the clashes were brief with 
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Abkhaz forces neutralising Georgian paramilitary units, Tbilisi placed the blame also on the CIS-
PKF for its failure to provide security.431 
     The MoD instructed the tightening of security around the check-points to increase the number 
of observation posts and stipulated that the further authorisation on the use of force could be only 
in self-defence.432 The MFA clarified that ‘under the current mandate of the blue helmets we have 
the right to intervene in the actions of subversive and terrorist groups only by agreement and in 
cooperation with the conflicting parties’.433 The thought of becoming embroiled in a further 
potential conflict along its periphery was unpalatable in Moscow. The CIS-PKF was also ill 
equipped to conduct major operations against spoiler groups. Even the commander of the CIS-
PKF conceded that while the MoD’s order was acknowledged, emphasis should be placed on 
political negotiations and advocated the creation of a local political body to facilitate the talks.434 
     Both contingents operating in Abkhazia and South Ossetia began a phase of increased security 
initiatives in the early 2000s. In South Ossetia, the JPKF conducted operations throughout the 
security zone to confiscate weapons.435 Tensions remained high in Abkhazia and while the 
potential increase of isolated instances of fighting in the Gali District were deterred by the 
frequent patrols of the CIS-PKF,436 the developments in the Kodori Gorge throughout 2001 and 
2002 threatened to further destabilise the region and damaged Moscow’s relations with Tbilisi. A 
spill over from the conflict in Chechnya, Chechen fighters alongside Georgian forces began to 
attack Abkhaz positions and towns in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge in late 2001. A pattern 
emerged in response to the violence, whereby the CIS-PKF would conduct patrols and respond 
with force if attacked. Any armed groups in the Gorge would be requested to withdraw to ensure 
a secure environment for the recommencement of CIS-PKF and UNOMIG patrols. This only 
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provided a brief pause in the fighting between the opposing sides and in the attacks on CIS-PKF 
observation posts. Moscow continued to take a cautious approach towards episodes of violence 
in Abkhazia, maintaining that the CIS-PKF should not participate in the fighting but should 
‘control and monitor the situation’. 437 
     Despite this, Russia began to use airstrikes to target Chechen and Georgian armed groups in 
the Kodori Gorge throughout 2002. These actions, however, were precipitated by a renewed 
anxiety over the spread of extremism throughout the Northern Caucasus.438 This use of force 
should be viewed as part of a wider counter-terrorist campaign in the Transcaucasian region. 
Russian authorities were unsympathetic to Tbilisi if the airstrikes killed Georgian forces as 
Moscow considered these groups supporters of Chechen extremists.      
     With the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia in mid-2004, Russian forces within the JPKF 
failed to intervene to quell the violence between Georgian and South Ossetian militia. The 
inactiveness of Russia’s forces during this crisis showed their scepticism about getting involved. 
Tbilisi was growing impatient with what it considered as an inactive JPKF based on a passive 
mandate and pushed for a revision of the mandate to include a wider geographical remit, the 
deployment of international forces (primarily Western), and the authorisation of peace 
enforcement. This, however, was met with considerable consternation in Moscow. The following 
years leading up to the events of August 2008 witnessed a creeping level of instability. The 
Russian contingent stationed in South Ossetia became a largely token force safeguarding 
Moscow’s political and strategic interests, whilst the Kremlin took steps to rearm the separatist 
forces. Allison (2008: 1147) notes that during this time ‘Russia and Georgia seemed to be 
preparing for armed conflict, while separatists in Ossetia and Abkhazia were apparently ready to 
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provide a pretext for this’. Moscow’s lifting of the sanctions against Abkhazia in March 2008 
which had been in place since 1996 further compromised its position as an impartial 
peacebroker.439 These had originally been a means to tackle Abkhaz intransigence.  
     These developments culminated in the war in 2008 and while an academic debate has emerged 
on the events of the conflict, the EU’s independent fact-finding mission headed by Swiss diplomat 
Heidi Tagliavini in 2009 provides a balanced analysis.440 The mission acknowledged that Georgia 
attacked South Ossetia and the JPKF, and noted that Russia’s initial use of force was in self-
defence but that its incursions into Georgia-proper were disproportionate. Russia attempted to 
legitimise its actions by invoking R2P as a form of peace enforcement. This was widely rejected 
by the academic and policy community with Allison (2009: 188-189) stating that ‘Russian 
diplomats have had to be dexterous in their selective legal references and efforts to exploit grey 
areas in unconsolidated R2P norms’. Although the mandate of the JPKF authorised the protection 
of civilians, it was not envisaged that such strategic force would be permitted. Rather, this was 
more an expression of Russia’s politically charged policy towards Georgia than a revision in 
Russia’s understanding regarding the protection of civilians. The earlier distribution of passports 
provided a pretext for Russia to intervene to protect its citizens and Russian-speaking population.  
The settlement process 
 
Moscow’s approach towards the settlement processes was shaped by the idea of Georgia’s limited 
sovereignty. This understanding was contingent, however, upon Russia’s wider relations with 
Georgia which deteriorated sharply from the mid-2000s onwards. Prior to Putin’s second term in 
office, Moscow engaged in the settlement process by promoting a negotiated peace. While 
Russia’s approach was in accordance with the other actors in the peace effort, the Russian 
leadership also had to balance this with the aim of maintaining a forward military presence in 
Georgia. From the mid-2000s, Moscow’s aim to preserve its regional presence began to take 
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precedence over the promotion of a negotiated settlement. The Kremlin’s understanding of 
Georgia’s qualified sovereignty started to further inform policy in light of the widening and 
deepening of European security governance. This was further complicated by the recognition of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 as discussed in chapter 4.  
     Moscow encouraged the intransigence of the separatist regions by not pressuring Sukhumi and 
Tskhinvali to accept settlement proposals. An insistence on the facilitation of confidence-building 
measures diverted attention away from settlement negotiations, Russia successfully froze any 
attempts to move the settlement process forward. Indeed, the more trust that was built between 
the parties, the likelier a compromise could be reached. Equally, the protracted nature of these 
discussions further entrenched the positions of the separatist parties. Although Tbilisi’s proposals 
were provided outside of existing diplomatic frameworks, and while the Georgian leadership’s 
rhetoric increased during this period, Tbilisi offered compromises and reflected the thinking of 
the lead negotiators since the early 1990s. During the initial years of Russia’s engagement in the 
settlement processes, Moscow attempted to devise political compromises in coordination with its 
agreement prepared in November 1994. These efforts failed due to Sukhumi’s intransigence and 
Tbilisi’s resolve to strengthen its territorial integrity.441  
     At the same time, the reorientation of Russian policy towards its immediate regional space 
under Yeltsin witnessed an attempt to balance its multiple interests in the Transcaucasus through 
the promotion of strategic aims and the maintenance of regional security.442 While agreements 
reflected a bargain between Tbilisi and Moscow based on Georgia’s permission to extend the 
lease on military bases in return for Russian support in the settlement process, Moscow’s support 
for compromised-based solutions also reflected its approach to the debate over territorial integrity. 
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Progress in the case of South Ossetia was also a protracted affair which gained little momentum 
until the latter half of 1994. Tskhinvali was reluctant to engage in negotiations whilst the conflict 
in Abkhazia continued as it aimed to politically profit from developments, and Tbilisi was pre-
occupied with Abkhazia (Sammut and Cvetkovski, 1996: 15). In 1994, on the request of 
Shevardnadze, the CSCE drew up a draft proposal for a settlement which provided autonomy for 
South Ossetia within Georgia.443 While providing Tskhinvali with a stronger position than 
previous proposals, it was rejected in 1995.  
     With Primakov appointed to the Foreign Ministry in 1996 Russia increased its efforts to 
cultivate a settlement.  In relation to Abkhazia, Primakov engaged in intense diplomatic 
negotiations, supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and Abkhazia’s autonomy.444 The UNSG 
recognised Russia’s efforts to resolve the issue of settlement,445 and the Georgian leadership 
adopted a resolution provisioning for Abkhazia’s autonomy – although this was rejected by 
Sukhumi.446 Abkhazia’s uncompromising policy was mirrored by South Ossetia with the creation 
of a presidential office in 1996.447 Russia argued that South Ossetia must retain a degree of 
autonomy within the territory of Georgia.448 This was accompanied by further peace talks in 
Moscow in March 1997, but only security guarantees were accomplished.449 In Abkhazia, 
throughout 1997 Moscow attempted to broker an agreement alongside the Geneva Process. While 
the draft Protocol on the Georgian-Abkhaz Settlement in June 1997 was rejected by Tbilisi 
because it gave too many powers to Sukhumi, Primakov nearly succeeded in negotiating a 
resolution.450 Despite these diplomatic attempts, the outbreak of violence in mid-1998 disrupted 
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450 Secretary General Report 558 (S/558), 18 July 1997, paragraph 5, p. 2; however, a further confidence 
building measure was signed by the parties in August 1997. See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 August 1997, 
accessed 30 March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/302356. 
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the Abkhaz-Georgian settlement process. Even Security Council Resolution 1255 in June 1999 – 
the initiation of an intense phase of negotiations – was undermined by a flurry of internal Abkhaz 
political activity with the holding of a constitutional referendum on 3 October 1999 and 
presidential elections.451  
      In the early 2000s, Russia’s approach towards the Abkhaz settlement became increasingly 
became increasingly ambivalent because of its deterioration in relations with Tbilisi. The Kremlin 
was incensed by what it perceived as Tbilisi’s disregard for Chechen and Georgian terrorist 
groups. While Moscow still recognised Georgia’s territorial integrity demonstrated by its support 
for Security Council Resolutions 1311 (2000) and 1364 (2001), it became less willing to pressure 
Abkhazia into accepting a stricter arrangement. Moscow entered a period of debate within the 
Group of Friends of the United Nations to Georgia (GOFUNG) and alongside the UNSGSR on 
constitutional competences between Sukhumi and Tbilisi.452 A proposal called the Boden Paper 
was finally put together in December 2001. It was supported by Security Council Resolution 1393 
in January 2002, but was rejected by Sukhumi because of the proposal’s promotion of a federal 
relationship.453  
     Moscow continued to reiterate a compromised settlement between Georgia and Abkhazia.454 
Russia support Security Council Resolution 1427 in July 2002 which put pressure on the parties 
                                                          
451 Security Council Resolution 1255 (1999) underlined the necessity for the parties to achieve an early 
and comprehensive political settlement based on ‘a settlement on the political status of Abkhazia within 
the State of Georgia, which fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its 
internationally recognized borders’. See Security Council Resolution 1255 (S/RES/1999), 30 July 1999, 
paragraph 5, p. 2. 
452 Extensive political negotiations were sustained throughout 2000 and 2001 at the UN in Geneva and 
New York, alongside the ministerial summits of the OSCE at Istanbul (1999), Athens (2000), and Yalta 
(2001). During this time, both political modalities and security aspects of a settlement were discussed. For 
a detailed overview see UN, ‘The Situation in Georgia’, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security 
Council, Chapter 8, available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/Chapter%208/Europe/00-
03_8_Georgia.pdf. 
453 Formally, this proposal was called the Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between 
Tbilisi and Sukhumi.  
454 RFE/RL, 17 April 2002, accessed 20 May 2016, available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1096372.html; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘State Secretary, 
First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Valery Loshchinin Meets Anri Dzhergenia, de facto Prime 





for a compromise.455 The Resolution also stressed its deep concern about Sukhumi’s refusal to 
accept the Boden Paper.456 In 2003, there was some progress in the settlement process with 
Russia’s creation of the Sochi Working Groups and evidence of an ease from Abkhazia with its 
invitation to the GOFUNG in early March 2003. However, the Abkhaz leadership continued to 
refuse a discussion regarding a settlement.  
     Russia’s engagement gave way to political expediency from the mid-2000s onwards. Russia 
made persistent protestations about its impartiality whilst blaming the deadlock on Georgia. South 
Ossetia became an increasingly contentious arena where this deterioration in relations between 
Russia and Georgia unfolded. Russia intensified its support for the de facto sovereignty of South 
Ossetia and advocated a ‘variety of options’ for Tskhinvali’s political status.457 With growing 
divergence between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, a more flexible political arrangement could be 
considered credible; yet, this was also disingenuous as it legitimised Russia’s underming of 
Georgia’s sovereignty. Moreover, in Abkhazia, Russia interfered in the electoral cycle of the 
Abkhaz presidency in January 2005, with the unauthorised visit of Duma representatives to the 
region.458  
     In response, the Georgian leadership attempted to shape the settlement processes by devising 
its own agreements outside of the existing diplomatic machinery. This only served to further 
antagonise Moscow which considered such developments a threat to the integrity of its 
stakeholder position in negotiations. In relation to South Ossetia, Saakashvili proposed a draft 
                                                          
455 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘On UN Security Council's Resolution on Georgia’, 20 July 2002, 
accessed 5 May 2014, available at 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/965ab3c3d7db4f3043256c06
0051d4ae!OpenDocument. 
456 Security Council Resolution 1427 (S/RES/1427), 29 July 2002, paragraph 6, p. 2. 
457 During a media interview in July 2004 a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry was 
unequivocal when stating that ‘basically a solution to the problem should take place, as has repeatedly 
been stressed by the Russian side, within the framework of the observance of the international principle of 
the territorial integrity of states. Here there may be a variety of options, but all this should occur only 
through a political process, on the basis of the creation of confidence-building measures between the 
parties’. See Rusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Russian MFA Information and Press Department 
Commentary Regarding Questions from Itar Tass about Georgian-Ossetian Problems’, 1 July 2004, 
accessed 12 May 2004, available at 
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0058b87d!OpenDocument. 




agreement at the Council of Europe in January 2005 based on a federal arrangement.459 This was 
rejected by Tskhinvali, which was followed by another Georgian agreement named the ‘Nogaideli 
Plan’ proposed in late 2005. The Plan promoted the establishment of new diplomatic machinery 
and pressed for a final resolution based on the previous proposal. Tskhinvali opposed the 
proposal, and Moscow was critical of its contents. Russia refused to revise the diplomatic format 
and argued against Georgia’s comprehensive resolution. Moscow promoted an incremental 
approach advocating that a discussion on a settlement should only begin after confidence-building 
measures had been successfully employed.460 While Moscow had a point in that the establishment 
of a resilient peace was only achievable if there was trust between the sides, this served to freeze 
negotiations by diverting the focus away from a final resolution. Tskhinvali’s proposal offered 
shortly after the Nogaideli Plan mirrored Russia’s position.461 
     This policy towards the settlement in South Ossetia gained further traction leading up to the 
conflict in August 2008. In light of the protracted debate over Kosovo’s status and its declaration 
of independence in February 2008, Putin questioned why the cases in Georgia could not also be 
considered exceptional cases.462 This was a valid point, however, Putin’s accusations of double-
standards levelled at the West’s interpretation of Kosovo’s case as sue generis overlooked 
Russia’s own hypocrisy; Moscow supported Serbia’s territorial integrity but at the same time 
undermined Georgia’s. At this stage, Russia’s engagement in the debate over territorial integrity 
was largely to expedite political aims. During a press conference in St Petersburg in June 2006, 
                                                          
459 While this referred to a federal arrangement, Saakashvili was clear that central institutions such as 
defence, financial & tax systems, and border controls would remain a prerogative of the Georgian state. 
See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 January 2005, accessed 8 May 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/7290425. 
460 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Mikhail Kamynin, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from RIA Novosti Regarding the Georgian Prime Minister's Plan for 
Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict’, 12 December 2005, accessed 13 May 2005, available at  
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05809ee!OpenDocument. 
461 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Mikhail Kamynin, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Answers a Media Question Regarding South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity's 
Initiative for Peaceful Settlement of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict’, 14 December 2005, accessed 13 May 
2014, available at  
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00368d7c!OpenDocument. 




the Russian President declared that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia ‘are complicated problems’ 
which ‘cannot be settled using a knife and razor’. Putin went on to suggest that  
 
what is needed is patience and the willingness to look for compromise so that people would 
want to live together, and to do this bridges must be built not just between Russia and Georgia, 
but also between the peoples of South Ossetia and Georgia. Regarding the issue of protecting 
territorial integrity, Russia’s position is based on international law and peoples’ interests.463  
 
Although Putin advocated a compromise, by referring to the interests of the people which included 
those in the separatist regions he deliberately left the question of Georgia’s territorial integrity 
open. Putin stated that the outcome of the settlement process was important for the wider 
relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi and, thus, should be conducive to Russian regional 
interests. This was problematic as Moscow was now subordinating Russia’s role as impartial 
mediator to its national interests. Russia’s paranoia of further ‘colour revolutions’ superseded its 
constructive engagement in the settlement.    
     After the war in 2008, Russia consolidated its hold over the separatist regions by recognising 
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.464 Moscow’s reference to the violent actions of 
Tbilisi assisted in the legitimation of its policy and Russia also argued that it was inappropriate to 
demand that Abkhazia and South Ossetia engage after they had experienced Georgian 
aggression.465 While there was merit in this argument, these protestations firmly shut the door on 
                                                          
463 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘President Vladimir Putin met with the President of Georgia, 
Mikhail Saakashvili’, 14 June 2006, accessed 14 May 2014, available at  
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/925bdb8a4ba155b5c325718
d0040193b!OpenDocument. 
464 On 26 August 2008 President Medvedev made a televised declaration to the Russian people, stating 
that ‘It is our understanding that after what has happened in Tskhinval and what has been planned for 
Abkhazia they have the right to decide their destiny by themselves. The Presidents of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, based on the results of the referendums conducted and on the decisions taken by the 
Parliaments of the two republics, appealed to Russia to recognize the state sovereignty of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. The Federation Council and the State Duma voted in support of those appeals. See Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’, August 26 2008, 
accessed 16 May 2014, available at 
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0042b450!OpenDocument. 
465 For instance, during a media interview in mid-August 2008, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated 
that ‘In dealing with any conflict it is necessary to take into account such basic principles as respect for 
the interests of the peoples living within this or that territory. After these interests have been swept away 
by Grad launchers, to prove to the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples that with Georgia they will live more 
comfortably is practically unrealistic’. See Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Interview of Russian 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs/State Secretary Grigory Karasin on South Ossetia’, 14 August 2008, 
accessed 16 May 2014, available at  
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any questions of settlement for the foreseeable future. Under Medvedev, Moscow affirmed that 
while it would ‘maximally help Georgia [to] live in peace with Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, this 
would not extend to integration.466 Hence, both regions became more dependent upon Russia with 
the establishment of closer military and economic ties.467 
Reconstruction and reconciliation 
 
In relation to the peacebuilding effort, Moscow’s initial approach demonstrated a dual track policy 
consistent with its behaviour during the post-conflict/ceasefire phases in its Balkan experiences. 
This was based on Russia’s support for specific projects aimed at the revitalisation of the former-
zones of conflict, alongside the consolidation of its economic relationship with Tbilisi which 
served both its regional economic interests and assisted in the overall rehabilitation of Georgia. 
This was followed by an instrumental approach from the mid-2000s which aimed to further 
consolidate its relationship with these separatist regions. 
     The brokering of the Sochi Agreement in June 1992 between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali 
demonstrated Russia’s recognition of the importance of regional reconstruction.468 The OSCE 
assisted humanitarian organizations to broaden activities in South Ossetia (MacFarlane, Linear 
and Shenfield, 1996: x-xi). The initial years after the conflict witnessed the voluntary return of 
substantial numbers of refugees and IDPs, with limited incidents of harassment (MacFarlane, 
Linear, and Shenfield, 1996: 54). The JPKF’s commander understood the importance of the 
peacebuilding and humanitarian processes and a product of consultations in the JCC, President 
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468 See Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian–Ossetian Conflict, 24 June 1992, Article 





Shevardnadze signed a decree in late 1997 on the rehabilitation of the Tskhinvali region which 
aimed to solve the issues of water and electricity supply to South Ossetia.469  
     Abkhazia proved to be more problematic due to the extent of regional destruction, including 
the displacement of a considerably larger body of people. During the initial years following the 
ceasefire, concerted efforts were made to solve the problem of refugees and IDPs.470 Both Tbilisi 
and Sukhumi disagreed on the issue of returns. The former demanded the issue of return to be 
resolved prior to a final political settlement, whilst the latter linked return with the settlement 
process arguing that substantial returns could only take place once Abkhazia’s political status was 
resolved.471 With this deadlock in the returns process, it was recognised that the most dangerous 
regions of Abkhazia at least be restored to encourage voluntary returns. A drive to rebuild 
Abkhazia gathered impetus with the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank, alongside local 
projects conducted by humanitarian organisations.472 This renewed effort was formulised through 
the establishment of the Geneva Process in July 1997 which focused on the settlement, refugee 
and IDP returns, and socio-economic reconstruction. Moscow relied on international assistance 
in terms of expertise and funding to facilitate these processes. Russia also contributed to these 
efforts through bilateral economic agreements and specific forms of aid.473 Moscow also had to 
tread a fine line between support for the existing sanctions regime on Abkhazia and for the 
provision of aid. Understanding that it needed to keep pressure on Sukhumi to facilitate the 
settlement process, it was aware of the humanitarian consequences of these sanctions. The CIS-
PKF engaged in reconstruction projects such as the restoration of roads and bridges which helped 
                                                          
469 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1996, accessed 30 March 2014, available at 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/293738; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 September 1997, accessed 30 
March 2014, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/303817. 
470 Secretary General Report 10 (S/10), 6 January 1995, paragraph 8 and 9, p. 2. 
471 Secretary General Report 181 (S/181), 6 March 1995, paragraph 3, p. 1. 
472 For instance, UNHCR initiated programmes of emergency repairs to some 30 schools, expanded its 
agricultural programme by distributing seeds and fertiliser to vulnerable families throughout the region, 
provided shelter materials for civilians in need at Gali, and provided specialised equipment for the 
hospital and other health structures in southern Abkhazia. See S/1997/558 18 July, para 13, p. 4; 
S/1995/937 8 November, para 35, p. 8. 
473 For example, in mid-March 1996 Russia signed a trade agreement with Georgia, which was formally 
known as the Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Caucasus Region. 
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humanitarian agencies and NGOs deliver aid.474 Russia also allowed the delivery of aid to 
Abkhazia across its territory and maintained transparency by notifying Georgian authorities in 
advance of deliveries.475 
     This continued in the early 2000s under Putin. On 23 December 2000 Moscow signed an 
intergovernmental agreement with Tbilisi regarding cooperation on issues of economic 
rehabilitation and refugee return in South Ossetia. Although sporadic, this was accompanied by 
the involvement of the CIS-PKF in local assistance projects in Abkhazia.476 Despite these efforts, 
Abkhazia remained unstable which prohibited UNHCR’s work in the returns process. 
Nevertheless, in late 2001 after a three-year hiatus the Geneva Process’s Working Group on social 
and economic reconstruction recommenced. The Working Group was convened throughout 2002 
and 2003 where several humanitarian issues were discussed.477   
     Moscow’s policy during 2003 via meetings with Georgia demonstrated an interest in 
mitigating the insecurity in the conflict zones through economic agreements and local projects.478 
This also aimed to secure a favourable relationship with Tbilisi in the context of its anxieties over 
the stationing of US troops in Georgia. After a presidential meeting in Sochi in early March 2003, 
working groups were created to act alongside the existing format in Abkhazia.479 They aimed to 
address issues on the humanitarian and return processes.480 For instance, Putin was successful in 
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476 S/2000/39 19 January para 25, p. 5. 
477 Secretary General Report 742 (S/742), 10 July 2002 paragraph 7, p. 1; Secretary General Report 39 
(S/39), 13 January 2003, paragraph 6, p. 2. 
478 In late January Russia’s Secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Rushailo, met with the Head of 
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479 These became known as the Sochi Groups.  
480 Secretary General Report 412, (S//412), 9 April 2003, paragraph 5, p. 2. 
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securing a compromise from Tbilisi in that the opening of the railway should proceed in parallel 
with the returns process to the Gali District.481 While these agreements were interrupted by 
political change in Georgia in late 2003, it demonstrated Moscow’s resolve to move the 
peacebuilding process forward. 
     With Russia’s shift in policy in the mid-2000s, there were instances of Russian support for 
Georgia’s renewed assistance to South Ossetia in mid-2004, and while Moscow continued to 
endorse the work of the OSCE and discussions on issues in the JCC throughout 2005, the 
humanitarian efforts of Moscow and Tbilisi became increasingly politicised (International Crisis 
Group, 2004: 23).482 Moscow criticised Tbilisi for acting outside of the JCC but also rendered 
unilateral humanitarian assistance to the Ossetian authorities.483 Russia also commissioned in 
2006 the construction of a pipeline from North Ossetia to Tskhinvali, which intended to ensure 
the independence of South Ossetia’s energy supply. The International Crisis Group (2004: 24) 
considered this a deliberate action to further alienate the breakaway territory from Georgia. In 
April 2008 Putin also instructed the Russian Government to ‘provide substantive support to’ and 
strengthen its relationship with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the areas of the 
economy.484 This engagement became more deliberate during the aftermath of the conflict in 
August 2008, with an increase in Russian assistance to the regions under President Medvedev.485 
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482 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary 
Regarding Questions from Itar Tass about Georgian-Ossetian Problems’, 7 January 2004, accessed 20 
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483 At the 2006 donor conference Russia pledged some $3 million for economic rehabilitation. This 
directly financed several projects in South Ossetia which were not implemented in cooperation with the 
OSCE and neither Georgia. See International Crisis Group (2004: 23). 
484 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Russian President’s Instructions to the Russian Federation 




485 EMERCOM even signed an agreement with South Ossetia in February 2011 in solidifying cooperation 
‘in preventing and dealing with emergencies’ and was the first agreement the Ministry had signed with a 
foreign state. See EMERCOM ‘Russia and South Ossetia have signed an agreement on cooperation in 
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This aid was increasingly politicised to cement Moscow’s relations with the regions. The 
launching of the Dzuarikau–Tskhinvali pipeline from North Ossetia to South Ossetia in August 




The case of Georgia demonstrated that Russia’s approach towards conflict management was 
complex, both diverging from and converging with the trends of European conflict management 
as captured by security governance. Russia’s involvement in Georgia has been conditioned by its 
increasingly acerbic relationship with Tbilisi. As a result of the tension between Russia’s security 
logics in its regional space, Moscow’s policy and practice has been uneven. Despite Russia’s 
instrumentality towards the peace effort – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – Russia’s 
participation in conflict management in Georgia demonstrated a continuity where it was aware of 
instability caused by the parties. In Abkhazia, Russian forces demonstrated a consistent 
commitment to the management of the conflict. They participated alongside UNOMIG and a 
range of NGOs – although their rules of engagement and resources were limited.  In this regard, 
they were unable to expedite the humanitarian and returns process. Even during the mid-2000s 
onwards, Russian forces in Abkhazia continued to implement their mandate regardless of the 
political situation between Moscow and Tbilisi.  
     South Ossetia on the other hand, proved to be less effective as a case of Russian conflict 
management. Russia’s establishment of the JCC and JPKF was a genuine means to cultivate a 
settlement to the conflict. It was largely from the mid-2000s onwards where Russia’s approach 
became instrumental. While Moscow maintained a status quo in the settlement processes this did, 
however, provide some form of stability to the region. Moscow’s use of force in August 2008 was 
a political act, as documented in the literature, to warn Western actors from interference in a 
region of vital Russian interests. The Georgian case – specifically South Ossetia – became a 
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battleground between Russia and the actors of European security governance. Despite this, while 
Moscow opposed the widening of European security governance at the system level, this did not 














































Besides the conflict in Georgia, Russian troops were also faced with the conflict that erupted in 
Moldova-Transnistria in late 1991. Moscow’s response was complex and reflected some of the 
core trends of European conflict management to promote regional stability. However, from the 
mid-2000s onwards Russia’s approach became increasingly bound up in self-interest which was 
linked to changes in its wider political and security relationship with the central actors of 
European security governance. Moscow began to exploit some of the emerging trends of 
European conflict management for its own ends, demonstrating an ambivalence that would 
condition its response to the humanitarian, political, and security processes of the peace effort. 
Crucially, Moscow’s approach towards Moldova-Transnistria showed similarities with its 
behaviour in the Balkans as Russia sought to balance a declared commitment to the wider 
systemic norms and processes of European security governance with its own foreign policy 
priorities. 
     The case of the conflict in Moldova-Transnistria is therefore an integral part of Russia’s 
regional experience of conflict management, which also made a significant contribution to its 
wider post-Soviet experience. This chapter will highlight the ambivalence in Russian behaviour 
and demonstrate the complexities of its response towards Chisinau and Tiraspol. The chapter is 
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divided into two principal sections covering Russia’s engagement across the pre- and post-
ceasefire phases of the peace effort in Moldova-Transnistria. This analysis is organised through 
the dimensions of European security governance which have captured and given rise to the 
evolutionary trends in European conflict management. 
 
6.2 Pre-ceasefire phase 
6.2.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the degree of Russia’s engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder 
interaction complexity. Russia’s behaviour was incoherent and a consequence of a fragmentary 
decision and policymaking process between the MFA on the one hand and the military 
establishment/MoD and conservative political elite in Moscow on the other. As illustrated by the 
perforated arrow in Figure 6.1, this was exacerbated by the limited ability of the military 
establishment/MoD to exercise a consistent degree of authority over the independent behaviour 
of certain elements of the 14 Army (14A) and its high command (see Lynch, 1999; Jackson, 
2003). Alongside this, the MFA engaged in an approach which placed itself at the centre of the 
pre-ceasefire peace effort. However, as shown in Figure 6.1, this did not rule out the promotion 
of a collective response at the diplomatic level through the Quadrilateral Commission (QC). The 
MFA was also instrumental in establishing an observer mission at the operational level, which 
included observers from each of the participating members of the QC. The Foreign Ministry’s 
aim to maintain a strong foothold in the peace effort was to promote its role as a regional security 
guarantor and to safeguard national interests. Despite this, the MFA’s relatively consistent 
engagement in collective action was undermined by the unilateral approach of the 14A and certain 









Figure 6.1 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the 




The MFA was extensively involved in the peace effort at the diplomatic level and attempted to 
cultivate a regional collective effort, where Russia retained a central stakeholder position and 
international actors such as the UN and CSCE were excluded. Crucially, this was not an attempt 
to suppress a collective response but was aimed at consolidating Russia’s role as regional security 
guarantor by taking ownership of regional responses, but also assisted in the safeguarding of 
Russia’s material and strategic interests. With the escalation of the violence into armed conflict 
in early 1992, the MFA supported in late March the establishment of a ceasefire and the creation 
of an initial commission including the opposing sides and security guarantors Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine.487 Yet, with disagreement between the opposing sides on a final settlement the 
                                                          




fighting continued almost immediately. This was further exacerbated by Moldova’s declaration 
of a state of emergency, which further heightened tensions with Tiraspol.488  
     The Foreign Ministry endeavoured to maintain its stakeholder position in the peace effort with 
Kozyrev personally leading negotiations in Moldova and Transnistria. In early April 1992, the 
QC was re-convened in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau where a further ceasefire was declared 
on 6 April. The MFA actively promoted a negotiated process between the opposing sides and 
made efforts to include interested parties such as Ukraine and Romania.489 At the same time, this 
approach was undermined by hard-line political forces in Moscow, with Vice-President Rutskoi’s 
unauthorised visit to Tiraspol who advocated a unilateral and forceful approach to solve the 
conflict.490 While the MFA was not promoting a collective process based on the inclusion of 
international actors such as the UN and CSCE, the Ministry was attempting to facilitated its own 
regional collective response. These efforts were disrupted by the 14A’s gradual involvement in 
the conflict on the side of Tiraspol, which culminated in the deployment of 14A units near the 
town of Dubasarii along the Dniestr River dividing Moldova from Transnistria.491  
     Following this incident, the violence escalated as Moldovan forces conducted a major 
offensive against the town of Bendery in June 1992. With the 14A providing considerable support 
to the separatist troops, Russia’s engagement via the Foreign Ministry ceased. The principles of 
collective action underpinning the QC format were brushed aside as Yeltsin and Rutskoi assumed 
responsibility for the negotiation process (Jackson, 2003: 102). Throughout June and July 1992 
there were a series of bilateral meetings between Yeltsin and Snegur in Moscow, concluded by 
the signing of a final ceasefire agreement on 21 July 1992.492 In the face of what Yeltsin 
considered as the MFA’s indecisiveness, the disruption of the existing format of the QC was an 
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attempt by the Kremlin to regain control of the situation and further consolidate Moscow’s 
foothold in the settlement process. By cutting out other parties, Yeltsin demonstrated a preference 
for direct bilateral diplomacy. Therefore, the extent of Moscow’s engagement in collective action 
became increasingly messy as the violence continued. Nevertheless, although the Russian 
leadership, under mounting domestic pressure to act, finally resorted to traditional bilateral 
negotiation, this did not rule out Yeltsin’s support for the approach favoured by the MFA which 
had steered Russia’s diplomatic involvement for several months previously.  
Operational Level 
 
The operational response towards the violence in Moldova was virtually non-existent and 
mirrored the approach exercised during the initial conflict in South Ossetia. Moscow’s lack of 
engagement in collective action was because its troops stationed in the region lacked experience 
in confronting intra-state violence, which was exacerbated by considerable political turmoil and 
uncertainty during the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This was accompanied 
by a poor decision and policymaking process in the military establishment/MoD and MFA, which 
meant that because of intermittent direction from Moscow the 14A began to act autonomously. 
This uneven response was intensified by the conspicuous lack of international involvement to 
help steer a response. Consequently, there was no coordination on the ground between the 14A 
and the observer mission illustrated in Figure 6.1.  
     The 14A remained the central actor in the region other than the opposing parties to the conflict. 
Initially, the 14A refrained from getting involved in the conflict and, besides isolated incidents of 
units providing military supplies to the separatist forces, remained confined to barracks. This was 
the official position of the 14A’s high command which was largely obeyed throughout the Army 
during the initial months of 1992. The 14A was not experienced in confronting this intra-state 
violence and gradually became involved as the conflict evolved. As mentioned above, the push 
for the 14A to further its involvement in the conflict increased considerably in the spring of 1992. 
Political forces, backed by certain groups from within the military establishment/MOD, supported 
a unilateral approach based on the power of the 14A rather than cultivating a collective response 
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in accordance with the MFA. Yet, despite this, there were voices from within the military which 
advocated for the internationalisation of the peace effort. The Deputy Commander of CIS forces, 
General Boris P’yankov, proposed that the 14A with the participation of CSCE observers should 
perform the ‘functions for the separation of the warring parties in Transnistria’.493 Although this 
raised significant questions about the neutrality and expertise of the 14A, it nevertheless 
demonstrated that there was no consensus about how to approach the conflict in the military 
establishment/MoD. While this understanding was present, it was overshadowed by ad hoc 
developments on the ground and by thinking that favoured unilateralism.  
     Running parallel with discussions on the purpose of the 14A was the establishment by the QC 
in April 1992 of the Observer Mission.494 The Observer Mission was directed by the QC and 
would operate ‘on an ongoing basis as a working body within the mechanism of political 
consultations among the four ministers of foreign affairs [QC]’495. The Observer Mission was an 
attempt to emulate diplomatic cooperation between the members of the QC, and was tasked with 
the responsibility of overseeing ceasefires between the two opposing sides along the Dniestr 
River. However, this Mission became largely ineffective as the violence gained ferocity and the 
14A increased its involvement during summer 1992. Yeltsin and Rutskoi’s interjection in the 
peace process undercut the MFA’s ability to support the work of the Observer Mission (although 
the Mission’s capacity was limited in the first place).  
6.2.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation 
Coercive Measures 
 
In comparison to Russia’s behaviour in the pre-Dayton phase of the peace effort in Croatia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moscow’s approach towards the use of force was extremely chaotic in 
Moldova-Transnistria during the early 1990s. Many views emerged from the Soviet and later 
Russian military establishment/MoD on how to utilise force in conflict management operations 
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as discussed in chapter 2. Crucially, while the arrangement of these views was largely based on 
the institutional divide between the military and the MFA, discrepancies occurred within and 
across the boundaries of the central power ministries. This hindered the extent in which thinking 
at the institutional level informed practice on the ground in the zones of conflict, where 
circumstances dictated largely pragmatic and ad hoc approaches adopted by existing 
Soviet/Russian forces stationed in the region. Moreover, the wider context of Russia’s foreign 
and security policy aims further complicated its response. 
     The conflict escalated in 1992 with fighting across the Dniestr River between government and 
separatist forces. Elements of the 14A stationed in the conflict zone provided military supplies to 
Tiraspol and Russian Cossacks participated in the fighting.496 However, this was not attributed to 
decisions made either by the 14A’s high command or in Moscow. The Russian leadership 
remained silent and troops of the 14A were under strict orders from their command not to interfere 
– even with increasing attacks from military groups in Moldova. This was followed by the MFA’s 
cautious approach towards the violence through the cultivation of diplomatic efforts to halt the 
fighting with the establishment of a ceasefire in late March.497 The 14A still refrained from 
officially participating in the conflict, with the ceasefire’s immediate failure and continuance of 
the fighting. While it was now reaffirmed by the high command of the 14A that units should 
actively oppose any attacks on military installations and civilians, this was not an order of 
intervention but one of self-defence.498 Indeed, the following warning from the 14A’s high 
command that its forces may breach neutrality should not be understood as a veiled threat directed 
at Chisinau for putting Moldova on a state of emergency in late March 1992.499 Instead, it was a 
realistic assessment of the situation where rogue elements of the 14A were increasingly becoming 
prepared to act.  
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     During the following months throughout April and May 1992, Russia’s role became 
considerably complex. Existing analysis contends that political forces, together with the military 
establishment and the MoD’s first draft military doctrine in May 1992, began to dominate 
decisions on the use of force to protect the Russian diaspora and other civilian populations (Lynch, 
1999: 115). While these views were promoted by certain actors involved, this analysis overlooks 
the extent of the divergence of understanding on the use of force within and between the power 
ministries. In accordance with the MFA and the command of the 14A, the high command of the 
CIS promoted the peacekeeping role of the 14A, which did not include the offensive use of force, 
and supported the involvement of the CSCE.500 The CIS command also understood that a political 
resolution of the conflict was required.501  
     Existing analysis also fails to place enough emphasis on the significance of the 14A’s 
autonomy and its constitutive units during this period. The level of force utilised was not specified 
by those in Moscow – in particular, certain groups within the military establishment/MoD – which 
was largely left to troops on the ground to decide which methods were appropriate. The 14A’s 
behaviour was further complicated by the ethnic ties that existed between units of the 14A and 
the local population, which triggered an emotional response towards the mounting violence 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol. It is therefore debatable whether these units would have employed 
comparable levels of force to protect civilians outside of this scenario in other instances of 
regional intra-state violence. Emblematic of this was the deployment of tank and infantry units of 
the 14A to positions around the town of Dubosary in late May 1992.502 Commenting on these 
provocative actions, the 14A’s commander acknowledged that individual units were involved in 
operations, but asserted that in doing so they had ‘gone out of control’ and were disobeying his 
explicit orders. The Commander in Chief of CIS forces, Marshall Shaposhnikov, was also clear 
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when he stated during an interview in late May 1992 that ‘It’s very easy to make judgements 
about responsibility when you’re sitting in this hall. But when a crowd of 15,000 infuriated 
people, many of whom buried friends and relatives yesterday, comes to the unit, I can’t rule out 
the possibility that some of the officers and generals might take the side of those wronged and 
humiliated people’.503 It is, therefore, crucial to acknowledge that this behaviour was primarily 
attributed to the complex circumstances the 14A faced rather than via a coherent doctrinal 
understanding and policy from Moscow.  
     This, however, did not rule out a degree of calculated behaviour from Moscow, which 
remained silent and ignored Moldova’s protest regarding 14A behaviour.504 While the 
maintenance of stability was at the forefront of Yeltsin’s mind, so too was the promotion of 
Russia’s national interests, such as the securing of a long term forward military presence in 
Moldova. At the same time, Yeltsin’s impulsive orders to withdraw the 14A demonstrated a 
cautiousness from the leadership in becoming further embroiled in the conflict. This was followed 
by an ease in the fighting and the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol 
in early June 1992, reinforcing Yeltsin’s attempts to halt the violence via diplomatic means. Yet, 
with the escalation of the fighting, Yeltsin made a pragmatic decision to support the 14A’s 
resistance against Chisinau’s offensive against separatist forces in Bendery in mid- to late June 
1992. As noted by one commentator: ‘This was the first case of clear Russian military intervention 
in a new state formed from the former Soviet Union’ (Jackson, 2003: 97).  
     It is acknowledged that at this point in the conflict a shift occurred in Russia’s approach 
towards a wider acceptance on the use of force (Lynch, 1999: 116; Jackson, 2003: 97). There was 
a turn towards the use of more forceful methods steered in large part by certain groups from the 
MoD who appointed Alexander Lebed, a Soviet-Afghan War veteran, to the command of the 14A 
in late June 1992. A hard-liner, Lebed labelled the Moldovan government a ‘fascist regime’ 
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because of the destruction of Bendery, and promoted the use of force to solve the conflict.505 On 
reflection Lebed stated that ‘Surprise, precise, powerful preemptive strikes, as well as the 
availability of backup mobile armoured groups, forced the initiators of the military conflict to 
come to the negotiation table’ (see Lynch, 1999: 118). Yeltsin also declared that ‘We cannot 
remain indifferent. In the final analysis, we simply must react to protect people and stop 
bloodshed. We have the force to do so and let Snegur know it’506. The MFA also started to take a 
tougher line against Moldova, agreeing to the framing of the violence in Bendery as a genocide 
against the Transnistrian people.507 Kozyrev even remarked that ‘forcible methods’ are useful ‘in 
order to convince an enemy or more precisely a conflicting side to embark on a path of 
negotiations and to seek peace’.508  
     On closer inspection, however, evidence suggests that despite the above this was not a 
definitive demonstration of a shift in doctrine and practice. In the case of the MoD, there were 
still those who advocated a more cautious approach and ruled out military intervention. As shown 
in the previous chapter, if such a decisive shift had occurred then Moscow’s approach towards 
the conflict in Abkhazia would have also demonstrated a more permissive and coherent 
application of force from the opening of the conflict or at least from the beginning of its escalation. 
Instead, the factors influencing the uneven practice of force present in Russia’s involvement in 
Moldova-Transnistria continued to condition Moscow’s response in Georgia. Moreover, while 
this use of force was adopted to tackle instability during the Moldovan-Transnistria conflict, it 
was also used to secure Russian national interests. This demonstrates that the decision to employ 
force was not exclusively conditioned by a doctrinal change from certain quarters of the MoD, 
but instead was increasingly shaped by political expediency.   
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     This was also the case concerning the impulsive behaviour of the MFA. Running parallel with 
his rhetoric on the use of force, Kozyrev continued to exercise a cautious approach and 
emphasised the role of sanctions. He exclaimed that ‘if systematic murders are committed and the 
diplomatic breaks do not work, Russia has the right – pending intervention by an international 
court of arbitration – to apply unilateral sanctions’.509 Similar to the MoD, the Foreign Ministry’s 
behaviour in South Ossetia, and in particular Abkhazia, remained opposed to the use of force and 
wedded to softer methods of diplomacy, support for the humanitarian process, and sanctions. 
Indeed, the offensive use of force to combat violence and to protect civilians was not officially 
adopted by the MFA. Finally, the fact that the 14A did not again substantially and directly 
participate in the fighting in the weeks following the Battle of Bendery and the signing of a final 
ceasefire in late July 1992 provides further weight to this analysis.  
The Settlement Process 
 
Moscow’s approach to the question of Chisinau’s territorial integrity was also complex. In the 
case of Tiraspol, Moscow maintained a consistent argument advocating for its wider autonomy 
within the framework of Moldova. At the same time, this was closely intertwined with the idea 
of Moldova’s qualified sovereignty, demonstrated by Moscow’s actions as the conflict unfolded. 
This, however, manifested itself in different ways due to the incoherent decision-making and 
policy implementation between the conservative political elite, military establishment/the MoD, 
and the MFA. This was an expression of Russia’s divergent and competing regional security 
logics. The conservative political elite in Moscow initially supported Transnistria’s forceful 
separation from Moldova but took a more moderate line by mid-1992. The military 
establishment/MoD was against Transnistria’s separation from Moldova, but at the same time 
conditioned Chisinau’s territorial integrity through humanitarian arguments which masked 
Russian political and strategic aims. The MFA was also concerned about Transnistria’s separation 
from Moldova due to its potential impact on the maintenance of Russia’s territorial integrity. 
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Again, while this approach was closely bound up with the securing of Russia’s regional interests, 
the cementing of Russia’s role as a regional security guarantor was a paramount concern for the 
Foreign Ministry. Based on the MFA’s thinking, Russia reserved the right to intervene in the 
debates over Moldova’s future territorial integrity. This was not necessarily linked to imperial 
intent as the MFA was consistent in supporting arrangements that advocated a compromise 
between Chisinau and Tiraspol.  
     With the escalation of the conflict in 1992, the Moldovan leadership attempted to appease 
Tiraspol in mid-March by offering a settlement package based on the creation of an independent 
county with a free economic zone within Moldova.510 President Mircea Snegur’s opposition to 
the federalisation of Moldova based on the elevation of Transnistria’s status to an autonomous 
region within Moldova became a regular point of contention.511 This was exacerbated by 
Tiraspol’s intransigence, which was buoyed by hard line political forces in Moscow. 
Nevertheless, during these initial stages of the political debate, the MFA made a considerable 
effort to instigate a compromise between the two sides. In late March 1992, the MFA organised 
a meeting between Chisinau and Tiraspol, alongside the establishment of the QC, to facilitate a 
diplomatic compromise.512 Yet, this constructive engagement in the settlement process was 
undermined considerably by the interventionist policies of Moscow’s conservative political 
elite.513 
     While these political interventions into Moldovan politics undermined Chisinau’s attempt to 
steer the debate on the issue of its territorial integrity, the MFA continued to cultivate a 
compromise. The Foreign Ministry demonstrated a balanced approach towards the increasingly 
pragmatic debate that was emerging in European security governance on the issue of self-
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determination and territorial integrity. Kozyrev visited the region in early April 1992 with the 
intention of cultivating a settlement. During a rally in Tiraspol Kozyrev was firm when stating 
that if Russian policy was to act on the assertions of certain conservative politicians that would 
see Transnistria as an independent entity, Moscow would be violating international law.514 Yet, 
Kozyrev conceded that if there was a Moldovan unification with Romania this would trigger a 
legitimate reconsideration of Transnistria’s political relationship with Chisinau in the form of 
independence.515 This approach was linked to the MFA’s problematic thinking that Russia 
possessed the automatic right to arbitrate Moldova’s internal political process as regional security 
guarantor. While Chisinau considered this a gross interference, it was reported that in private 
Moldovan diplomats had recognised that a compromise could be reached.516 The leadership in 
Tiraspol continued to insist on the status of a republic within Moldova, while Chisinau remained 
resolute in its proposals of a Dnestr District with cultural autonomy. Despite these earlier 
statements, Kozyrev was desperately attempting to reach a compromise commenting that 
‘Probably the truth lies somewhere in between. The Moldovans are frightened by the word 
‘republic’. It probably isn’t necessary to insist on it. An American state or a federal land [state] 
in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] have very broad rights but are not called republic’.517    
     This balanced response gave way to greater interference in June and July 1992, with Russia’s 
coordinated military engagement in support of the separatists in Moldova. As noted above, Yeltsin 
became more involved in negotiations and sought a peace which safeguarded Russian interests. 
However, while Yeltsin’s approach supported the idea of Moldova’s qualified sovereignty and 
while the 14A supported by the military leadership attempted to force a peace, this did not rule 
out the possibility of a compromise which was still present in the Russian leadership’s thinking. 
Yeltsin sent Rutskoi to Moldova to negotiate a ceasefire and a final settlement to the conflict, 
which included the cessation of violence, the disbandment of armed formations, the stationing of 
a peacekeeping force to separate the two sides, and, the return of deputies from the eastern districts 
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to the Moldovan parliament.518 Although this was not a comprehensive political settlement, it 
offered a point of departure from which a more concrete arrangement could be established. 
Chisinau looked favourably on Rutskoi’s last proposal and offered several ministerial positions 
for Tiraspol.519 The Moldovan leadership was firm, however, that a fulfilment of the minimum 
programme was a precondition to a discussion on Transnistria’s political future. The Transnistrian 
leadership opposed this prerequisite, commenting that ‘the question of our status must be 
considered first, especially since it jibes with resolutions of the Supreme Soviets of Russia and 
the Dnestr region’.520  
     A ceasefire was signed on 21 July 1992 and in a joint Moldovan-Russian communique a set 
of principles for a peaceful solution of the conflict were announced, including respect for 
Moldova’s sovereignty, the need for a special status of Transnistria, and the right of the population 
of Transnistria to decide its own future if Moldova reunited with Romania. This last potential 
condition demonstrated the degree in which the Russian leadership was willing to dictate the 
terms of Moldova’s internal political process as regional security guarantor.   
 
6.3 Post-Ceasefire phase      
6.3.1 The pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity 
 
As illustrated below in Figure 6.2, Moscow understood the utility in cultivating collective efforts 
at both the diplomatic and operational levels primarily through the JCC and with the OSCE. This 
also included a degree of interaction between the 14A/Operational Group of Russian Forces 
(OGRF) and the OSCE Voluntary Fund for Ammunition Withdrawal and Disposal (VFAWD) 
concerning the issue of arms withdrawal and reduction. However, the JPKF’s cooperation with 
local and international NGOs was relatively limited and ad hoc. This degree of interaction 
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stemmed from its doctrinal understanding which was attributed to its wider normative outlook 
intrinsic to its foreign policy as discussed in chapter’s 1 and 2. 
     Moscow pressed for a central role in this collective response to fulfil its self-appointed role as 
regional security guarantor. This was also a means to ensure Russia could steer the peace effort 
in directions conducive to its national interests in Moldova and Transnistria. As shown by 
Russia’s experiences in Georgia, these interests had a profound impact upon the extent of Russia’s 
engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity. It is crucial to 
acknowledge far from exercising a calibrated policy based on the ‘de facto torpedoing [of] 
multilateral efforts’ (Flikke and Godzimirski, 2006: 12), Moscow’s behaviour fluctuated – 
particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – between periods of engagement and dis-engagement 
vis-a-vis collective action. The ambiguity in Russian behaviour was a result of the competing 
security logics shaped by developments in Moscow’s relationship with Chisinau and its wider 
































Figure 6.2 An overview of the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity of the 
post-ceasefire phase of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict 
 
 
Diplomatic Level  
 
The development of mechanisms of collective action during this phase were relatively 
sophisticated. At the centre was the JCC which modelled itself on the format in South Ossetia and 
aimed to facilitate a consensus-based process between the parties to the conflict. It also included 
Russia as security guarantor and the CSCE/OSCE and Ukraine as observers. From the 2000s 
onwards, the OSCE increased its engagement through the JCC, Parliamentary Missions, and 
official OSCE chairperson visits. In 2005, the JCC was expanded to include the EU and the US 
as observers in a 5+2 format, which also convened several working groups on governance, 
humanitarian, and security issues. The short-lived Primakov Commission of the early 2000s also 
played a role in the settlement process and interacted with the JCC through informal and ad hoc 
channels.    
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     Throughout the 1990s Russia demonstrated a sustained level of engagement in the pooling of 
sovereignty through stakeholder interaction complexity. While the arrangement of the JCC 
reinforced Russia’s central foothold in the peace effort and while this assisted Russian aims to 
secure national interests, Moscow demonstrated a commitment to expedite the diplomatic process 
through bilateral channels and in coordination with the offices of the CSCE/OSCE. Indeed, as 
will be discussed below, this was complicated by the issue of the 14A’s withdrawal and the 
removal of stockpiles of weapons from Moldova and Transnistria. The immediate years following 
the Russian brokered ceasefire in July 1992, Moscow held bilateral consultations in early 1993 
with the Moldovan leadership and participated in the JCC to facilitate a final resolution.521  With 
the appointment of Primakov to the Foreign Ministry in 1996, Russia’s engagement in the 
settlement process in coordination with the JCC increased. Throughout 1996 and 1997 Primakov 
exercised a pro-active policy through the auspices of the JCC where intense diplomatic work 
towards a final resolution took place.  
     Although this format became politically-charged from the mid-2000s onwards, at this stage 
Russia’s constructive engagement was based on attempts to cultivate collective responses. Even 
with the straining of relations between Moscow and the OSCE over aspects of the CFE Treaty 
during the late 1990s, Russia maintained its cooperation with Vienna in the settlement process. 
Several informal meetings outside of the JCC took place between Russia, the OSCE, and the 
parties in mid-1999, where it was the OSCE’s intention to further internationalise the settlement 
process based on a ‘mini Rambouillet’.522 This was followed by an international conference in 
Tiraspol in late-1999 which aimed to facilitate conditions for settlement and included 
representatives from the JCC and experts from several European countries.523 The OSCE was 
unable to influence an expansion of the JCC format due to Transnistrian intransigence and a lack 
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of political will from the Russian leadership which was suspicious of formal external actor 
involvement.  
     During the Yeltsin presidency, Russia’s approach towards the cultivation of collective action 
demonstrated a balancing act which mirrored its response to the ongoing settlement processes in 
Georgia. Moscow traversed a fine line purposefully committing to the collective effort but 
remaining alert to the protection of its regional interests. At this stage of the conflict, Russia 
managed to largely navigate this balancing act as the pursuit of national interest did not 
necessarily conflict with its commitment to collective action. However, the continuity of this 
balancing act became increasingly ambiguous during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies, 
making Russia’s approach towards the pooling of sovereignty into formats of collective action 
increasing complex. Therefore, Moscow’s engagement in collective policies fluctuated 
considerably, demonstrating commitment, indifference, and instrumentality. Russia’s behaviour 
became increasingly conditioned by the contours of its wider political and security relationship 
with the central actors of system of European security governance. 
     The immediate years of Putin’s first presidential term witnessed the establishment of the 
Primakov Commission which aimed to expedite the settlement process. Expert commentary 
considered this an instrumental initiative based on a trade-off between Chisinau and Moscow, 
where the latter would follow Russia’s international political line and give preferential treatment 
to Russian businesses in the country, whilst Moscow would support conflict resolution (Popescu, 
2006: 2). Although national interests featured as drivers underpinning Russian behaviour, this 
was also informed by an engagement to facilitate a resolution. The Primakov Commission 
‘assisted in developing a unified approach for mediators of the Transnistrian settlement’ including 
the participation of experts from Washington and European capitals (Devyatkov, 2012: 54). The 
then OSCE Chairperson even considered the Commission a positive step in the resolution process 
and an informal meeting took place on the 26 July 2000 to discuss the settlement.524 This was 
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followed by a meeting between Primakov and his Ukrainian counterpart on 23 August 2000.525 
The fact that the Commission engaged in dialogue with the members of the JCC was evidence 
that it was not a means to circumvent but to complement existing diplomatic machinery. 
     From late 2000, the OSCE stepped up its involvement in the settlement which was supported 
by Moscow. An OSCE Parliamentary Mission was sent to Moldova and Transnistria in late 
September and discussed the modalities of the settlement, including visits to ammunition and 
weapons stores under the control of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova 
(OGRF).526 The Mission reported that while the settlement process was failing, this was not 
through a lack of Russian diplomatic engagement.527 Alongside the members of the JCC and in 
accordance with experts from the Europe and the US, Moscow continued to contribute towards 
the facilitation of settlement talks in August 2001.528 This was followed by a 10-month hiatus in 
negotiations because of dilatory Moldovan and Transnistrian tactics. However, in July 2002 there 
was a meeting of the JCC which was welcomed by Russia, with one MFA spokesperson 
remarking that the session ‘may become the starting point for a qualitatively new stage of [the] 
Transnsitrian settlement’.529 Following this meeting, where a draft paper was signed on the 
potential federalisation of Moldova, Russia maintained its channels of stakeholder interaction 
complexity via a series of meetings in the format of the JCC in Chisinau throughout mid- to late 
2002.530 At the same time, however, Moscow was attempting to cultivate a favourable bilateral 
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relationship with Moldova and Putin met the Moldovan leadership in February 2003 to discuss a 
range of issues, including the settlement.531  
     However, Moscow’s promotion of its national interests in Moldova began to complicate its 
response towards the settlement. In the context of President Voronin’s settlement proposal during 
his meeting with Putin, the Joint Constitutional Commission (JcC) was established and steered in 
large part by the OSCE representative. It included a group of Western experts to help formulate 
a constitutional arrangement for Moldova and Transnistria. The Commission was transparent and 
maintained a degree of cooperation and consultation with the members of the JCC, which included 
the participation of Russian diplomats (Hill, 2012: 84). The JcC was tasked to prepare a draft 
settlement proposal for six months’ time, initiating a period of intense work by OSCE staff and 
constitutional external experts via a series of seminars and negotiations throughout 2003. Yet, at 
the same time Russia was engaging in these broader discussions, it was also secretly developing 
a settlement proposal of its own. This unilateral approach effectively undermined the efforts of 
the JcC and was certainly not in the spirit of collective action. The tabling of Russia’s proposal in 
November 2003 and its last minute rejection by Voronin initiated a period of Russian 
disengagement from the peace effort. The scaling down of Russian diplomacy coincided with the 
OSCE’s further engagement in early to mid-2004 as it aimed to promote the plan developed by 
the JcC. 
     Nevertheless, some progress was made in September 2005 when the JCC agreed to invite the 
EU and the US to participate as observers. This followed a period of intense diplomatic activity 
in the JCC between the mediators and observers. Russia’s involvement was not necessarily a 
demonstration of solidarity with its counterparts in the JCC on expediting the settlement process. 
Instead, its engagement was a means to monitor any settlement proposals, such as the Ukraine’s 
initiative in 2005, that it considered contradictory to its interpretation of a settlement which 
included the safeguarding of national interests. A considerable degree of inertia began to shape 
                                                          




collective action as the opposing sides ceased participating in the JCC. By the end of Putin’s 
presidency, this state of affairs had not changed and while there was continuity between the 
mediators and observers via meetings of the JCC – in addition to the establishment of several 
working groups in 2007 –, Russia had become comfortable with the status-quo.  
     With a general warming and ‘reset’ in relations between Moscow and its Western counter 
partners under Medvedev, this provided a renewed impetus to the settlement process. Russia re-
engaged in the JCC alongside the other members – although it was not until November 2011 that 
the opposing sides re-engaged.532 Moscow’s participation in diplomatic channels was 
accompanied by the initiation of the Meseberg process in mid-2010. Led by Berlin, Meseberg 
was not only about the cultivation of a strategic partnership between Russia and the EU, but also 
aimed to breathe new life into the Moldovan-Transnistrian settlement process. While Russia 
continued to participate in the JCC during the latter stages of Medvedev’s presidency, Russian 
engagement in the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity had essentially 
resumed its status-quo path.  
Operational Level 
 
The degree of Russian engagement in collective action via stakeholder interaction complexity 
during the post-ceasefire peace effort was sporadic compared to its involvement in Georgia and, 
indeed, the Balkans. Russia’s engagement was shaped by a tension based on the facilitation of 
regional security/stability, including a viable settlement, and the pursuit of narrow national 
interests. Alongside the intransigence of the opposing sides (particularly Transnistria), this 
complex interplay meant that collective action at the operational level was never consistently 
sustained throughout this period. Yet, unlike the breakdown of multilateral efforts in the security 
zones in Georgia in 2008, the conflict management formats regulating the areas of responsibility 
endured – although relations between the participating actors remained strained.  
                                                          




     The signing of the Russian-brokered ceasefire on 21 July 1992 established a similar 
operational format to manage the security and humanitarian situation that had been set up in South 
Ossetia a month previously. A JCC was created that consisted of representatives from the 
opposing sides, Russia, and CSCE/OSCE observers. The JCC was in overall command of the 
military contingents operating in the security zone although this was facilitated through the Joint 
Military Commission (JMC).533 The conflict management operation, or JPKF, consisted of units 
from both opposing parties and Russia as the central peace broker. As in the case of South Ossetia, 
the JPKFs trilateral format was a means to promote transparency and consensus between the 
opposing parties so that both Chisinau and Tiraspol could take ownership of the peace effort. 
Alongside the structures of the JMC and the JPKF, a small unit of Military Observers (MO) was 
established reflecting the composition of the JPKF and tasked to monitor the security zone in 
cooperation with the main force structures and central command in Bendery (Waters, 2003: 
148).534 Besides the military dimension, the peace effort also included the CSCE/OSCE Mission 
to the Republic of Moldova (or observer mission), which was responsible for observing the 
situation on the ground and for investigating specific incidents.535 The mission would cooperate 
with the JCC and the JPKF in executing the peace effort. The CSCE/OSCE also cooperated with 
international organisations and NGOs in their effort to facilitate the regional humanitarian 
process.536 The level of interaction between the JCC/JPKF and humanitarian actors was less pro-
active because no formal channel of interaction was developed between these actors.  
     The period after the signing of the ceasefire witnessed a sustained level of stakeholder 
interaction complexity within the JPKF as it set about securing the security zone through joint 
patrols, the confiscation of weapons and armaments, the provision of security to refugees and 
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IDPs returning home, and joint training exercises.537 As noted above, Russia’s contribution to the 
peace effort also included its engagement in the withdrawal of forces and weapons stockpiles 
from Transnistria, which although a controversial issue gained momentum during the early to 
mid-2000s after agreements made in the OSCE’s Istanbul Summit in 1999. Although 
experiencing sustained resistance from Tiraspol, Moscow cooperated with the OSCE’s VFAWD 
to remove large quantities of Soviet era equipment and military hardware. However, despite this 
cooperation, throughout the 2000s the JPKF failed to function as a collective mechanism to 
mitigate periods of tension between the opposing parties as noted above. While this may have 
been a result of Russian inertia, other plausible explanations relate to the consensual nature of the 
JPKF which constrained action, a lack of resources, and a preference to solve disputes 
diplomatically via the JCC. The deterioration in relations between Moscow and Chisinau in the 
mid-2000s and the stasis in the peace process led to Moldova’s temporary withdrawal from the 
structures of the JCC. This impacted the degree of cooperation between the members of the JPKF 
to execute their mandate. The breakdown of the collective effort on the ground was exacerbated 
further by the initiation of EUBAM in 2005 which was greeted with disdain by Tiraspol and 
Moscow. The Russian leadership considered it a unilateral effort outside of existing multilateral 
mechanisms to change the facts on the ground in favour of Moldova.  
     Russia continued to support the JCC and the format of the JPKF, pointing out their 
effectiveness in maintaining regional security. These protestations increased during the aftermath 
of the failed Kozak Memorandum in November 2003, where Chisinau and members of the OSCE 
increased their calls for a revision of existing formats.538 Moscow’s resistance towards the 
alteration of the JCC and the JPKF was largely driven by an anxiety about the potential erosion 
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of its ability to shape the peace effort on the ground. While political expediency began to 
increasingly shape Russian behaviour, calls for the revision of these formats would not necessarily 
have produced substantive results. Indeed, the injection of further impetus into the peace effort 
via the Meseberg Process in 2010 resulted in a period of enhanced diplomatic activity based on 
existing formats, but did not alter the status-quo of the JPKF’s behaviour on the ground which 
continued to function and cooperate with the OSCE observer mission.539 This raises a crucial 
point about Russia’s relationship with the OSCE, which became increasingly pragmatic from 
2008 onwards. Russia continued its cooperation with the OSCE in Moldova as it was a useful 
actor in the peace effort and helped to legitimise the JPKF. At the same, Moscow demanded the 
OSCE’s withdrawal from South Ossetia following the August war. In this sense, while Russian 
engagement in collective action in Moldova became increasingly instrumental throughout the 
2000s to legitimise its continued de facto leadership of the JCC and the JPKF, this did not rule 
out Moscow’s recognition of the utility of cooperation to facilitate a stable status-quo on the 
ground until a compromised-based settlement could be negotiated. 
6.3.2 Norms, collective interests and policies of implementation  
Coercive Measures 
 
The ceasefire agreement signed on 21 July 1992 provided an extremely vague mandate regarding 
the use of coercive measures. It was stipulated that on the authority of the JCC, the JPKF could 
take ‘necessary steps for the restoration of peace and order’.540 In comparison to the detailed rules 
of engagement of the peace efforts in the Balkans, this agreement could not provide an 
informative guidebook for the participating contingents in the JPKF and to the diplomats in the 
JCC. As reflected in the JPKF in South Ossetia, the format was intentionally designed for 
peacekeeping based on the notions of impartiality, consent, and transparency. By their very nature 
the parties to the conflict were included in the JPKF which placed them in a difficult position if 
military contingents and/or paramilitary groups from their side breached the mandate. In this 
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sense, the JPKF ruled out the use of force beyond a defensive and limited manner. This change 
was facilitated by the prevalence of softer views on conflict management by the MFA and of 
certain groups in the MoD – although certain high ranking officers in the military continued to 
express more favourable views on the use of force.  
     Moscow’s shift towards the use of softer methods was not simply a calculated decision once 
national interests had been achieved as suggested by some commentary (Waters, 2003). Instead, 
the outcome of doctrinal debates within the power ministries and political elite was a crucial factor 
in determining this change. This thinking came through in the design of the JPKF, where the force 
was conventionally positioned between the two opposing sides within the designated security 
zone along the banks of the Nestru River. This provided a static buffer zone between the sides, 
where the JPKF were tasked to conduct patrols mirroring the behaviour of the missions in 
Georgia.541 The JPKF went beyond a traditional interpositionary deployment as many wider-
peacekeeping duties were exercised, including patrolling, the confiscation of weapons, and the 
demolition of mines and explosive devices. This also included the protection of vital economic 
and industrial facilities situated in the security zone.542 The mission also recognised that the 
delivery of aid to the region was a central aspect of the peace effort.543 As in its other missions, 
Russia considered the JPKF in Moldova a tool to assist in expediting the wider conflict resolution 
process.  
     The security environment the JPKFs had to contend with in Moldova was considerably more 
peaceful than those of Abkhazia throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and South Ossetia from the 
mid-2000s onwards. However, the performance of the JPKF was mixed. On occasions the JPKF 
failed to exercise a pro-active approach for the protection of civilians and the maintenance peace. 
This was particularly the case during the ‘language’ crisis that erupted in mid-2004 over the 
closure of several Moldovan schools in Transnistria that continued to teach in the Latin script. 
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This erupted into a wider crisis as Chisinau attempted to blockade Transnistria which in return 
cut off electricity to parts of Moldova resulting in power outages. The forced closures of some of 
the schools by Transnistrian authorities and militia were according to the OSCE mission 
‘accompanied by acts of vandalism and the illegitimate use or threat of use of force by law 
enforcement personnel against children, including orphans, parents and school personnel’.544 
With the deepening of the crisis throughout the summer months of 2004, the then OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities described Tiraspol’s policy as ‘linguistic cleansing’.545 
Amidst this mounting tension, the JPKF remained passive and only took limited steps through the 
use of patrolling to deter local militia from attempting to forcible enter the schools.546 This was 
accompanied by the promotion of negotiations between the parties by the mediators and observers 
of the JCC.547 Moscow finally managed to broker an end to the crisis in late August, considering 
the use of coercive methods to be counterproductive. While there was a degree of credibility in 
this thinking, this was largely political and aimed at discrediting Chisinau. Russia could have 
played a more influential role in halting the crisis by instructing its contingent in the JPKF to be 
more pro-active.548  
     Despite this, the JPKF was required to provide regional security and its stationing in Moldova 
should not be reduced solely to an extension of Russian political expediency. In many ways, the 
JPKF had to deal with an increasingly complicated political environment, which was the fallout 
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of Russian-Moldovan relations. Moscow was persistent in refusing to change the format of the 
JPKF and argued that it was still a source of stability in the region. An MFA statement was 
resounding when commenting that the JPKF had provided stability since the signing of the 
ceasefire in 1992.549 There is a degree of credibility in this as the JPKF still operated smoothly 
with interaction between the various sides and, unlike in South Ossetia, the host country’s 
contingent did not withdraw. The JPKF also conducted sporadic training exercises between the 
contingents, which included training in the protection of humanitarian aid, assistance to refugees, 
patrolling, and the fight against terrorist groups.550  
     However, the JPKF also served the purpose of retaining a military foothold in Moldova which 
featured in Russian thinking particularly from the mid-2000s onwards in the context of NATO 
and EU enlargement (Wolff, 2012: 20). This was confirmed by Putin in an interview with 
Kommersant in March 2008, where he pointed out that the maintenance of Moldova’s neutrality 
ruled out ‘the presence of any [foreign] troops on [the] territory’. Putin further explained that ‘We 
can accept the presence of civilian observers, but not military peacekeepers […] Here’s the 
situation. If they leave. Everyone leaves. It can’t be that some leave but then others take their 
place. We do not want to trade the present peacekeepers for any others’.551  
Reconstruction and reconciliation 
 
Russia’s engagement in policies of peacebuilding was directed through the following channels: 
(1) humanitarian aid; (2) trade & investment. This has been heavily politicised because of Russia’s 
attempt to secure economic interests in the region, which was particularly the case during the 
Putin and Medvedev presidencies (Lynch, 2006; Popescu, 2006;). Moscow made attempts to 
build relations with the former Soviet Republics in light of the widening and deepening of 
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European security governance along its borders. Hence, the emphasis of Russia’s aid and trade 
fluctuated between Moldova and Transnistria. Nevertheless, contrary to mainstream commentary, 
Russia’s engagement in this area was not solely to expedite political aims as Russia was aware of 
the spread of instability in its immediate regional space. In this sense, some of these humanitarian 
and economic initiatives were genuine means to cultivate a stable post-conflict environment. The 
nature in which Russia would approach this, however, was largely unilateral and sporadic, relying 
heavily on the OSCE’s and the EU’s development projects.  
     During the 1990s, Russian policy towards the former Soviet Republics aimed to cultivate a 
space of integrated relations via the institutional auspices of the CIS. Under Primakov, Russian 
policy attempted to engage its neighbours on a comprehensive and uniform basis. This included 
Moldova, where Primakov sought to foster further economic relations with Chisinau.552  These 
included the development of several economic projects in Moldova, which were considered a 
means of assistance and a form of bilateral economic engagement.553 However, by the end of 
Yeltsin’s presidency, relations between Russia and Moldova had deteriorated. This was largely 
due to the ongoing issue surrounding the withdrawal of Russian forces and arms from Moldova.  
     Russia’s engagement in the provision of assistance and the cultivation of bilateral economic 
initiatives during Putin’s presidency were driven by an increasingly complex understanding of its 
immediate regional space. The Russian leadership was alert not only to the safeguarding of its 
interests but also recognised the need to maintain stability in the former Soviet space. Russia’s 
behaviour has been far from transparent, with the use of economic levers against Chisinau. During 
Putin’s initial years, Moscow regularly halted gas deliveries to Moldova claiming that this was a 
result of out-standing debts. Russia, however, only resumed delivery after new agreements had 
been signed, which usually involved the increasing of Russia’s shares in the Moldovan gas 
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distribution network (Nygren, 2008: 8). Russia’s behaviour would become increasingly complex 
by the mid-2000s during the period of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova (EUBAM). 
Moscow considered the placing of a stranglehold around the Transnistrian economy as a 
destabilising move, and this border mission also impacted Russia’s regional economic and 
financial interests.  
     In response, Moscow sent a delegation of high ranking Foreign Ministry and economic 
officials, including representatives from Gazprom, to Moldova and convened an urgent meeting 
with President Voronin. This also included the signing of an agreement with Tiraspol on the 
further integration of Russian and Transnistrian businesses, and Moscow contemplated providing 
Tiraspol with a loan of up to $150 million USD.554 Indeed, one Russian official from the Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (CCI) stated that ‘The era of handouts, talk and cheap kisses, including 
economic ones, is over’, and further remarked that ‘When our Dnestr region colleagues say that 
it’s hard to ship goods to Russia and that customs officers are running amok, we intend to address 
all these problems in earnest’.555 Russia stopped gas deliveries to Moldova in January 2006 and 
only after painstaking negations over the restructuring of prices did the delivery of gas resume. 
One scholar pointed out that ‘From a purely economic point of view, this strategy of getting 
whatever is possible from a poor customer is understandable’, but that the net effect was that 
‘Moldova became even more dependent and had less and less ability to pay for gas deliveries’ 
(Nygren, 2008: 8). Moreover, Russia sent what it framed as humanitarian assistance, including 
medical supplies and food, to Tiraspol which aimed to alleviate the humanitarian consequences 
of EUBAM and to discredit Chisinau and the EU. 
     Moscow’s messy involvement in peacebuilding processes continued under Medvedev and 
while Moscow’s thinking was still shaped by a degree of instrumentality to stem the institutional 
tide of NATO and the EU (Wolff, 2012: 20), Moscow’s economic support to Transnistria was not 
as forthcoming as it had been under Putin. With political re-engagement during the Meseberg 
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process (see discussion below) and Tiraspol’s increasing gas debt which by 2011 had reached $3 
billion USD, Russia became increasingly irritated by the Transnistrian leadership’s sense of 
entitlement regarding subsidies and aid (Devyatkov, 2012: 58). Russian officials began to 
participate in the individual working groups of the JCC and delivered genuine aid to Transnistria. 
Russia also launched a formal investigation against Tiraspol based on accusations of fraud in the 
redistribution of Russian humanitarian aid throughout 2008 and 2009 (Devyatkov, 2012: 58). 
Moscow’s delivery of this financial assistance was for the sole purpose of societal rehabilitation 
in the areas of pensions and social/healthcare. Moscow, therefore, halted its assistance in 2010 
only for it to continue in 2011 after Tiraspol had properly allocated the assistance.556 This, 
however, did not improve the status of the settlement process.  
The settlement process 
 
Russia’s engagement in the settlement process in Moldova was arguably more pro-active than in 
Georgia because the Russian leadership did not have to contend with a determined and ultra-
nationalist Moldovan president. Apart from the period between late-2003 and 2008 (triggered by 
the rejection of the Kozak Memorandum), Russia has attempted to cultivate a resolution to the 
conflict. Even though the final understanding of a settlement became more conducive to Russian 
national interests from 2003 onwards, this did not rule out a recognition of a resolution. In this 
sense, ‘freezing’ the settlement process has been less of an objective here than it was from the 
beginning of Putin’s second term in the conflicts in Georgia. Despite this, Russia’s understanding 
of Moldova’s limited sovereignty continued to condition its response towards the post-ceasefire 
peace effort. This was related to the maintenance of a military presence in the region and to what 
Russia considered as its ‘rightful’ responsibility to broker a settlement as self-proclaimed security 
guarantor. From the mid-2000s, for Russia the settlement process in Moldova largely became ‘a 
small part of a wider game of seeking to ensure that Russia’s voice [remained] heard across 
European security matters and especially in the former Soviet Union’ (Lowenhardt, 2003: 108). 
                                                          




     Throughout the 1990s Moscow made genuine attempts to solve the conflict in accordance with 
the other observers of the JCC. While Russia put forward the case of synchronising weapons 
withdrawal with conflict resolution (which was rejected outright by the OSCE and Chisinau), 
Moscow did make efforts to facilitate a political settlement. In early 1993 Yeltsin met with the 
Moldovan leadership and supported Chisinau’s territorial integrity.557 This was followed by a 
meeting organised by Moscow in late February where both parties failed to come to a 
compromise558. At the same time, the 14A’s withdrawal was still an issue, however, Yeltsin made 
it clear that Russia could not simply withdraw it because of the logistical and social problems it 
would create.559 To further complicate matters, the commander of the 14A, General Lebed, 
participated in the Transnistrian general elections violating Moldova’s sovereignty. Crucially, this 
was not a decision made by Moscow but reflected the autonomy of regional commanders at the 
time.560 Moreover, the Russian leadership continued to engage in negotiations with Chisinau 
throughout 1994 and 1995 over the withdrawal of the 14A, and while a timetable for the 
withdrawal of the 14A was agreed, this was not ratified by the Duma. 561 
     Despite this, the Russian leadership remained committed to the facilitation of a settlement 
through the support of draft memorandums presented at the JCC in mid-1996 and mid-1997. 
Although the draft supported Transnistria’s autonomy within Moldova, it failed to initiate a 
positive conversation on a settlement as Chisinau’s leadership refused to take the memorandum 
further pointing out that the document omitted specific details concerning Transnistria’s political 
relationship to Moldova.562 The OSCE viewed this memorandum negatively and argued that it 
was a ‘stone in the road’ because it did not provide any concrete proposals. Moscow disagreed, 
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arguing that it was a stepping stone from which to build a viable settlement based on a 
compromise between the parties.563 Russia continued to put diplomatic pressure on the parties, 
with Yeltsin’s joint presidential statement with the Moldovan leadership declaring the 
inviolability of Chisinau’s sovereignty. The issue of Russian troop withdrawal remained a 
problem as Moscow continued to link this with the implementation of the settlement process. 
During a session of the OSCE’s Permanent Council in Oslo in November 1998 Russia was heavily 
criticised for dragging its heels. Russian officials argued, however, that stability guaranteed by 
the OGRF was necessary for the facilitation of a settlement.564 Although a secure environment 
was necessary to successfully expedite the peace effort, it was solely the JPKF’s responsibility. 
Nevertheless, Russia agreed to commit to a withdrawal of its forces under the OSCE’s Istanbul 
agreement in November 1999 and immediately began to implement the extraction of its forces 
and arms. 565 
     With the beginning of Putin’s first term in office, Russia increased its efforts to expedite a 
settlement via the Primakov Commission, including cooperation with the OSCE to remove and 
dispose of weapons stockpiles. The OSCE wasted no time in creating a working commission to 
prepare a plan for ammunition disposal and established a tripartite commission with Russia and 
local Transnistrian authorities on the issue of weapons disposal.566 Throughout 2002 there were 
several rounds of ammunition and hardware withdrawal from Moldova, although the 
Transnistrian side continued to delay this process arguing that Moscow should compensate them 
for the loss of ammunition and weapons. In this context, Russia looked towards their colleagues 
in the OSCE for understanding regarding the slow rate of arms withdrawal.567 This relatively 
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constructive engagement in the settlement process hardened in 2003 with what can only be 
described as Moscow’s deceitful promotion of the Kozak Memorandum outside of the diplomatic 
channels of the JCC. Putin mislead the OSCE and undermined the painstaking work of the JcC 
throughout 2003 via the secret formulation of its own proposal, which met three conditions: (1) a 
high level of influence for the secessionist entity to the point of creating a dysfunctional state; (2) 
the maintenance of Russia as the central power broker; (3) and a continued Russian military 
presence (Popescu, 2006: 5). 
     Russia was attempting to cultivate a settlement that not only provided a degree of stability but 
also favoured its political interests. According to Lynch (2006: 63), while the ‘proposal raised 
interesting ideas’ it possessed ‘serious weaknesses’. This was because Tiraspol was 
overrepresented in the federal centre ‘to such an extent that Moldova itself would have faced the 
danger of becoming transnistrianised’ and, therefore, it would have been in a position to block 
the movement of Moldova’s potential EU membership (Lynch, 2006: 63). The failure of the 
Kozak Memorandum only strengthened Russia’s growing anxiety about the West’s interference 
in the domestic affairs of states along its border. The remaining years of Putin’s presidency 
showed a Russia that was largely dis-engaged from the settlement process – even though it 
accepted the inclusion of the EU and US as observers in the JCC. Indeed, the Russian leadership 
acknowledged but politely declined the plan proposed by Kiev in April 2005 which was 
enthusiastically supported by Chisinau. The Plan aimed to federalise Moldova and 
internationalise the peace effort.    
     Moscow’s approach towards the peace effort became more constructive during the Medvedev 
presidency. This was largely a result of the reset in relations between Moscow and Washington, 
and was further cultivated through the Meseberg process in 2010. However, throughout this 
process Russia continued to maintain a line that was agreed during the beginning of Medvedev’s 
presidency: a settlement should be based on a mutual compromise of ‘equality’ and that the OGRF 
and JPKF would only be withdrawn once a settlement had been finalised. With the resumption of 
official talks via the 5+2 format in November 2011 and further meetings in Dublin the following 
year there was a degree of positive re-engagement in the diplomatic process. Yet, by the end of 
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Medvedev’s presidency the status-quo had crept back into the negotiations. Crucially, this was 
not necessarily a deliberate Russian policy, but rather a reluctant ‘Plan B’ if it could not make 




This chapter has explored Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Moldova-Transnsitria. It was 
argued that Russia’s approach was complex, both diverging from and converging with the norms 
and processes of European conflict management. Russia demonstrated a degree of 
constructiveness in expediting the settlement process. Moscow establishment of the JCC and the 
JPKF were genuine attempts to resolve the conflict – although Russia was alert to the safeguarding 
of its regional interests. In this sense, for Russia’s regional experience, Transnsitria is perhaps the 
most fluid and complicated of settlements Russia has participated in. Indeed, Moscow was a part 
of the problem through its support for Tiraspol. This, however, did not demonstrate a sustained 
level of support for Tiraspol. Rather Russia demonstrated a degree of engagement in the policies 
of security governance as developed in European conflict management. Nevertheless, Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict was always going to be ambiguous as a result of its competing security 






























Summary of thesis 
Argument  
 
The thesis has explored the extent Russia’s experience of managing intra-state violence has 
evolved in in accordance with norms and processes of security governance as developed in 
European approaches of conflict management. To reiterate, security governance in Europe has 
been characterised as ‘the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and 
separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the 
issues), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and 
purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes’ (Webber and Croft et al, 2004: 4). The 
engagement in security governance initiated the development of several trends in European 
conflict management. First, through various stages of development operations progressively came 
to possess a humanitarian dimension. The notions of consent and impartiality were relaxed in 
order to protect the mandate and to facilitate humanitarian aspects of an operation. At its extreme, 
this shift was closely intertwined with the second trend, whereby the integrity of state sovereignty 
as a prevalent norm became increasingly contested, particularly if a conflict threatened 
international peace. Again, this went through a tortuous process where learning and the ‘triumph 
of the lack of will’ (Gow, 1997) came at the expense of the protection of civilians. Alongside this, 
the dilemma regarding the balance between territorial integrity and self-determination remained 
increasingly fraught as a result of this focus on human rights, with decisions implemented on an 
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increasingly pragmatic basis. The third trend showed the re-calibration of conflict management 
operations to include a range of methods and operations. At the centre of this expansion of 
responsibilities, was the development of highly integrated peacebuilding strategies and policies 
of post-conflict rehabilitation. This developed in accordance with the fourth trend based on the 
emergence of complex coordination and interaction through the pooling of sovereignty between 
multiple actors, where a consent-based culture of coordination between civil and military aspects 
of a mission developed. While there have been problems with this relationship, this has not 
negated the fact that actors considered such coordination a necessity and continued to engage in 
policies of civil-military interaction.  
     This thesis has argued that Russia’s post-Soviet behaviour towards the mitigation of intra-state 
conflict has shown a selective engagement in the policies of security governance developed in 
European conflict management. It has demonstrated that Russia’s behaviour has been conditioned 
by a convergence with and a divergence from these broad evolutionary trends in European conflict 
management. During the period of study between 1991 and 2012 Russia’s approach was far more 
expansive and complex than currently recognised by the existing literature. Moscow’s behaviour 
demonstrated a coherence that reflected some of the core aspects of the policies of security 
governance which have evolved in European conflict management. Crucially, Russian approaches 
have shown a tendency to traverse both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security behaviour, 
with a selective subscription to the methods and aims across the spectrum of operations developed 
in the European experience. This has been driven by a policy that combines the staunch defence 
of its sovereign identity and national interests with a declared commitment to collective European 
approaches that have attempted to manage the impact of globalisation in the policy area of conflict 
management. In this regard, the thesis has demonstrated that while Russia’s wider policy agenda 
may have gravitated towards Westphalian preferences about how to approach the impact of 
globalisation, its behaviour in the policy area of conflict management has shown a more nuanced 
picture of its security preferences. This follows that both Westphalian and Post-Westphalian states 
typically share an interest in effective policies of security governance in the management of 
conflict.       
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     In terms of Russia’s engagement in the wider European neighbourhood, chapter’s 3 and 4 
demonstrated a largely consistent Russian approach that gravitated towards a middle-ground 
between Westphalian and Post-Westphalian security provision. Russia’s engagement in the peace 
efforts in the Balkans was crucial for the development of its wider experience in conflict 
management. In relation to the pooling of sovereignty and stakeholder interaction complexity, 
throughout the missions in the Balkans Moscow participated in the pooling of sovereignty through 
diverse channels of interaction complexity at both the diplomatic and operational levels. Russia 
was conscious of steering collective action away from an exclusive reliance on Western 
institutions – although it had to accept NATO’s increasing leadership as the missions progressed, 
which was a bitter pill for the Russian leadership to swallow as it remained opposed to a NATO-
centred system of European security governance. Russia also contributed to the cultivation of a 
culture of civilian-military coordination. However, it was more comfortable interacting with 
agencies affiliated with or in the UN as Russia remained suspicious of the activities of NGOs and 
considered many of them a hindrance to the credibility of the peace efforts.  
     In Russia’s regional experience, its behaviour has demonstrated a degree of ambiguity 
although this has not been a consistent characteristic of its response. Russia’s involvement in 
regional conflict management has evolved in stages where an adherence to its doctrinal 
understanding has fluctuated due to its uneven policy towards its immediate regional space. The 
tension between its contribution towards European security governance and the safeguarding of 
its national interests became gradually more acute in Russia’s approach towards the former Soviet 
space. Russia found it increasingly difficult – particularly from the mid-2000s onwards – to accept 
the widening and deepening of European security governance along its border. As a consequence, 
its approach has not only revealed a manipulation of methods attributed to both forms of security 
provision noted above, but also demonstrated a continuity mirroring its behaviour towards 
conflict in the wider European neighbourhood. This challenges existing scholarship which 
interprets Russia’s regional experience as a highly calibrated response that only serves Russia’s 





Based on this argument, this has made the following contributions. Given that the existing 
literature on Russian conflict management is predominantly focused on its regional experience 
between the early to mid-1990s, the thesis has filled a gap in the existing literature by offering an 
extensive empirical treatment of Russian behaviour. To elucidate continuity and change in its 
behaviour, this has been based on an interrogation of Moscow’s approach across its immediate 
regional space and the wider European neighbourhood from the early 1990s to 2012. The research 
has therefore provided a rounded understanding of Russia’s approach towards conflict 
management in the European context by exploring how Russia’s approach has evolved in 
accordance with European policies and practices. This has been ‘operationalised’ through a 
comparative multi-case study analysis to provide an informative understanding of Russian 
behaviour in the European context, which the existing literature has thus far failed to provide 
because of its focus largely on Russia’s regional experience based on a narrow timeframe between 
the early to mid-1990s. Where attempts have been made to offer an analysis of Russia’s 
experience in the wider European neighbourhood based on its engagement in the Balkans, these 
have only offered an insight into Russia’s general Balkan policy rather than a rigorous inspection 
of Russian conflict management. This research has helped to make further sense of Russia’s post-
Soviet foreign and security policy as the issues dealt with in this policy area reflect the wider 
ongoing debates between Moscow and the central actors of European security governance. 
     Alongside this empirical contribution, this thesis has also added to the conceptual significance 
of the growing body of literature on security governance and its relation to the broader discipline 
of IR and Security Studies. First, the project has complemented existing debates in the security 
governance literature by assessing Russian foreign and security policy in accordance with the 
Westphalian/Post-Westphalian tradition in the security governance literature, and through this has 
examined Russia’s interaction with the evolution of security governance across time and space in 
the specific policy area of conflict management. Going beyond existing works which only provide 
general analysis of Russia and European security governance, this thesis has therefore examined 
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the specifics of an issue area to offer a close conceptual and empirical inspection of Russia’s 
approach towards security governance. Second, this thesis has contributed towards the wider 
disciplines of IR and Security Studies based on the application of security governance to frame 
the research project. While security governance has not enjoyed the same level of acceptance as 
its established theoretical siblings, such as security communities, institutions and regimes, and 
global governance, this thesis has complemented a growing literature on security governance 
which continues to highlight the conceptual and analytical purchase of understanding security 
decision-making and policy implementation through a governance lens.   
 
Limitations and avenues for future research 
Limitations 
 
Although this project delivered clear results, potential shortcomings in the research design and 
outcome relating to methods, generalisability, timeframe and focus must be acknowledged. First, 
access to information proved to be a difficult task via the use of semi-structured interviews. The 
fieldwork conducted in Moscow (see Appendix A for further detail) failed to produce substantial 
returns from relevant sources such as the MFA and the MoD, which were responsible for the 
policy area of conflict management. While this was due to trust issues typical of government 
institutions and ministries, it was also because government bodies in Russia did not operate in a 
culture where interviews were offered to external researchers. As such, there was no access to the 
practitioners and policymakers involved in the case studies used in this project. Nevertheless, 
although access would have enhanced the quality of the empirical data, a reliance on extensive 
documentary analysis meant that the research project was still viable.  
     Second, like most interpretivist research, the project can be accused of lacking generalizable 
conclusions. It was possible to achieve this when analysing Russian conflict management in the 
European context because the project employed a rigorous multi-case study analysis. However, 
this was less so when offering conclusions on Russian foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the 
system of European security governance. This was because the project only focused on one policy 
area to elucidate trends in this wider relationship. Nevertheless, while this would have been a 
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major limitation if the goal had been to provide novel conclusions about Russia’s political and 
security relationship with European security governance, in the project’s defence its original 
contribution to knowledge was situated at the policy area level of analysis. Hence, the study made 
it explicitly clear that its research on the policy area of conflict management would be used to 
complement an existing view in the academic debate on Russia and European security 
governance. It is acknowledged, however, that although other issues pertinent to the wider 
relationship were touched upon in chapter 1, there is certainly room for further possibilities of 
research into other policy areas to produce more substantive conclusions about Russian foreign 
and security policy (discussed below). Third, because the project covered the full spectrum of 
conflict management operations and methods in the Russian experience, the analysis may have 
lacked detail at times. In the project’s defence, it was necessary to tackle existing conclusions in 
the literature which were of a general nature. Therefore, a holistic approach was necessary to 
ensure that existing claims in the literature were rigorously challenged. Crucially, now that this 
line of research has been undertaken, it has allowed the possibility for further research into one 
specific method and/or operation of Russian conflict management.  
     Finally, the project’s timeframe may have restricted the analysis and limited the significance 
of the thesis’ contributions. The study provided an interrogation of the evolution of Russian 
conflict management in the broader context of Moscow’s relationship with the system of 
European security governance; however, this was confined to the period from the early 1990s to 
the end of Medvedev’s presidency in mid-2012. While this study has gone a long way to provide 
an ‘up-to-date’ treatment of Russia’s experience of conflict management vis-à-vis the existing 
body of literature, it can still be considered a ‘snapshot’ in time where any developments beyond 
2012 are not considered. This is important since the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have raised 
vital questions concerning Russia’s response to intra-state violence and its political and security 
relationship with the central actors of European security governance (and the West more broadly). 
Yet, besides the obvious problem of playing catch-up with events if the research had focused on 
these conflicts, it would be imprudent to ignore the thesis’ conclusions as the experiences Russia 
gained from its involvement in the conflicts analysed in this study have become deeply ingrained 
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in its understanding and practice of conflict management. In short, these experiences cannot be 
erased from the institutional memory of Russia’s power ministries. As will be discussed further 
below, it is unlikely that Moscow’s response to both emergencies represents a watershed in 
Russian conflict management. Likewise, while the present period is potentially the lowest point 
in relations between Russia and its Western counterparts since the height of the Cold War 
(although not comparable), this has not ruled out a future rapprochement. Indeed, if the first two 
decades after the end of the East-West confrontation reveals anything, it is that there is evidence 
of an almost institutionalised cyclical pattern of agreement and disagreement between Russia and 
the West.  
Possibilities 
 
Considering the above limitations, there are several possibilities for future avenues of research. 
The first relates to the issue of generalisability and considers the potential exploration of multiple 
policy areas as case studies to assess developments in Russia’s post-Soviet relationship with the 
central actors of European security governance. The framework of security governance would be 
applied to each policy area to examine Russian behaviour across the dimensions of the framework 
as outlined in this thesis. Potential policy areas would include conflict management, other non-
traditional security threats such as terrorism and trans-national crime, and more conventional 
issues relating to non-proliferation and arms control. This would be a comprehensive project that 
would require extensive research and resources. However, its exploration into Russian behaviour 
across multiple policy areas would provide the necessary methodological rigour required to offer 
generalizable conclusions about Russia’s relationship with the central actors of European security 
governance. A further possibility would be to provide a deeper empirical and conceptual 
investigation into a single method/operation employed by Russia when managing intra-state 
conflict. As a largely under-developed and neglected topic in existing studies, this research would 
potentially focus on Moscow’s engagement in peacebuilding as a feature of its approach to 
conflict management. Again, this project would replicate the research design used in this thesis 
to assess Russia’s understanding and practice of peacebuilding both as a mechanism to manage 
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conflict and as a means to fulfil certain foreign policy aims. In this regard, the research would use 
the same case studies across Russia’s immediate regional space and the wider European 
neighbourhood as featured in this project.  
     The final avenue is perhaps the most important line of enquiry and will receive the most 
attention. This relates to an analysis of Russian conflict management beyond the timeframe of 
this study to include further intra-state conflicts Russia has responded to. As briefly mentioned 
above, this study has gone far to provide a rigorous up-to-date assessment of Russian conflict 
management, but has not taken this beyond 2012 to include an examination of recent events in 
Syria and Ukraine. Indeed, how Russia has approached the violence in these regions is pertinent 
to the wider significance of this study in terms of its engagement in conflict management and its 
wider external policy. First, this relates to whether Russia’s response has signalled a fundamental 
shift in Moscow’s foreign policy thinking; and, second, whether this shift has been reflected in its 
understanding and practice of conflict management vis-à-vis European (and wider Western) 
approaches. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an extensive reply to these 
enquiries, some thoughts will be offered on the emerging academic and policy debate. 
     The extent Russia’s response to the conflicts has signalled a wider shift in its foreign policy 
thinking is a central question which has steered the emerging academic and policy debate. Russia 
has been accused by the West of obstructing international action in Syria and for engaging, 
alongside President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in a brutal fight against opposition forces; and has 
been charged with the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine and the fuelling of the violence in the 
Donbass region to secure strategic and political interests. It has been argued by Western 
policymakers that Russian action in Syria and Ukraine demonstrate its wider foreign policy goal 
of tearing down the existing international order.568 A comparable evaluation of Russia’s behaviour 
has also been advocated by certain political commentary, which sum up Moscow’s behaviour as 
an aggressive power play aiming to re-establish its regional and global role in the face of 
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longstanding rules of international order (Allison, 2014: 1255; Giles, Hanson, and Lyne et al., 
2015: vi; Giles, 2016: 2-3; Stent, 2016; Wilson, 2014: 197). There is a decree of credibility in 
these assessments. First, since the end of the Cold War a realist undertone has featured in Russian 
foreign policy thinking, becoming more prominent from the mid- to late 2000s, and has continued 
under the current Putin presidency. Second, Moscow has showed signs of a ‘push-back’ against 
the largely Western dominated international order, which has become increasingly less palatable 
for the Russian leadership.  
     However, these readings continue to overlook the ongoing tension between the logics driving 
Moscow’s behaviour. As highlighted in this thesis and pointed out by one expert commentator 
‘Russian foreign policy is marked by a complex interplay between an attachment to sovereign 
autonomy on the one hand and interdependent approaches to regional and global security 
problems on the other’ (Averre, 2016: 718). This has been expressed in Moscow’s existing 
national security strategy, which affirms its independent sovereign identity but points out its role 
as a robust international actor in resolving global problems and responsibly upholding 
international law.569 Lavrov has articulated this position further, where his vision of a ‘post-West 
world order’ put forwards the idea that each country ‘develops its own sovereignty within the 
framework of international law and will strive to balance their own national interests with those 
of their partners’.570 While these aims are not necessarily incompatible, it could be put forward 
that in Russia’s case a friction has escalated in recent years between these two ingredients at the 
centre of Russian foreign policy thinking.  
     Moscow’s involvement in Syria and Ukraine is potentially a product of this increasing friction. 
In the case of Syria, certain commentators point out Russia’s strategic and economic interests 
with Damascus alongside its concerns regarding the erosion of its power/influence vis-à-vis the 
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West (Charap, 2013: 37; Giles, 2016). While these factors feature in Moscow’s decision-making, 
other scholars offer more thoughtful assessments about Russian views on domestic and 
international order. In the former, it has been argued that Russia relates regime change in Syria 
with concerns about the legitimacy of its own domestic order (Allison, 2013; Lukyanov, 2016: 
35-36). In the latter, it has been put forward that Russia’s opposition to regime change refers to 
its support for a negotiated, pluralist global order based on international law as the chief ordering 
mechanism of stability (Averre and Davies, 2015). These debates have featured in assessments 
on Russia’s response to the conflict in Ukraine, with policymakers and scholars arguing that 
Moscow has employed a strategy to challenge the existing regional European order (Allison, 
2014; Wilson, 2014) and to pursue hegemony over the post-Soviet space (Giles, Hanson, and 
Lyne et al., 2015: vi). While acknowledging that Russia has exercised a controversial approach 
to Ukraine and violated the latter’s sovereignty, other commentary is less inclined to consider this 
a turning point towards an aggressive revisionism in Russia’s external policy. Scholarship has 
argued that its overreaction is due to the importance of Ukraine in Russian foreign policy thinking 
where Kyiv is considered crucial for the development of its ‘great power’ status and enhanced 
engagement with its immediate external environment (Tsygankov, 2015: 2). Russian protestations 
about a Western-inspired coup in Kyiv to legitimise its behaviour do not stand up to scrutiny (see 
Allison 2014), but Russian arguments relate to deeper grievances which cannot be dismissed and 
concern the ‘profound, systemic problems in the organisation of European security’,571 
highlighting the necessity of a transparent and ‘indivisible’ space of Euro-Atlantic security based 
on the revisiting, and not the ‘tearing down’, of regional relations via the Helsinki principles.572  
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     While Russia’s relationship with its Western counterparts has potentially reached its lowest 
point since the Cold War, the fundamental logics driving current Russian policy have their roots 
in the last two and a half decades based on common themes raised by the Yeltsin, Putin and 
Medvedev presidencies as outlined in this thesis. Moscow has laid down a normative marker 
against certain features of the West’s interpretation of international order, but this is not an 
outright rejection of the existing status quo. In the European context and in case of Ukraine, 
Moscow is not calling for the wholesale revision of the norms and rules regulating European 
security governance. As highlighted by one academic expert, Russia’s ‘desire to avoid isolation 
and calls for what amounts to co-management of the European security order […] suggests a 
reluctance to return to a détente-like co-existence of two hostile orders’ (Averre, 2016: 718). 
Although further research is required, views advocating that Russia foreign policy is experiencing 
a seismic shift in its foreign policy thinking should be treated with caution. Instead, what we are 
potentially witnessing is a greater unwillingness in Moscow to accept an increasingly 
marginalised role in European affairs through its inability to shape regional models of security 
governance.  
     This brings us to the next point of enquiry on whether Russia’s response to Syria and Ukraine 
has also demonstrated a shift in its approach to conflict management. An answer in the affirmative 
would assume that Moscow’s responses to these conflicts can be considered cases of Russian 
conflict management rooted in existing experiences explored in this study. This requires further 
unpacking and while a lengthy analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis a few thoughts will be 
provided. In the case of Syria, Russia’s response has reflected the complexity of the conflict on 
the ground based on the following scenarios: (1) a civil war between government and opposition 
forces; (2) and the fight against regional and international terrorism. Prior to its military 
intervention in September 2015, Russian behaviour was largely guided by the sovereign consent 
and territorial integrity of Syria which featured in its legacy of conflict management. Russia 
demonstrated an agreement with its Western counterparts regarding the principles of sovereign 
responsibility as enshrined in the R2P, but remained in disagreement over their implementation 
and thus blocked any forcible international action against the Assad regime (Averre and Davies, 
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2015: 822). Russia promoted a softer response to deal with atrocities and violence based on 
diplomacy, fact finding missions, and the facilitation of the humanitarian process. This 
demonstrated continuities with its response to the Balkan conflicts, and indeed with its regional 
experiences prior to its politicisation of the settlement processes of these conflicts from the mid-
2000s onwards.  
     Yet, with government setbacks in Syria throughout 2014 and 2015, Russia’s decision to 
intervene militarily was a determined (although reactionary) move to support the collapsing Assad 
regime. Russia’s shift away from focusing on softer measures to the use of overwhelming force 
has been an attempt to ‘change the facts on the ground’, meaning a revision of the balance of 
power between the opposing parties in favour of government forces. Although the norm of 
sovereignty has certainly featured as a guiding principle in its experience of conflict management, 
Moscow’s ongoing response in Syria is qualitatively different where increased instability 
(through the targeting of population centres and infrastructure) are considered acceptable costs 
for the long-term goals of preserving regime stability and a functioning Syrian state. This is 
certainly a departure and an escalation from its legacy of conflict management explored in this 
study, and there are grounds to suggest that this should be considered a specifically tailored 
response to a conflict Moscow deems of vital importance to its present and future role in 
international relations. Throwing further doubt on the assessment that Russian action is 
demonstrative of a definitive change in its approach to conflict management, is its engagement in 
the fight against IS which it considers a form of counter-terrorism distinct from policies of conflict 
management. 
     Russia’s involvement in Ukraine has also raised pertinent questions regarding its conflict 
management approach. Demonstrating the continued relevance of the thesis’ analysis and 
conclusions, Moscow’s response has reflected the logics of its regional experience from the mid-
2000s onwards where a degree of ambivalence began to increasingly shaped its behaviour. In 
Ukraine, this has been driven by the aim of cultivating a degree of stability in the context of 
securing vital national interests in the region. These have included a humanitarian justification 
for the protection of Russia’s diaspora and other regional populations, which has been both 
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promoted for genuine reasons and used instrumentally to secure economic interests and the key 
political aim of preventing the extension of European security governance to its immediate 
neighbourhood. However, certain readings of Russia’s behaviour have argued that it has been a 
highly calibrated response and an escalation of previous tactics to destabilise Ukraine (Freedman, 
2014; Giles, 2015; Mankoff, 2014). Besides Russia’s calculated intervention in Crimea (see 
Allison, 2014), there is some validity in these conclusions as one of Russia’s aims has been to 
steer Ukraine away from the central institutions of European security governance. Moscow has 
also exercised a strategy of deniability and has continued to support pro-Russian groups through 
the sustained use of force against government forces.  
     However, there are positive trends in its behaviour and while this may seem controversial in 
light of the above (and largely contested by Western academic opinion), Russia has shown a 
degree of engagement in the humanitarian and political processes. This has been demonstrated 
through Russia’s participation in the Normandy Format and the Trilateral Contact Group, where 
it has sought to facilitate a compromised settlement based on the Geneva document of April 2014. 
This has, however, provided Russia with the continued leverage over the negotiations and a voice 
in the future sovereignty of Ukraine and linking this to Russia’s problematic view of the limited 
sovereignty of its immediate regional neighbours which increasingly gained traction from the 
mid-2000s onwards (Davies, 2016: 737). Nevertheless, alongside this, Moscow has engaged in 
the regular delivery of aid to the regions – although this remains a contentious issue as Russia has 
not always been transparent about its deliveries and cooperation with the ICRC has been sporadic 
(Davies, 2016: 739-740).  
     In this regard, further analysis is required to provide a sensible and thorough judgement about 
whether Russia’s response to this conflict should be considered another case study in its post-
Soviet experience of conflict management. This reflects the complexity of Russia’s approach to 
the conflict, where on the one hand Moscow has considered this an arena of contestation with its 
European counterparts due to the importance of Ukraine in its foreign policy thinking. Yet, Russia 
has continued to engage in methods of conflict management which have featured in its responses 
to the Balkan conflicts and its regional experience. This points to the continued relevance of the 
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thesis’ conclusions by offering a conceptually and empirically rigorous context from which to 
explain certain aspects of Russia’s response. As mentioned above, Moscow’s experiences of 
conflict management in the European context cannot be erased from the institutional memory of 
Russia’s power ministries, and while its regional behaviour will continue to remain ambivalent 
and controversial this should not be used to generalise its present and future response to the 










































Broadly speaking this thesis has employed a qualitative approach to interrogate Russia’s 
experience of conflict in the wider European context. This thesis has operationalised such an 
approach to capture the ‘meaning, process, and context’ (Divine, 2002: 197-199) of Russia’s 
doctrine, policy and practice in the issue area of conflict management. This starting point of the 
research design explicitly acknowledges that contrary to quantitative-based research, ‘All 
empirical material’ is subject to ‘different interpretations’ (Divine, 2002: 206) and that ‘the onus 
is on the qualitative researcher to make the interpretation of the data as explicit as possible in the 
development of an argument using systematically gathered data’ (Divine, 2002: 207). This 
interpretivist response to research recognises that although research ‘cannot provide the mirror 
reflection of the social world that positivists strive for’, it can, however, provide access to the 
meanings people, and in this case state-actors, ‘attribute to their experiences and social worlds’ 
(Miller and Glassner, 2004: 126). It is this interpretivist response which has driven the selection 
of three methods. In terms of ‘data’ gathering, this thesis has used the principal method of 
documentary analysis supported using semi-structured interviews. The material gathered has been 
organised using the method of case study analysis, which has been a core driver of the thesis’ 





Case study analysis  
Case study analysis has been a crucial method in this project’s research design and used to 
interrogate Russia’s response towards intra-state violence in the European context. Using case 
study analysis has enabled the research to provide a rich narrative of Russian behaviour in the 
policy area of conflict management and to contribute towards the wider debate on Moscow’s 
relationship with the central actors of European security governance. As Stark and Torrance 
(2005: 33) point out ‘The strength of case study is that it can take an example of an activity – ‘an 
instance of action’ – and use multiple methods and data sources to explore it and interrogate it’. 
In this regard, ‘the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex 
social phenomena’ (Yin, 2003: 3; also see George and Bennett, 2004). Case studies do not 
necessarily provide generalizable ‘findings’, however, but they do ‘illuminate more general 
issues’ (Stark and Torrance, 2005: 33-34) typically based on meticulous empirical analysis. Case 
study analysis has therefore been an invaluable method for this research project. It has enabled 
this thesis to ‘drill’ down into the specifics of Russia’s behaviour across multiple cases in order 
to build a rounded picture of its engagement in the policy area of conflict management. While it 
is acknowledged that case study analysis is not always able to produce generalizable findings 
about a particular subject area, in this research it has allowed the project to identify broad trends 
in Russia’s experience of conflict management in the European context due to the quantity (and 
quality) of cases consulted.  
     Case study selection has been pivotal to the overall contributions made by this research project. 
In this sense, it is necessary to briefly reiterate the thesis’ core contributions. First, the existing 
literature on Russian conflict management is limited because it is restricted to Russia’s behaviour 
in its immediate regional space and is predominantly focused on a narrow timeframe between the 
early to mid-1990s. This severely limits our understanding of Russia’s response to complex intra-
state conflicts, and impacts our understanding of how this has informed Moscow’s wider political 
and security relationship with the central actors of Europe’s system of security governance. As 
such, an exploration of the evolution of Russia’s regional and wider European experiences is 
required to understand Russian conflict management in the European context. Second, this linked 
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to the thesis’ conceptual significance through the project’s use of European security governance 
as a framework to analyse Russian foreign and security policy decision-making and 
implementation at a system level and policy area level of analysis. This will add to the existing 
literature on security governance (particularly in Europe) which continues to advocate the 
conceptual purchase of understanding how security policy is implemented and thought about 
through the lens of governance.  
     The rationale of these contributions has therefore informed the criteria of case study selection 
based on the quantity and quality of the cases. This has been rationalised through: (1) Russia’s 
understanding of Europe’s political and security landscape between its immediate regional space 
and the wider European neighbourhood; (2) the extent and nature of Russian involvement; (3) 
and the relevance to the wider debate on Russia and European security governance  First, multiple 
case studies are required which cover Russia’s European experience of conflict management 
based on its immediate regional space and the wider European neighbourhood. This offers a 
rounded analysis of Russian behaviour in the policy area of conflict management and will 
contribute towards the ongoing debate on Russia and European security governance, including 
the existing literature on the application of security governance. At this stage, several conflicts 
across these spaces present themselves as potential case studies of Russian conflict management. 
In the wider European space the intra-state conflicts in the Balkans, including Croatia and Bosnia 
& Herzegovina and Kosovo, are the obvious choices as these are the only cases which offer any 
meaningful insight into Russia’s conflict management experience outside of its regional space. 
However, Moscow’s immediate regional space presents multiple possibilities of case studies of 
Russian conflict management. These include South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, 
Transnistria-Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan.  
     Now that a selection of potential cases have been identified based on Russia’s understanding 
of the European regional political and security space, it is necessary to refine the selection based 
on the second and third components of the selection criteria. This part of the selection process is 
crucial as it will directly shape the conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis conducted in 
this research project. In relation to the second component, the Balkan conflicts mentioned above 
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offer crucial insights into Russia’s behaviour due to the extent of its involvement in the military, 
humanitarian and diplomatic processes of each individual conflict. Moreover, Russia’s ‘Balkan 
experience’ is crucial for understanding trends in Russian foreign and security policy, particularly 
regarding its relationship to the central actors of European security governance.  
     The selection process in Russia’s immediate regional space is more complicated due to the 
degree of variation of Russia’s involvement across multiple cases of intra-state violence outlined 
above. This relates to the degree and duration of its engagement in the military, humanitarian and 
diplomatic processes of each case of conflict management. Cases have therefore been chosen on 
their capacity to provide sustained informative empirical analysis throughout the duration of the 
timeframe operationalised in this research project. For these reasons, Russia’s involvement in the 
conflicts in Georgia and Moldova have been selected as the most accurate and representative 
cases of Russia’s regional experience of conflict management. South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 
Transnistria offer rich empirical cases not only of developments in the full spectrum of Russia’s 
response to intra-state violence, but also of Moscow’s political and security relationship with the 
evolving system of European security governance. In all cases Russia has been deeply engaged 
in the military aspects of managing the conflicts, has been a central actor in the settlement 
processes and has engaged in some way or another in the humanitarian efforts.  
     Russia has also been engaged in conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. These, 
however, have not offered the same degree of insight as the cases above which provide a superior 
overview of Russian behaviour. Whilst offering a level of insight, Russia’s involvement in the 
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has been limited to diplomatic engagement in and outside of the 
OSCE Minsk Group. Moreover, this case has not been as instructive about Russia’s wider 
relations with its European and wider Western counterparts as the cases outlined above. The 
conflict in Tajikistan as a viable case of Russian conflict management also suffers from similar 
limitations. While Russia responded to the violence through diplomatic and military means, this 
excluded its engagement in the humanitarian process and was limited to a narrow period between 
the early to mid-1990s. As a result, this offered minimal insight into the full spectrum of methods 
and operations in the Russian experience. The exclusion of Tajikistan as a case study of Russian 
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conflict management was also based on the final component of the selection criteria outlined 
above concerning its relevance to the wider debate on Russia and European security governance. 
Indeed, this conflict’s geographical and political/security bearing on Russia and issues of 




This section will provide a brief discussion on the contributions of interviews and then go on to 
discuss my experience of fieldwork in Moscow. Semi-structured interviews have been a central 
research method of this thesis because it has provided the opportunity ‘to collect and rigorously 
examine narrative accounts of social worlds’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 137). Indeed, Sterner 
Kvale (1983: 175) explains that  
 
The qualitative research-interview seeks to describe and understand the meaning of 
central themes in the life-world of the interviewee. The main task in interviewing is to 
understand the meaning of what is said. The interviewer thus registers and interprets what 
is said, as well as how it is said; he must be observant of and able to interpret, vocalization, 
facial expressions and other bodily gestures. 
 
In this regard, it is the ‘flexibility of the interview that makes it so attractive’ (Bryman, 2008: 436) 
where “rambling’ or going off at tangents is often encouraged’ because it provides ‘insights into 
what the interviewee sees as relevant and important’ (Bryman, 2008: 437; Miller and Glassner, 
2004: 127). There are, however, ethical issues which should always be considered when 
conducting semi-structured interviews. The interviewer must be alert not to place ‘undue pressure 
on the person he or she is talking to’ and will even need to be prepared to refrain from pursuing a 
certain ‘line of questioning if it is clearly a source of concern’ (Bryman, 2008: 447). The 
interviewer must also be aware of the ‘reflexivity’ of the interview process and appreciate that 
‘they can never be normal conversations even at the most unstructured end of the spectrum’ 
(Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68). The interviewer is conducting the interview for a purpose 
and, therefore, the researcher whether explicitly or implicitly is constantly comparing what is 
being said with what other persons have said, ‘assessing whether it is something new or something 
which supports other information’ (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68-69). Virtually all interviews 
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are, therefore, bounded in the sense that ‘not everything the respondent might wish to discuss will 
be of interest to the researcher’ (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 68-69). 
     The validity of the interview as a research method is brought into question as a result of issues 
of trust, interpretation and meaning. Interview respondents may ‘sometimes respond to 
interviewers through the use of familiar narrative constructs’ (Miller and Glassner, 2004: 127) in 
order to impress the interviewer. This may lead to exaggerated and inaccurate information which 
is problematic for the empirical credibility of the research project. As Miller and Glassner (2004: 
128) point out ‘[the] interviewee may not trust us, they may not understand our questions, or they 
may purposely mislead us in their responses’. This also concerns problems relating to the scope 
of interpretation ‘where the meaning heard by one individual may not be the same as that intended 
by the speaker’ (Barbour and Schostak, 2004: 42), because the ‘words employed to represent 
experiences, realities, points of view, expressions of self are all open to alternative meanings’ 
(Barbour and Schostak, 2004: 42). 
     In this sense, semi-structured interviews provided a useful secondary method for data 
collection. Where necessary, the interviews conducted were directly used and featured in the 
thesis to illustrate Russian approaches to conflict management. However, as the research project 
developed it became clear that the interviews would largely be used to confirm and corroborate 
the data collected through documentary analysis. The information accessed through interviews 
did not reveal anything more substantive on Russian conflict management that was not already 
uncovered by extensive documentary analysis. However, because this was not known during this 
stage of the research process, interviews were conducted to ensure that every relevant avenue and 
viable means of data collection had been covered and utilised. Nevertheless, the data gathered 
from the interviews contributed to the research process by helping, alongside the use of 
documents, to develop a ‘picture’ of Russian conflict management.  
     This project was based on several interviews conducted with Russian security and foreign 
policy experts and specialists on Russian conflict management. This also included interviews with 
former practitioners and policymakers from the Russian MFA and the MoD, alongside Russian 
UN military observers (see Appendix B). This provided an insight into Russian conflict 
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management doctrine, policy and practice, and to the contours of the wider debate on Russia’s 
external policy and European security governance. The interviews were conducted in two rounds 
of fieldwork in Moscow in autumn 2014 with the support of the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO) and in spring 2015 with the support of the Institute of Europe, 
Russian Academy of Sciences (IERAS). The fieldwork was funded by the EU under the broad 
framework of a Marie Curie Action International Research Staff Exchange scheme (IRES) 
entitled ‘EU in Depth – European Identity, Cultural Diversity and Political Change’. The 
interviews were based on a uniform set of questions – although their sequence would change 
depending on the dynamics of each interview.  
     While the nature of conducting this fieldwork in Moscow was rewarding, it also posed many 
challenges of which some were not overcome.573 The nature of conducting research on such a 
sensitive topic – particularly due to the current political climate between Russia and its Western 
counterparts – proved to be a challenge when approaching potential interview participants. At 
times, there was indeed a degree of suspicion regarding the purpose and nature of my research. 
Nevertheless, the participants which I did interview were relatively relaxed and open with their 
views and answers to my questions. This was helped by my affiliation with two of the premier 
research institutions in Russia – IMEMO and IERAS – which acted as ‘gatekeepers’ during my 
fieldwork process. This affiliation was crucial in providing access to interviewees which may not 
have been forthcoming without this institutional ‘stamp of credibility’. Alongside this, I received 
informal assistance from a doctoral researcher at IMEMO who performed a gatekeeping role and 
helped to arrange and to interpret certain interviews. For some interview participants, the fact that 
I was accompanied by a native Russian speaker made them comfortable and more willing to 
divulge further information.574  
                                                          
573 It should be noted that I can only speak from my own experiences and, therefore, what is detailed here 
may not be in common with the experiences of others who have conducted similar fieldwork in Moscow 
and, indeed, Russia.  
574 The efforts of Pavel Vovkodav, who at the time of the fieldwork was a doctoral research at IMEMO, 
were invaluable to this fieldwork.  
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     Despite this, I was only able to conduct a limited number of interviews and did not gain access 
to the relevant bodies and departments in the MFA and the MoD responsible for the policy area 
of conflict management. Indeed, on the advice of one of my interview participants, the formal 
letter of request to the MoD addressed to the department covering peacekeeping operations did 
not receive a reply. While this was due to issues of trust and the culture of secrecy typical of 
government institutions and ministries, it was also explained by staff at IMEMO and IERAS that 
Russian officials and practitioners did not have the time to offer interviews.  
 
Documentary Analysis  
Documentary analysis has been defined as ‘a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating 
documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material’ 
(Bowen, 2009: 27). As in other analytical methods in qualitative research, documentary analysis 
includes the assessment and interpretation of ‘data’ to produce ‘meaning, gain understanding, and 
develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen, 2009: 27). In the research of this thesis, extensive 
documentary analysis was used to provide a thorough understanding of Russian conflict 
management in the wider European experience. The research consulted a range of sources to 
facilitate a systematic and rigorous content analysis, which was required to form a measured and 
thorough response to the thesis’ research question. It should be noted, however, that although 
some of the primary material listed in the references did not directly feature in the thesis, it was 
used to build an empirical picture of the subject ‘matter’ during the research process.  
     In this sense, documentary analysis was the central method used to carry out this research as 
it provided a means to track change and development of Russian conflict management across both 
space and time. Moreover, the analysis of documents was considered the most effective and viable 
means of gathering data across the project’s several case studies as ‘events’ could no longer be 
observed during this research. For instance, Russia’s engagement in the Balkan conflicts had been 
substantively reduced by the time of this research, and the conflict management formats in 
Georgia were compromised by the mid-2000s and terminated with the conflict in August 2008. 
Access to these ‘sites’ of conflict management was also limited and problematic, and it was 
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questionable whether the research would have gained further understanding from visiting these 
areas that was not already documented. Arguably, fieldwork could have been conducted in 
Moldova-Transnistria; however, the research would have only gained a minimal and narrow 
‘snapshot’ of the case study, which would also have been beyond the project’s timeframe used to 
systematise the rationale of the research.   
     With these constraints in mind, the documents consulted in this study provided a broad and 
detailed coverage; allowing an insight spanning a long period, and many events and settings (Yin, 
1994: 102). When delivering this coverage, the unavoidable presence of reporting and selection 
bias was acknowledged and efforts were used to minimise their impact on the project’s 
contributions and argument. Beginning from the premise that researchers ‘should look at 
documents with a critical eye’ and that documents should not be treated ‘as necessarily precise, 
accurate, or complete recordings of events that have occurred’ (Bowen, 2009: 33), an array of 
documents from multiple Russian and English language sources were used to corroborate and 
verify Russia’s behaviour in each of the case studies of this research project. Moreover, when 
required this was supplemented by expert commentary in the existing academic debate. Overall, 
this collection of sources was used to contextualise Russia’s behaviour in the broader narrative of 
each case study and as a way to gain access to Russia’s practice and understanding of conflict 
management. The primary material used to inform the research of this thesis was, therefore, 
divided into the following three principal sections covering the above aims: ‘catalogues and 
collections’; ‘newspapers and media’; and ‘official foreign policy documents, press releases and 
statements’.  
     In relation to catalogues and collections, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, the Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, and the RFE/RL reports from the Friends and Partners Database 
were particularly useful in providing a selection of the main translated press materials from Russia 
and other former Soviet Republics. These sources included media reporting on Russia’s response 
to the conflicts, and commentary on Russia’s wider relationship with the central actors of 
European security governance. By reporting on developments in each conflict, these helped to 
contextualise the case studies. They also offered crucial insights into the drivers and nature of 
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Russian behaviour through the inclusion of press interviews, statements, and declarations by 
Russian policymakers and diplomatic/military practitioners. These sources also included outlines 
of agreements and treaties pertinent to each case study. Alongside this, the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers edited by Bertrand Ramcharan and The 
Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation edited by Heike Krieger 
were also useful volumes of collated documentation specific to the Balkan case studies. Each 
volume included agreements, statements from leading European and Western actors, reports of 
meeting proceedings of the ICFY, the Contact Group, the UN Security Council, the OSCE, and 
the European Community/Union, and a widely accepted chronological account of events (based 
on this documentation). This helped to build the international context of the Balkan conflicts, 
from which an analysis of Russia’s response was undertaken.  
     The second category regarding newspapers and media was also vital to the execution of this 
research project. The bulk of the research was based on commentary from reporters, alongside 
agreements, statements and press releases from Russian policymakers and diplomatic/military 
practitioners. These were centred around Krasnaya Zvezda, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and Itar Tass 
as arguably the three leading newspapers on matters of Russian foreign and security policy, with 
the former being an official newspaper of the MoD and the latter owned by the Russian 
government. Other Russian newspapers were also consulted, such as Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
Izvestiya, Novye Izvestiya, and Sputnik, although these were only sporadically used. Some of these 
newspapers may be accused with information bias due to their agendas/origins (including some 
of the catalogues above); however, this project is specifically focused on analysing Moscow’s 
behaviour and, therefore, a reliance on these sources to present the Russian position was required. 
These sources also proved useful to elucidate Western viewpoints, particularly in relation to the 
conflicts in the Balkans, and offered extensive detail on the events of the case studies under 
scrutiny. Indeed, while it was necessary to remain alert to biased accounts from press reports, 
other sources were used to contextualise each conflict and to carefully evaluate official Russian 
arguments to minimise the ‘fog’ of documentary research.  
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     Official foreign policy documents, press releases and statements were also consulted. 
Moscow’s position was accessed through Russian Foreign Ministry press releases and statements, 
including articles authored by Russian policymakers and ministers. The Foreign Ministry website 
was accessible and informative, adding another layer of insight into Russian thinking on conflict 
management and foreign policy. However, to achieve a rounded understanding of the political 
and security context of Russia’s official position, the views of the other leading actors, such as 
the OSCE, the Contact Group, and the OHR, in each conflict management operation were also 
consulted and examined. The reports from the UNSG were particularly important because they 
offered a concise chronological account of the case studies, included agreements/treaties made by 
the opposing parties and peacebrokers, and provided crucial observations which helped to 
rigorously navigate the events of each case study. Moreover, UN Security Council Meeting 
proceedings, which included statements from Russian, Western, and high ranking UN officials, 
were also invaluable to enhancing the empirical depth of the cases in the Balkans and in Abkhazia. 
Indeed, when other sources were less informative, these proceedings filled crucial gaps in the 























Appendix B – Interview Participants  
 
 
Arbatova, N. Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, IMEMO 
Baranovsky, V, Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, deputy director of IMEMO 
Danilov, D. Expert in Russian foreign and security policy, IERAS 
Goltz, A. Former reporter for the Krasnaya Zvezda and Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
Gyrtovoi, V. Former Russian peacekeeper in the JPKF, Moldova-Transnistria, 1992-1993 
Kashin, V. Senior Research Fellow, the Center for Comprehensive European and International 
Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics; Senior Researcher, the 
Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS 
Khadorenok, M. Russian defence expert and a retired Colonel 
Kozhokin, E. Professor, MGIMO. He served as deputy chairman of the Security Affairs 
Committee of the Russian Supreme Soviet 
Morozov, Y. Retired Colonel and former UN military observer in former Yugoslavia (19941995) 
and in Georgia/Abkhazia (20002001). Expert on Russian conflict management, and foreign 
and security policy  
Nikitin, A. Expert on Russian conflict management. Professor, IMGIMO and IMEMO 
Nikitina, Y. Associate Professor, MGIMO. Expert on Russian foreign and security policy  
Polikanov, D. Expert in Russian conflict management, PIR Centre  
Reeve, R. Former British diplomat and former Head of the OSCE Observer Mission to Georgia 
2004-2007 
Tarusin, V. Retired Colonel and former UN Military Observer attached to UNPROFOR  
Trubnikov, T. Former Director of the Russian External Intelligence Service, former First Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Russia on CIS Affairs, former Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of Russia to India, retired General, and on the board of directors of IMEMO 
Scherbak, I. Former First Deputy Representative of Russia’s delegation to the UN 
Zagorskii, A. Expert in Russian conflict management, and foreign and security policy 
Zolotarev, P. Deputy Director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian 
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